A Heterogeneous Routing Game
2013 (English)In: 2013 51st Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2013, IEEE conference proceedings, 2013, 448-455 p.Conference paper (Refereed)
Most literature on routing games make the assumption that drivers or vehicles are of the same type and, hence, experience the same latency or cost when traveling along the edges of the network. In contrast, in this article, we propose a heterogeneous routing game in which each driver or vehicle belongs to a certain type. The type determines the cost of traveling along an edge as a function of the flow of all types of drivers or vehicles over that edge. We examine the existence of a Nash equilibrium in this heterogeneous routing game. We study the conditions for which the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium can be posed as a convex optimization problem and is therefore numerically tractable. Numerical simulations are presented to validate the results.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
IEEE conference proceedings, 2013. 448-455 p.
Routing Game, Potential Game, Convex Optimization
Transport Systems and Logistics Control Engineering
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-138597DOI: 10.1109/Allerton.2013.6736559ISI: 000350802400063ScopusID: 2-s2.0-84897743316ISBN: 978-147993409-6OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-138597DiVA: diva2:681495
51st Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2013; Monticello, IL; United States; 2 October 2013 through 4 October 2013
QC 201406182013-12-202013-12-202015-12-07Bibliographically approved