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Investigating the Interaction Between Traffic Flow and Vehicle Platooning Using a Congestion Game
KTH, School of Electrical Engineering (EES), Automatic Control. KTH, School of Electrical Engineering (EES), Centres, ACCESS Linnaeus Centre.
KTH, School of Electrical Engineering (EES), Automatic Control. KTH, School of Electrical Engineering (EES), Centres, ACCESS Linnaeus Centre.ORCID iD: 0000-0001-9940-5929
2014 (English)In: Proceedings of the 19th IFAC World Congress, 2014 / [ed] Boje, Edward; Xia, Xiaohua, 2014, 4170-4177 p.Conference paper, Published paper (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

We consider a congestion game with two types of agents to describe the traffic flow on a road at various time intervals in each day. The first type of agents (cars) maximize a utility which is determined by a sum of a penalty for using the road at a time other than their preferred time interval, the average velocity of the traffic flow, and the congestion tax. The second type of agents (trucks or heavy-duty vehicles) can benefit from using the road together with other second-type agents. This is because the trucks can form platoons to save fuel through reducing the air drag force. We study a Nash equilibrium of this game to study the interaction between the traffic flow and the platooning incentives. We prove that the introduced congestion game does not admit a potential function unless we devise an appropriate congestion taxing policy. We use joint strategy fictitious play and average strategy fictitious play to learn a pure strategic Nash equilibrium of this congestion game. Lastly, we demonstrate the developed results on a numerical example using data from a highway segment in Stockholm.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2014. 4170-4177 p.
Series
IFAC papers online, ISSN 1474-6670
Keyword [en]
Heavy-Duty Vehicle Platooning, Atomic Congestion Game, Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium, Learning Algorithm
National Category
Control Engineering Transport Systems and Logistics
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-149282DOI: 10.3182/20140824-6-ZA-1003.00847ISBN: 978-3-902823-62-5 (print)ISBN: 978-1-63439-456-7 (print)OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-149282DiVA: diva2:738765
Conference
19th World Congress of the International Federation of Automatic Control (IFAC 2014) 24-29 August 2014, Cape Town, South Africa
Note

QC 20150327

Available from: 2014-08-19 Created: 2014-08-19 Last updated: 2015-03-27Bibliographically approved

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Johansson, Karl Henrik

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CiteExportLink to record
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Citation style
  • apa
  • harvard1
  • ieee
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Language
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