Cryptanalysis of a Universally Verifiable Efficient Re-encryption Mixnet
2012 (English)In: IACR Cryptology ePrint ArchiveArticle in journal (Refereed) Published
We study the heuristically secure mix-net proposed by Puiggal´ı and Guasch (EVOTE2010). We present practical attacks on both correctness and privacy for some sets of parametersof the scheme. Although our attacks only allow us to replace a few inputs, or tobreak the privacy of a few voters, this shows that the scheme can not be proven secure.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-112831OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-112831DiVA: diva2:587567
QC 201302202013-01-142013-01-142015-04-28Bibliographically approved