Randomized partial checking revisited
2013 (English)In: Lect. Notes Comput. Sci., 2013, 115-128 p.Conference paper (Refereed)
We study mix-nets with randomized partial checking (RPC) as proposed by Jakobsson, Juels, and Rivest (2002). RPC is a technique to verify the correctness of an execution both for Chaumian and homomorphic mix-nets. The idea is to relax the correctness and privacy requirements to achieve a more efficient mix-net. We identify serious issues in the original description of mix-nets with RPC and show how to exploit these to break both correctness and privacy, both for Chaumian and homomorphic mix-nets. Our attacks are practical and applicable to real world mix-net implementations, e.g., the Civitas and the Scantegrity voting systems.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2013. 115-128 p.
, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, ISSN 0302-9743 ; 7779
Mix-net, Privacy requirements, Voting systems, Cryptography, Voting machines, Computerized tomography
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-134682DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-36095-4_8ScopusID: 2-s2.0-84874341037ISBN: 9783642360947OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-134682DiVA: diva2:677076
Cryptographers' Track at the RSA Conference 2013, CT-RSA 2013, 25 February 2013 through 1 March 2013, San Francisco, CA
QC 201312092013-12-092013-11-272013-12-09Bibliographically approved