Keyed Logic BIST for Trojan Detection in SoC
2014 (English)In: Proceedings of IEEE International Symposium on System-on-Chip (SOC'2014), IEEE conference proceedings, 2014Conference paper (Refereed)
As demonstrated by the recent attack on Intel’s Ivy Bridge processor, the traditional Logic Built-In Self-Test (LBIST) methods do not provide adequate protection of SoC against malicious modifications known as hardware Trojans. In this paper, we introduce a simple but efficient countermeasure against hardware Trojans which exploits non-zero aliasing probability of LBIST. We propose to generate LBIST test patterns based on a configurable key which is decided and programed into the circuit after the manufacturing stage. Since the key and hence expected LBIST signature are unknown at the manufacturing stage, an attack based on selecting suitable values for the Trojan which result in the same signature as a fault-free circuit signature becomes infeasible.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
IEEE conference proceedings, 2014.
BIST, hardware Trojan, countermeasure
Electrical Engineering, Electronic Engineering, Information Engineering
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-165594DOI: 10.1109/ISSOC.2014.6972433ScopusID: 2-s2.0-84919360616ISBN: 978-147996890-9OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-165594DiVA: diva2:808625
International Symposium on System-on-Chip (SOC'2014)
FunderSwedish Foundation for Strategic Research , SM12-0005
QC 201505072015-04-292015-04-292015-06-10Bibliographically approved