Natural selection and social preferences
2006 (English)In: Journal of Theoretical Biology, ISSN 0022-5193, E-ISSN 1095-8541, Vol. 239, no 1, 79-92 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
A large number of individuals are randomly matched into groups, where each group plays a finite symmetric game. Individuals breed true. The expected number of surviving offspring depends on own material payoff, but may also, due to cooperative breeding and/or reproductive competition, depend on the material payoffs to other group members. The induced population dynamic is equivalent with the replicator dynamic for a game with payoffs derived from those in the original game. We apply this selection dynamic to a number of examples, including prisoners' dilemma games with and without a punishment option, coordination games, and hawk-dove games. For each of these, we compare the outcomes with those obtained under the standard replicator dynamic. By way of a revealed-p reference argument, our selection dynamic can explain certain "altruistic" and "spiteful" behaviors that are consistent with individuals having social preferences.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2006. Vol. 239, no 1, 79-92 p.
natural selection, group selection, social preferences, altruism, reproductive externalities
Mathematics Biological Sciences
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-86706DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2005.07.014ISI: 000235721900008OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-86706DiVA: diva2:500949
QC 201202272012-02-132012-02-132012-02-27Bibliographically approved