Unity and Autonomy in Expressivist Logic
2014 (English)In: Dialectica, ISSN 0012-2017, E-ISSN 1746-8361, Vol. 68, no 3, 443-457 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
It is argued that expressivists can solve their problems in accounting for the unity and autonomy of logic - logic is topic independent and does not derive from a general logic' of mental states - by (1) adopting an analysis of the logical connectives that takes logically complex sentences to express complex combinations of simple attitudes like belief and disapproval and dispositions to form such simple attitudes upon performing suppositional acts, and (2) taking acceptance and rejection of sentences to be the common mental denominator in descriptive and evaluative discourse, and structural requirements governing these to be the basis for logic. Such an account requires that attitudes like belief, intention and disapproval can come in hypothetical mode - plausibly linked to the capacity to mentally simulate or emulate one's own attitudes - and, if correct, suggests that these form the basic building blocks for our capacity to understand logically complex sentences.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2014. Vol. 68, no 3, 443-457 p.
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-155148DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12072ISI: 000342744600008ScopusID: 2-s2.0-84908881727OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-155148DiVA: diva2:760954
QC 201411052014-11-052014-10-312014-11-05Bibliographically approved