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  • 1.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    Philosophy and History, KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Behavioural Public Policy2015In: Economics and Philosophy, ISSN 0266-2671, E-ISSN 1474-0028, Vol. 31, no 3, p. 500-506Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 2.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Cognitive economics. An interdisciplinary approach2006In: Economics and Philosophy, ISSN 0266-2671, E-ISSN 1474-0028, Vol. 22, no 3, p. 448-455Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 3.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Review of The Structure of Values and Norms, by S.O. Hansson2004In: Economics and Philosophy, ISSN 0266-2671, E-ISSN 1474-0028, Vol. 20, no 2, p. 396-403Article, book review (Refereed)
  • 4.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    Philosophy and History, KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Why behavioural policy needs mechanistic evidence2016In: Economics and Philosophy, ISSN 0266-2671, E-ISSN 1474-0028, Vol. 32, no 3, p. 463-483Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Proponents of behavioural policies seek to justify them as evidence-based'. Yet they typically fail to show through which mechanisms these policies operate. This paper shows - at the hand of examples from economics and psychology - that without sufficient mechanistic evidence, one often cannot determine whether a given policy in its target environment will be effective, robust, persistent or welfare-improving. Because these properties are important for justification, policies that lack sufficient support from mechanistic evidence should not be called evidence-based'.

  • 5.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    et al.
    Philosophy and History, KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Marchionni, Caterina
    Univ Helsinki, Ctr Philosophy Social Sci, Dept Polit & Econ Studies, Unioninkatu 40A, FIN-00014 Helsinki, Finland..
    Feufel, Markus A.
    Tech Univ Berlin, Dept Psychol & Ergon, Div Ergon, Marchstr 23,MAR 3-2, D-10587 Berlin, Germany..
    TOWARD A FRAMEWORK FOR SELECTING BEHAVIOURAL POLICIES: HOW TO CHOOSE BETWEEN BOOSTS AND NUDGES2018In: Economics and Philosophy, ISSN 0266-2671, E-ISSN 1474-0028, Vol. 34, no 2, p. 243-266Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper, we analyse the difference between two types of behavioural policies - nudges and boosts. We distinguish them on the basis of the mechanisms through which they are expected to operate and identify the contextual conditions that are necessary for each policy to be successful. Our framework helps judging which type of policy is more likely to bring about the intended behavioural outcome in a given situation.

  • 6.
    Gustafsson, Johan E.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    An extended framework for preference relations2011In: Economics and Philosophy, ISSN 0266-2671, E-ISSN 1474-0028, Vol. 27, no 2, p. 101-108Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In order to account for non-traditional preference relations the present paper develops a new, richer framework for preference relations. This new framework provides characterizations of non-traditional preference relations, such as incommensurateness and instability, that may hold when neither preference nor indifference do. The new framework models relations with swaps, which are conceived of as transfers from one alternative state to another. The traditional framework analyses dyadic preference relations in terms of a hypothetical choice between the two compared alternatives. The swap framework extends this approach by analysing dyadic preference relations in terms of two hypothetical choices: the choice between keeping the first of the compared alternatives or swapping it for the second; and the choice between keeping the second alternative or swapping it for the first.

  • 7.
    Gustafsson, Johan E.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Erratum: AN EXTENDED FRAMEWORK FOR PREFERENCE RELATIONS (vol 27, pg 101, 2011)2011In: Economics and Philosophy, ISSN 0266-2671, E-ISSN 1474-0028, Vol. 27, no 3, p. 359-367Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 8.
    Hansson, Sven Ove
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Economic (ir)rationality in risk analysis2006In: Economics and Philosophy, ISSN 0266-2671, E-ISSN 1474-0028, Vol. 22, no 2, p. 231-241Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Mainstream risk analysis deviates in at least two important respects from the rationality ideal of mainstream economics. First, expected utility maximization is not applied in a consistent way. It is applied to endodoxastic uncertainty, i.e. the uncertainty (or risk) expressed in a risk assessment, but in many cases not to metadoxastic uncertainty, i.e. uncertainty about which of several competing assessments is correct. Instead, a common approach to metadoxastic uncertainty is to only take the most plausible assessment into account. This will typically lead to risk-prone deviations from risk-neutrality Secondly, risks and benefits for different persons are added to form a total value of risk. Such calculations are used to support the view that one should accept being exposed to a risk if it brings greater benefits for others. This is in stark contrast to modern Paretian welfare economics, that refrains from interindividual comparisons and does not require people to accept a disadvantage because it brings a larger advantage for others.

  • 9.
    Hansson, Sven Ove
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy.
    Philosophical problems in cost-benefit analysis2007In: Economics and Philosophy, ISSN 0266-2671, E-ISSN 1474-0028, Vol. 23, no 2, p. 163-183Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is much more philosophically interesting than has in general been recognized. Since it is the only well-developed form of applied consequentialism, it is a testing-ground for consequentialism and for the counterfactual analysis that it requires. Ten classes of philosophical problems that affect the practical performance of cost-benefit analysis are investigated: topic selection, dependence on the decision perspective, dangers of super synopticism and undue centralization, prediction problems, the indeterminateness of our control over future decisions, the need to exclude certain consequences for moral reasons, bias in the delimitation of consequences, incommensurability of consequences, difficulties in defending the essential requirement of transferability across contexts, and the normatively questionable but equally essential assumption of interpersonal compensability.

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