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An Expressivist Bilateral Meaning-is-Use Analysis of Classical Propositional Logic
KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
2014 (English)In: Journal of Logic, Language and Information, ISSN 0925-8531, E-ISSN 1572-9583, Vol. 24, no 1, 27-51 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

The connectives of classical propositional logic are given an analysis in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions of acceptance and rejection, i.e. the connectives are analyzed within an expressivist bilateral meaning-is-use framework. It is explained how such a framework differs from standard (bilateral) inferentialist frameworks and it is argued that it is better suited to address the particular issues raised by the expressivist thesis that the meaning of a sentence is determined by the mental state that it is conventionally used to express. Furthermore, it is shown that the classical requirements governing the connectives completely characterize classical logic, are conservative (indeed make the connectives redundant) and separable, are in bilateral harmony, are structurally preservative with respect to the classical coordination requirements and resolve the categoricity problem. These results are taken to show that one can give an expressivist bilateral meaning-is-use analysis of the connectives that confer on them a determinate coherent classical interpretation.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2014. Vol. 24, no 1, 27-51 p.
Keyword [en]
Bilateral logic, Expressivism, Inferentialism
National Category
URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-166965DOI: 10.1007/s10849-014-9209-9ScopusID: 2-s2.0-84925533886OAI: diva2:814820

QC 20150528

Available from: 2015-05-28 Created: 2015-05-21 Last updated: 2015-05-28Bibliographically approved

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