Optimal expected rank in a two-sided secretary problem
2007 (English)In: Operations Research, ISSN 0030-364X, E-ISSN 1526-5463, Vol. 55, no 5, 921-931 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
In a two-sided version of the famous secretary problem, employers search for a secretary at the same time as secretaries search for an employer. Nobody accepts being put on hold, and nobody is willing to take part in more than N interviews. Preferences are independent, and agents seek to optimize the expected rank of the partner they obtain among the N potential partners. We find that in any subgame perfect equilibrium, the expected rank grows as the square root of N (whereas it tends to a constant in the original secretary problem). We also compute how much agents can gain by cooperation.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2007. Vol. 55, no 5, 921-931 p.
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-90763DOI: 10.1287/opre.1070.0403ISI: 000250943300009OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-90763DiVA: diva2:506471
QC 201203092012-02-282012-02-282012-03-09Bibliographically approved