Commuting for meetings
2014 (English)In: Journal of Urban Economics, ISSN 0094-1190, E-ISSN 1095-9068, Vol. 81, 104-113 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Urban congestion causes travel times to exhibit considerable variability, which leads to coordination problems when people have to meet. We analyze a game for the timing of a meeting between two players who must each complete a trip of random duration to reach the meeting, which does not begin until both are present. Players prefer to depart later and also to arrive sooner, provided they do not have to wait for the other player. We find a unique Nash equilibrium, and a continuum of Pareto optima that are strictly better than the Nash equilibrium for both players. Pareto optima may be implemented as Nash equilibria by penalty or compensation schemes.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2014. Vol. 81, 104-113 p.
Congestion, Random travel time variability, Coordination game
Transport Systems and Logistics Economics and Business
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-147054DOI: 10.1016/j.jue.2014.03.002ISI: 000336197400009ScopusID: 2-s2.0-84898756234OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-147054DiVA: diva2:728308
QC 201406242014-06-242014-06-232014-06-24Bibliographically approved