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Formal Analysis of Secure Neighbor Discovery in Wireless Networks
KTH, School of Electrical Engineering (EES), Communication Networks.
2013 (English)In: IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, ISSN 1545-5971, E-ISSN 1941-0018, Vol. 10, no 6, 355-367 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

We develop a formal framework for the analysis of security protocols in wireless networks. The framework captures characteristics necessary to reason about neighbor discovery protocols, such as the neighbor relation, device location, and message propagation time. We use this framework to establish general results about the possibility of neighbor discovery. In particular, we show that time-based protocols cannot in general provide secure neighbor discovery. Given this insight, we also use the framework to prove the security of four concrete neighbor discovery protocols, including two novel time-and-location-based protocols. We mechanize the model and some proofs in the theorem prover Isabelle.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2013. Vol. 10, no 6, 355-367 p.
Keyword [en]
Neighbor discovery, relay attack, formal verification, distance bounding
National Category
Computer Science
URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-136489DOI: 10.1109/TDSC.2013.17ISI: 000326835700003ScopusID: 2-s2.0-84897785160OAI: diva2:677294

QC 20131209

Available from: 2013-12-09 Created: 2013-12-05 Last updated: 2013-12-09Bibliographically approved

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