Investigating the Interaction Between Traffic Flow and Vehicle Platooning Using a Congestion Game
2014 (English)In: Proceedings of the 19th IFAC World Congress, 2014 / [ed] Boje, Edward; Xia, Xiaohua, 2014, 4170-4177 p.Conference paper (Refereed)
We consider a congestion game with two types of agents to describe the traffic flow on a road at various time intervals in each day. The first type of agents (cars) maximize a utility which is determined by a sum of a penalty for using the road at a time other than their preferred time interval, the average velocity of the traffic flow, and the congestion tax. The second type of agents (trucks or heavy-duty vehicles) can benefit from using the road together with other second-type agents. This is because the trucks can form platoons to save fuel through reducing the air drag force. We study a Nash equilibrium of this game to study the interaction between the traffic flow and the platooning incentives. We prove that the introduced congestion game does not admit a potential function unless we devise an appropriate congestion taxing policy. We use joint strategy fictitious play and average strategy fictitious play to learn a pure strategic Nash equilibrium of this congestion game. Lastly, we demonstrate the developed results on a numerical example using data from a highway segment in Stockholm.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2014. 4170-4177 p.
, IFAC papers online, ISSN 1474-6670
Heavy-Duty Vehicle Platooning, Atomic Congestion Game, Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium, Learning Algorithm
Control Engineering Transport Systems and Logistics
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-149282DOI: 10.3182/20140824-6-ZA-1003.00847ISBN: 978-3-902823-62-5ISBN: 978-1-63439-456-7OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-149282DiVA: diva2:738765
19th World Congress of the International Federation of Automatic Control (IFAC 2014) 24-29 August 2014, Cape Town, South Africa
QC 201503272014-08-192014-08-192015-03-27Bibliographically approved