Laser Damage Helps the Eavesdropper in Quantum Cryptography
2014 (English)In: Physical Review Letters, ISSN 0031-9007, E-ISSN 1079-7114, Vol. 112, no 7, 070503- p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
We propose a class of attacks on quantum key distribution (QKD) systems where an eavesdropper actively engineers new loopholes by using damaging laser illumination to permanently change properties of system components. This can turn a perfect QKD system into a completely insecure system. A proof-of-principle experiment performed on an avalanche photodiode-based detector shows that laser damage can be used to create loopholes. After similar to 1 W illumination, the detectors' dark count rate reduces 2-5 times, permanently improving single-photon counting performance. After similar to 1.5 W, the detectors switch permanently into the linear photodetection mode and become completely insecure for QKD applications.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2014. Vol. 112, no 7, 070503- p.
Tailored Bright Illumination, Key Distribution, Avalanche Photodiodes, Security, Mechanisms, Photons, Devices, Attack
Other Physics Topics
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-143435DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevLett.112.070503ISI: 000331952500001ScopusID: 2-s2.0-84894494194OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-143435DiVA: diva2:706957
QC 201403242014-03-242014-03-212015-11-30Bibliographically approved