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Security of smart distribution grids: Data integrity attacks on integrated volt/VAR control and countermeasures
KTH, School of Electrical Engineering (EES), Automatic Control. KTH, School of Electrical Engineering (EES), Centres, ACCESS Linnaeus Centre.ORCID iD: 0000-0001-5491-4068
KTH, School of Electrical Engineering (EES), Communication Networks. KTH, School of Electrical Engineering (EES), Centres, ACCESS Linnaeus Centre.ORCID iD: 0000-0002-4876-0223
KTH, School of Electrical Engineering (EES), Automatic Control. KTH, School of Electrical Engineering (EES), Centres, ACCESS Linnaeus Centre.ORCID iD: 0000-0003-1835-2963
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, USA.
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2014 (English)In: American Control Conference (ACC), 2014, IEEE conference proceedings, 2014, 4372-4378 p.Conference paper, Published paper (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

We examine the feasibility of an attack on themeasurements that will be used by integrated volt-var control(VVC) in future smart power distribution systems. The analysisis performed under a variety of assumptions of adversarycapability regarding knowledge of details of the VVC algorithmused, system topology, access to actual measurements, andability to corrupt measurements. The adversary also faces anoptimization problem, which is to maximize adverse impactwhile remaining stealthy. This is achieved by first identifyingsets of measurements that can be jointly but stealthily corrupted.Then, the maximal impact of such data corruptionis computed for the case where the operator is unaware ofthe attack and directly applies the configuration from theintegrated VVC. Furthermore, since the attacker is constrainedto remaining stealthy, we consider a game-theoretic frameworkwhere the operator chooses settings to maximize observabilityand constrain the adversary action space.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
IEEE conference proceedings, 2014. 4372-4378 p.
National Category
Control Engineering
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-159718DOI: 10.1109/ACC.2014.6859265ISI: 000346492604156Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-84905675031ISBN: 978-1-4799-3272-6 (print)OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-159718DiVA: diva2:787059
Conference
American Control Conference,4-6 June 2014 , Portland, Oregon, USA
Note

QC 20150223

Available from: 2015-02-09 Created: 2015-02-09 Last updated: 2015-11-17Bibliographically approved

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preprint(609 kB)162 downloads
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Teixeira, AndréDán, GyörgySandberg, Henrik

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