Exercise of Market Power on Ramp Rate in Wind-Integrated Power Systems
2015 (English)In: IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, ISSN 0885-8950, Vol. 30, no 3, 1614-1623 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
With an increasing penetration of wind power, there is likely to be an increasing need for fast-ramping generating units. These generators ensure that no load is lost if supply drops due to the uncertainties in wind power generation. However, it is observed in practice that, in a presence of network constraints, fast-ramping generating units are prone to act strategically and exercise market power by withholding their ramp rates. In this paper we model this gaming behavior on ramp rates. We assume a market operator who collects bids in form of marginal costs, quantities, and ramp rates. He runs a ramp-constrained economic dispatch given the generators' bids, forecasted demand, and contingencies. Following the game-theoretic concepts, we set up a multi-level optimization problem. The lower-level problem is the ramp-constrained economic dispatch and the higher-level represents the profit maximization problems solved by strategic generators. The whole problem is formulated as an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC). The outcome of the EPEC problem is a set of Nash equilibria. To tackle the multiple Nash equilibria problem, the concept of the extremal-Nash equilibria is defined and formulated. We model the concept of extremal-Nash equilibria as a single-stage mixed-integer linear programming problem (MILP) and demonstrate the application of this mathematical framework on an illustrative case and on a more realistic case study with tractable results.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2015. Vol. 30, no 3, 1614-1623 p.
Research subject Electrical Engineering
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-165341DOI: 10.1109/TPWRS.2014.2356255ISI: 000353641000053ScopusID: 2-s2.0-84928522523OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-165341DiVA: diva2:808097
QC 201505132015-04-272015-04-272015-06-12Bibliographically approved