Two Countermeasures Against Hardware Trojans Exploiting Non-Zero Aliasing Probability of BIST
2016 (English)In: Journal of Signal Processing Systems, ISSN 1939-8018, E-ISSN 1939-8115Article in journal (Refereed) Epub ahead of print
The threat of hardware Trojans has been widely recognized by academia, industry, and government agencies. A Trojan can compromise security of a system in spite of cryptographic protection. The damage caused by a Trojan may not be limited to a business or reputation, but could have a severe impact on public safety, national economy, or national security. An extremely stealthy way of implementing hardware Trojans has been presented by Becker et al. at CHES’2012. Their work have shown that it is possible to inject a Trojan in a random number generator compliant with FIPS 140-2 and NIST SP800-90 standards by exploiting non-zero aliasing probability of Logic Built-In-Self-Test (LBIST). In this paper, we present two methods for modifying LBIST to prevent such an attack. The first method makes test patterns dependent on a configurable key which is programed into a chip after the manufacturing stage. The second method uses a remote test management system which can execute LBIST using a different set of test patterns at each test cycle.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Springer Science+Business Media B.V., 2016.
hardware Trojan, hardware security, LBIST
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-183977DOI: 10.1007/s11265-016-1127-4ScopusID: 2-s2.0-84960328861OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-183977DiVA: diva2:913285
FunderSwedish Foundation for Strategic Research , SM14-0016
QP 2016042016-03-212016-03-212016-04-05Bibliographically approved