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Virtuous Choice and Parity
Lincoln College, Oxford.ORCID iD: 0000-0001-9984-7831
Section of Philosophy and Ethics, Eindhoven University of Technology.
2012 (English)In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, ISSN 1386-2820, E-ISSN 1572-8447, Vol. 15, no 1, 71-82 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

This article seeks to contribute to the discussion on the nature of choice in virtue theory. If several different actions are available to the virtuous agent, they are also likely to vary in their degree of virtue, at least in some situations. Yet, it is widely agreed that once an action is recognised as virtuous there is no higher level of virtue. In this paper we discuss how the virtue theorist could accommodate both these seemingly conflicting ideas. We discuss this issue from a modern Aristotelian perspective, as opposed to a purely exegetic one. We propose a way of resolving what seems to be a major clash between two central features of virtue ethics. Our proposal is based on the notion of parity, a concept which recently has received considerable attention in the literature on axiology. Briefly put, two alternatives are on a par (or are 'roughly equal') if they are comparable, although it is not the case that one is better than the other, nor that they are equally good. The advantages of applying the concept of parity to our problem are twofold. Firstly, it sheds new light on the account of choice in virtue theory. Secondly, some of the criticisms that have been mounted against the possibility of parity can be countered by considering the notion of choice from a virtue theory perspective.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2012. Vol. 15, no 1, 71-82 p.
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URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-80588DOI: 10.1007/s10677-011-9273-zISI: 000303476400006ScopusID: 2-s2.0-84858708352OAI: diva2:496474

QP 2012. QC 20130212

Available from: 2012-02-09 Created: 2012-02-09 Last updated: 2013-02-12Bibliographically approved

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Fröding, Barbro
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