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Cognitive Enhancement and the Principle of Need
KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology.ORCID iD: 0000-0001-9984-7831
2015 (English)In: Neuroethics, ISSN 1874-5490, E-ISSN 1874-5504, Vol. 8, no 3, 231-242 p.Article in journal (Refereed) PublishedText
Abstract [en]

In this article we argue that (i) the principle of need, on some interpretations, could be used to justify the spending of publically funded health care resources on cognitive enhancement and (ii) that this also holds true for individuals whose cognitive capacities are considered normal. The increased, and to an extent, novel demands that the modern technology and information society places on the cognitive capacities of agents, e.g., regarding good and responsible decision-making, have blurred the line between treatment and enhancement. More specifically, it has shifted upwards. As a consequence, principles of need on their most reasonable interpretations can be used to support publically funded cognitive enhancement. At least this is so, if broader aims than curing and ameliorating diseases are included in the goals of health care. We suggest that it would be plausible to see health care as accepting such broader goals already today.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Springer, 2015. Vol. 8, no 3, 231-242 p.
Keyword [en]
Cognitive capacities, Egalitarianism, Enhancement, Goals of health care, Principle of need, Prioritizations
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URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-179159DOI: 10.1007/s12152-015-9234-7ISI: 000365128000002ScopusID: 2-s2.0-84947040795OAI: diva2:883213

QC 20151216

Available from: 2015-12-16 Created: 2015-12-11 Last updated: 2015-12-16Bibliographically approved

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