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We Can Believe the Error Theory
KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
2015 (English)In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, ISSN 1386-2820, E-ISSN 1572-8447, Vol. 18, no 3, 453-459 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Bart Streumer argues that it is not possible for us to believe the error theory, where by 'error theory' he means the claim that our normative beliefs are committed to the existence of normative properties even though such properties do not exist. In this paper, we argue that it is indeed possible to believe the error theory. First, we suggest a critical improvement to Streumer's argument. As it stands, one crucial premise of that argument-that we cannot have a belief while believing that there is no reason to have it-is implausibly strong. We argue that for his purposes, Streumer's argument only requires a weaker premise, namely that we cannot rationally have a belief while believing that there is no reason to have it. Secondly, we go on to refute the improved argument. Even in its weaker form, Streumer's argument is either invalid or the crucial premise should be rejected.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2015. Vol. 18, no 3, 453-459 p.
Keyword [en]
Error theory, Bart Streumer, Normative reasons, Belief formation
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URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-168684DOI: 10.1007/s10677-014-9532-xISI: 000354377400003ScopusID: 2-s2.0-84905325896OAI: diva2:818039

QC 20150608

Available from: 2015-06-08 Created: 2015-06-08 Last updated: 2015-06-08Bibliographically approved

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