A faithful distributed implementation of dual decomposition and average consensus algorithms
2013 (English)In: 2013 IEEE 52nd Annual Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), 2013, 2985-2990 p.Conference paper (Refereed)
We consider large scale cost allocation problems and consensus seeking problems for multiple agents in which agents are suggested to collaborate in a distributed algorithm to find a solution. If agents are strategic and minimize their own individual cost rather than the global social cost, they are endowed with an incentive not to follow the intended algorithm, unless the tax/subsidy mechanism is carefully designed. Inspired by the classical Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism and more recent algorithmic mechanism design theory, we propose a tax mechanism that incentivises agents to faithfully implement the intended algorithm. In particular, a new notion of asymptotic incentive compatibility is introduced to characterize a desirable property of such class of mechanisms. The proposed class of tax mechanisms provides a sequence of mechanisms that gives agents a diminishing incentive to deviate from suggested algorithm.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2013. 2985-2990 p.
, IEEE Conference on Decision and Control. Proceedings, ISSN 0743-1546
Mechanism Design, Faithful Implementation, Incentive Compatible
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-138595DOI: 10.1109/CDC.2013.6760337ISI: 000352223503068ScopusID: 2-s2.0-84902324282ISBN: 978-146735717-3OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-138595DiVA: diva2:681494
52nd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2013; Florence; Italy; 10 December 2013 through 13 December 2013
QC 201409122013-12-202013-12-202015-12-08Bibliographically approved