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Secure Vehicular Communication Systems: Design and Implementation of a Vehicular PKI (VPKI)
KTH, School of Electrical Engineering (EES), Communication Networks.
2012 (English)Independent thesis Advanced level (degree of Master (Two Years)), 20 credits / 30 HE creditsStudent thesis
Abstract [en]

The idea of vehicular communication systems could bring more safety, immunity

and assurance in driving while it poses a variety of applications in traffic efficiency,

driver assistance, environmental hazards, road conditions and infotainment. The aim

is to make driving safer and to facilitate driving to the full extent, even on dangerous

roads. However, having effective and robust operations within the VC system needs an

infrastructure to handle threats, faults, illegitimate activities and unexpected incidents.

Message authentication, integrity, non-repudiation and privacy within such a system are

considered as the most controversial issues from security perspective. The idea is to

protect privacy not only from legal point of view, but also from technical perspective

in terms of using privacy enhancing technologies. To provide security within such a

system, the idea of Public Key Infrastructure is considered as a promising solution.

Using long-term certificates does reveal the real identity of the owner. Since users’

privacy is considered as the main security requirement in the VC system, standard

certificates (X.509) and normal PKI cannot be used within a VC network. There are

some functionalities and features for vehicular communication systems that do not exist

in standard PKI. As a result, using pseudonym certificates to perform transactions within

the VC system is a solution.

In this report, a vehicular public key infrastructure, called VPKI, is proposed. OpenCA

is used as the PKI, equipped with Pseudonym Certificate Authority (PCA), Long-Term

Certificate Authority (LTCA) and Pseudonym Resolution Authority (PRA). These

authorities are certified by the RCA and they have privileges to perform their tasks.

LTCA is responsible for issuing long-term certificates while PCA is responsible for

issuing pseudonym certificates. PRA is the authority to perform pseudonym resolution to

identify the real identity of a pseudonym certificate. When it comes to CRL, PCA is the

responsible authority to determine revoked pseudonym certificates in order to keep the

system secure. Three protocols are then proposed to obtain pseudonym certificates, latest

version of pseudonym CRL as well as performing pseudonym resolution. Obtaining

pseudonym certificates is done in two phases. Firstly, each vehicle sends a request

to LTCA to get a valid token. In the second step, the token is used by PCA to issue

pseudonym certificates.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2012. , 115 p.
EES Examensarbete / Master Thesis, XR-EE-LCN 2012:015
Keyword [en]
Vehicular PKI, Pseudonym CA (PCA), Long-Term CA (LTCA), Pseudonym Resolution
National Category
Electrical Engineering, Electronic Engineering, Information Engineering
URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-119820OAI: diva2:612626
Educational program
Master of Science - Information and Communication Systems Security
Available from: 2013-07-10 Created: 2013-03-22 Last updated: 2013-07-10Bibliographically approved

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