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Keyed Logic BIST for Trojan Detection in SoC
KTH, School of Information and Communication Technology (ICT), Electronics and Embedded Systems.ORCID iD: 0000-0001-7382-9408
2014 (English)In: 2014 INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON SYSTEM-ON-CHIP (SOC)Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

As demonstrated by the recent attack on Intel's Ivy Bridge processor, the traditional Logic Built-In Self-Test (LBIST) methods do not provide adequate protection of SoC against malicious modifications known as hardware Trojans. In this paper, we introduce a simple but efficient countermeasure against hardware Trojans which exploits non-zero aliasing probability of LBIST. We propose to generate LBIST test patterns based on a configurable key which is decided and programed into the circuit after the manufacturing stage. Since the key and hence expected LBIST signature are unknown at the manufacturing stage, an attack based on selecting suitable values for the Trojan which result in the same signature as a fault-free circuit signature becomes infeasible.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
IEEE Press, 2014.
National Category
Electrical Engineering, Electronic Engineering, Information Engineering
URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-171031ISI: 000356507900005ISBN: 978-1-4799-6890-9OAI: diva2:841309
16th International Symposium on System-on-Chip (SoC), OCT 28-29, 2014, Tampere, FINLAND

QC 20150713

Available from: 2015-07-13 Created: 2015-07-13 Last updated: 2015-07-13Bibliographically approved

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Dubrova, Elena
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