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Preference Change and Conservatism: comparing the Bayesian and the AGM models of preference revision
Helsinki Collegium of Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki.
2012 (English)In: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, E-ISSN 1573-0964, Vol. 190, no 14, 2623-2641 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Richard Bradley's Bayesian model of preference kinematics is compared with Sven Ove Hansson's AGM-style model of preference revision. Both seek to model the revision of preference orders as a consequence of retaining consistency when some preferences change. Both models are often interpreted normatively, as giving advice on how an agent should revise her preferences. I raise four criticisms of the Bayesian model: it is unrealistic; it neglects an important change mechanism; it disregards endogenous information relevant to preference change, in particular about similarity and incompleteness; and its representational framework, when expanded with similarity comparisons, may give misleading advice. These criticisms are based on a principle of conservatism, and on two proposals of similarity metrics for the Bayesian model. The performance of the Bayesian model, with and without the similarity metrics, is then tested in three different cases of preference change, and compared to the performance of the AGM model.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2012. Vol. 190, no 14, 2623-2641 p.
Keyword [en]
AGM, Attitude revision, Bayesianism, Conservatism, Consistency, Normative decision theory, Preference change, Rationality, Similarity
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URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-81959DOI: 10.1007/s11229-010-9863-7ISI: 000327144000002ScopusID: 2-s2.0-84888019047OAI: diva2:497794

QC 20140127

Available from: 2012-02-11 Created: 2012-02-11 Last updated: 2014-01-27Bibliographically approved

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Grüne-Yanoff, Till
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