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Cyber-Secure and Resilient Architectures for Industrial Control Systems
KTH, School of Electrical Engineering (EES), Automatic Control. KTH, School of Electrical Engineering (EES), Centres, ACCESS Linnaeus Centre.
KTH, School of Electrical Engineering (EES), Automatic Control. KTH, School of Electrical Engineering (EES), Centres, ACCESS Linnaeus Centre.ORCID iD: 0000-0003-1835-2963
KTH, School of Electrical Engineering (EES), Automatic Control. KTH, School of Electrical Engineering (EES), Centres, ACCESS Linnaeus Centre.ORCID iD: 0000-0001-9940-5929
2015 (English)In: Smart Grid Security: Innovative Solutions for a Modernized Grid, Elsevier, 2015, 149-183 p.Chapter in book (Other academic)
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Text
Abstract [en]

In this chapter, we survey cyber security solutions for control and monitoring systems that are used to manage the Smart Grid. We start with a short review of the history and use of Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, and how cyber security in control systems has recently become a major concern, in the wake of the Stuxnet and other recently discovered malware. We follow up with surveying information technology and control-centric security tools that can be used to improve the resilience of industrial control systems. Feedback control loops are core components in the Smart Grid, as they enable the maximal utilization of the physical infrastructure and its resources. As the number of control loops in the Smart Grid increases, the cyber security challenges faced by ICSs become increasingly important within the Smart Grid's context. To highlight such novel challenges, we give an overview of the envisioned control loops in future Smart Grids, and discuss the potential impact of cyber threats targeting critical Smart Grid functionalities. As a case study, false-data injection attacks on power transmission networks are considered. The level of resilience to such attacks is assessed through a control-centric risk assessment methodology, which is also used for allocating the deployment of more modern and secure equipment. The chapter ends with a discussion of future research challenges in the area.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Elsevier, 2015. 149-183 p.
Keyword [en]
Industrial Control Systems, Resilient Control, Risk Assessment, Security
National Category
Control Engineering
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-181190DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-12-802122-4.00006-7Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-84943177049ISBN: 9780128023549 (print)OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-181190DiVA: diva2:903571
Note

QC 20160216

Available from: 2016-02-16 Created: 2016-01-29 Last updated: 2016-02-16Bibliographically approved

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Teixeira, AndréSandberg, HenrikJohansson, Karl H.
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