On two theorems of Quinzii and rent controlled housing allocation in Sweden
2007 (English)In: International Journal of Game Theory, ISSN 0020-7276, E-ISSN 1432-1270, Vol. 3, no 9, 515-526 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
The Swedish rent control system creates a white market for swapping rental contracts and a black market for selling rental contracts. Empirical data suggests that in this black-and-white market some people act according to utility functions that are both discontinuous and locally decreasing in money. We discuss Quinzii's theorem for the nonemptiness of the core of generalized house-swapping games, and show how it can be extended to cover the Swedish game. In a second part, we show how this theorem of Quinzii and her second theorem on nonemptiness of the core in two-sided models are both special cases of a more general theorem.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2007. Vol. 3, no 9, 515-526 p.
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-90764DOI: 10.1142/S0219198907001576ScopusID: 2-s2.0-34948881190OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-90764DiVA: diva2:506473
QC 201203092012-02-282012-02-282012-03-09Bibliographically approved