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What distinguishes the practice-dependent approach to justice?
KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
2016 (English)In: Philosophy & Social Criticism, ISSN 0191-4537, E-ISSN 1461-734X, Vol. 42, no 1, 3-23 p.Article in journal (Refereed) PublishedText
Abstract [en]

The practice-dependent approach to justice has received a lot of attention in post-millennium political philosophy. It has been developed in different directions and its normative implications have been criticized, but little attention has been directed to the very distinction between practice-dependence and practice-independence and the question of what theoretically differentiates a practice-dependent account from mainstream practice-independent accounts. The core premises of the practice-dependent approach, proponents argue, are meta-normative and methodological. A key feature is the presumption that a concept of justice is dependent on the function or aim of the social practices to which it is supposed to be applied. Closely related to this meta-normative thesis is an interpretive methodology for deriving principles of justice from facts about existing practices, in particular regarding their point and purpose. These two premises, practice-dependent theorists claim, differentiate their account since (1) they are not accepted by practice-independent accounts and (2) they justify different principles of justice than practice-independent accounts. Our aim in this article is to refute both (1) and (2), demonstrating that practice-independent accounts may indeed accept the meta-normative and methodological premises of the practice-dependent accounts, and that we are given no theoretical reason to think that practice-dependent accounts justify other principles of justice for a practice than do practice-independent accounts. In other words, practice-dependent theorists have not substantiated their claim that practice-dependence is theoretically differentiated from mainstream accounts. When practice-dependent proponents argue for other principles of justice than mainstream theorists, it will be for the usual reason in normative theory: their first-order normative arguments differ.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Sage Publications, 2016. Vol. 42, no 1, 3-23 p.
Keyword [en]
global justice, Aaron James, normative principles, practice-dependence, Andrea Sangiovanni
National Category
Political Science Philosophy
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-180483DOI: 10.1177/0191453715580475ISI: 000366597600001ScopusID: 2-s2.0-84951299629OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-180483DiVA: diva2:895033
Note

QC 20160118

Available from: 2016-01-18 Created: 2016-01-14 Last updated: 2016-01-18Bibliographically approved

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