On the interaction between content-oriented traffic scheduling and revenue sharing among providers
2013 (English)In: 2013 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications Workshops (INFOCOM WKSHPS 2013), IEEE Communications Society, 2013, 333-338 p.Conference paper (Refereed)
The Internet consists of economically selfish players in terms of access/transit connection, content distribution, and users. Such selfish behaviors often lead to techno-economic inefficiencies such as unstable peering and revenue imbalance. Recent research results suggest that cooperation in revenue sharing (thus multi-level ISP settlements) can be a candidate solution for the problem of unfair revenue share. However, it is unclear whether providers are willing to behave cooperatively. In this paper, we study the interaction between how content-oriented traffic scheduling at the edge is and how stable the intended cooperation is. We consider three traffic scheduling policies having various degrees of content-value preference, compare them in terms of implementation complexity, network neutrality, and stability of cooperation, and present interesting trade-offs among them.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
IEEE Communications Society, 2013. 333-338 p.
, 2013 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications Workshops, INFOCOM WKSHPS 2013
Content distribution, Implementation complexity, Network neutralities, Recent researches, Revenue-sharing, Techno-economics, Traffic scheduling, Scheduling, Internet service providers
Computer and Information Science
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-133826DOI: 10.1109/INFCOMW.2013.6562870ScopusID: 2-s2.0-84882951103ISBN: 9781479900565OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-133826DiVA: diva2:664856
2013 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications Workshops, INFOCOM WKSHPS 2013; Turin, Italy, 14-19 April 2013
QC 201311182013-11-182013-11-112014-03-13Bibliographically approved