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Optimal expected rank in a two-sided secretary problem
Malardalen Univ, Dept Math & Phys.
Malardalen Univ, Dept Math & Phys. (Combinatorics)
Malardalen Univ, Dept Math & Phys.
2007 (English)In: Operations Research, ISSN 0030-364X, E-ISSN 1526-5463, Vol. 55, no 5, 921-931 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

In a two-sided version of the famous secretary problem, employers search for a secretary at the same time as secretaries search for an employer. Nobody accepts being put on hold, and nobody is willing to take part in more than N interviews. Preferences are independent, and agents seek to optimize the expected rank of the partner they obtain among the N potential partners. We find that in any subgame perfect equilibrium, the expected rank grows as the square root of N (whereas it tends to a constant in the original secretary problem). We also compute how much agents can gain by cooperation.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2007. Vol. 55, no 5, 921-931 p.
National Category
Discrete Mathematics
URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-90763DOI: 10.1287/opre.1070.0403ISI: 000250943300009OAI: diva2:506471
QC 20120309Available from: 2012-02-28 Created: 2012-02-28 Last updated: 2012-03-09Bibliographically approved

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Eriksson, KimmoSjöstrand, Jonas
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