Randomized Partial Checking Revisited
2012 (English)In: IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, Vol. 2012Article in journal (Other academic) Published
We study mix-nets with randomized partial checking (RPC) as proposed by Jakobsson, Juels, and Rivest (2002). RPC is a technique to verify the correctness of an execution both for Chaumian and homomorphic mix-nets. The idea is to relax the correctness and privacy requirements to achieve a more efficient mix-net.
We identify serious issues in the original description of mix-nets with RPC and show how to exploit these to break both correctness and privacy, both for Chaumian and homomorphic mix-nets. Our attacks are practical and applicable to real world mix-net implementations, e.g., the Civitas and the Scantegrity voting systems.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2012. Vol. 2012
cryptographic protocols, mix-net, election schemes
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-112830OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-112830DiVA: diva2:587568
QC 201305022013-01-142013-01-142013-05-02Bibliographically approved