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Status and Experience with the Technical Basis and Use of Probabilistic Risk Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission.
VTT.
Relcon Scandpower.
OECD Nuclear Energy Agency.
2010 (English)In: Proc. of PSAM 10: International Probabilistic Safety Assessment & Management Conference, International Association of Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management, paper 47, 2010Conference paper, Published paper (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

Probabilistic safety criteria, including safety goals, have been progressively introduced byregulatory bodies and utilities. They range from high level qualitative statements to technical criteria.They have been published in different ways, from legal documents to internal guides. They can beapplied as legal limits down to “orientation values”. The OECD/NEA Working Group on Risk(WGRISK) prepared a questionnaire on the probabilistic risk criteria for nuclear power plants.Answers were received from 13 nuclear safety organizations and 6 utilities. The reported probabilisticr i s k c r i t e r i a c a n b e g r o u p e d i n t o 4 c a t e g o r i e s , i n r e l a t i o n w i t h t h e t o o l s t o b e u s e d f o r a s s e s s i n gcompliance: core damage frequency, releases frequency, frequency of doses and criteria oncontainment failure. Introduction of probabilistic safety criteria is generally considered to result insafety improvements. Opinion is widespread on the benefits of using probabilistic safety criteria forcommunication with the public, ranging from bad to good experiences. The responses to thequestionnaire suggested that more work should be considered in the definition of releases frequencies:some regulators include a time range (generally 24 hours) in the criterion while others do not limit thet i m e t o b e c o n s i d e r e d . I t i s s u g g e s t e d t h a t , i n t h e f i r s t c a s e , t h e e x i s t i n g P S A s s h o u l d b e r e v i s i t e d t oassess if long development accident sequences were considered

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2010.
Keyword [en]
probabilistic safety criteria, risk criteria, safety goal, nuclear safety
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-90794OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-90794DiVA: diva2:506548
Conference
International Probabilistic Safety Assessment & Management Conference, 7–11 June 2010, Seattle, Washington, USA
Note
QC 20120410Available from: 2012-02-29 Created: 2012-02-29 Last updated: 2012-04-10Bibliographically approved

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http://www.vtt.fi/inf/julkaisut/muut/2010/PSAM10_paper_47_1.pdf

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CiteExportLink to record
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Citation style
  • apa
  • harvard1
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
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More styles
Language
  • de-DE
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More languages
Output format
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  • asciidoc
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