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Truthful Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing
KTH, School of Information and Communication Technology (ICT).
2016 (English)Independent thesis Advanced level (degree of Master (Two Years)), 20 credits / 30 HE creditsStudent thesis
Abstract [en]

Smart devices have become one of the fundamental communication and computing devices in people's everyday lives over the past decade. Their various sensors and wireless connectivity have paved the way for a new application area called mobile crowdsensing where sensing services are provided by using the sensor outputs collected from smart devices. A mobile crowdsensing system's service quality heavily depends on the participation of smart device users who probably expect to be compensated in return for their participation. Therefore, mobile crowdsensing applications need incentive mechanisms to motivate such people into participating. In this thesis, we first defined a reverse auction based incentive mechanism for a representative mobile crowdsensing system. Then, we integrated the Vickrey-Clarke- Groves mechanism into the initial incentive mechanism so as to investigate whether truthful bidding would become the dominant strategy in the resulting incentive mechanism. We demonstrated by theoretical analysis that overbidding was the dominant strategy in the base incentive mechanism, whereas truthful bidding was the dominant strategy in the derived incentive mechanism when the VCG mechanism was applicable.

Finally, we conducted simulations of both incentive mechanisms in order to measure the fairness of service prices and the fairness of cumulative participant earnings using Jain's fairness index. We observed that both the fairness of service prices and the fairness of cumulative participant earnings were generally better in the derived incentive mechanism when the VCG mechanism was applied. We also found that at least 70% of service requests had fair prices, while between 5% and 85% of participants had fair cumulative earnings in both incentive mechanisms.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2016. , 40 p.
Series
TRITA-ICT-EX, 2016:3
Keyword [en]
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, mobile crowdsensing, truthful incentive mechanism, Jain's fairness index.
National Category
Computer and Information Science
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-188492OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-188492DiVA: diva2:935343
Subject / course
Information and Software Systems
Educational program
Master of Science - Distributed Computing
Supervisors
Examiners
Available from: 2016-06-10 Created: 2016-06-10 Last updated: 2017-04-19Bibliographically approved

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CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

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Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • harvard1
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf