What not to expect from the pragmatic turn in political theory
2015 (English)In: European Journal of Political Theory, ISSN 1474-8851, E-ISSN 1741-2730, Vol. 14, no 2, 121-140 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
The central ideas coming out of the so-called pragmatic turn in philosophy have set in motion what may be described as a pragmatic turn in normative political theory. It has become commonplace among political theorists to draw on theories of language and meaning in theorising democracy, pluralism, justice, etc. The aim of this paper is to explore attempts by political theorists to use theories of language and meaning for such normative purposes. Focusing on Wittgenstein’s account, it is argued that these attempts are unsuccessful. It is shown that pragmatically influenced political theorists draw faulty epistemological, ontological and semantic conclusions from Wittgenstein’s view in their normative theorising, and it is argued that pragmatically influenced theories of language and meaning, however full of insight, cannot be put to substantial normative use in political theory. The general scope of the thesis is motivated by pointing to the general form of the argument and by moving beyond Wittgenstein to other philosophers of mind and language, illustrating how similar overextensions are made with regard to Robert Brandom’s theory of language and meaning.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2015. Vol. 14, no 2, 121-140 p.
Aletta norval, James tully, Normative political theory, Philosophy of language and meaning, Pragmatic turn, Wittgenstein
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-166890DOI: 10.1177/1474885114537635ScopusID: 2-s2.0-84924910135OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-166890DiVA: diva2:818784
QC 201506092015-06-092015-05-212015-06-09Bibliographically approved