Formal Analysis of Secure Neighbor Discovery in Wireless Networks
2013 (English)In: IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, ISSN 1545-5971, E-ISSN 1941-0018, Vol. 10, no 6, 355-367 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
We develop a formal framework for the analysis of security protocols in wireless networks. The framework captures characteristics necessary to reason about neighbor discovery protocols, such as the neighbor relation, device location, and message propagation time. We use this framework to establish general results about the possibility of neighbor discovery. In particular, we show that time-based protocols cannot in general provide secure neighbor discovery. Given this insight, we also use the framework to prove the security of four concrete neighbor discovery protocols, including two novel time-and-location-based protocols. We mechanize the model and some proofs in the theorem prover Isabelle.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2013. Vol. 10, no 6, 355-367 p.
Neighbor discovery, relay attack, formal verification, distance bounding
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-136489DOI: 10.1109/TDSC.2013.17ISI: 000326835700003ScopusID: 2-s2.0-84897785160OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-136489DiVA: diva2:677294
QC 201312092013-12-092013-12-052013-12-09Bibliographically approved