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  • 1. Grune-Yanoff, Till
    et al.
    Rosencrantz, Holger
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy.
    Beneficial safety decreases2011In: Theory and Decision, ISSN 0040-5833, E-ISSN 1573-7187, Vol. 70, no 2, p. 195-213Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We construct a model of rational choice under risk with biased risk judgement. On its basis, we argue that sometimes, a regulator aiming at maximising social welfare should affect the environment in such a way that it becomes 'less safe' in common perception. More specifically, we introduce a bias into each agent's choice of optimal risk levels: consequently, in certain environments, agents choose a behaviour that realises higher risks than intended. Individuals incur a welfare loss through this bias. We show that by deteriorating the environment, the regulator can motivate individuals to choose behaviour that is less biased, and hence realises risk levels closer to what individuals intended. We formally investigate the conditions under which such a Beneficial Safety Decrease-i.e. a deteriorating intervention that has a positive welfare effect-exists. Finally, we discuss three applications of our model.

  • 2.
    Lindberg, Per Olov
    et al.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Transport Science.
    Smith, Tony E.
    A note on a recent paper by Dagsvik on IIA and random utilities2017In: Theory and Decision, ISSN 0040-5833, E-ISSN 1573-7187, Vol. 82, no 2, p. 305-307Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In a recent paper in this journal, Dagsvik derives the class of independent random utility representations that are "equivalent" to the independence-from-irrelevant-alternatives (IIA) assumption by Luce (Individual choice behavior: a theoretical analysis. Wiley, New York, 1959). In this short note, we clarify the relations between this paper by Dagsvik, and a paper in Lindberg's 2012 thesis.

  • 3. Weibull, Jörgen. W
    et al.
    Mattsson, Lars-Göran
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Transport and Economics (closed 20110301), Transport and Location Analysis (closed 20110301).
    Voorneveld, Mark
    Better may be worse: Some monotonicity results and paradoxes in discrete choice under uncertainty2007In: Theory and Decision, ISSN 0040-5833, E-ISSN 1573-7187, Vol. 63, no 2, p. 121-151Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    It is not unusual in real-life that one has to choose among finitely many alternatives when the merit of each alternative is not perfectly known. Instead of observing the actual utilities of the alternatives at hand, one typically observes more or less precise signals that are positively correlated with these utilities. In addition, the decision-maker may, at some cost or disutility of effort, choose to increase the precision of these signals, for example by way of a careful study or the hiring of expertise. We here develop a model of such decision problems. We begin by showing that a version of the monotone likelihood-ratio property is sufficient, and also essentially necessary, for the optimality of the heuristic decision rule to always choose the alternative with the highest signal. Second, we show that it is not always advantageous to face alternatives with higher utilities, a non-monotonicity result that holds even if the decision-maker optimally chooses the signal precision. We finally establish an operational first-order condition for the optimal precision level in a canonical class of decision-problems, and we show that the optimal precision level may be discontinuous in the precision cost.

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