The aim of this doctoral thesis is to analyze ethical issues in the adoption and implementation of Vision Zero policies. 

The first article analyses criticisms against Vision Zero goals and measures promoted to reach them. We identify and assess “moral”, “operational”, and “rationality-based” arguments against Vision Zero. In total, thirteen different criticisms are analyzed. 

The second article seeks to reconcile the two major decision-making principles in road safety work, i.e., Cost Benefit Analysis and Vision Zero, which are often viewed as incompatible. We argue that the two principles can be compatible if the implementation of Vision Zero accepts temporal compromises intended to promote efficient allocation of resources, and the results of Cost Benefit Analysis are viewed not as optimal and satisfactory as long as fatal and serious injuries continue occurring. 

The third article uses Vision Zero as a normative framework to explore and analyze road safety work in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The ensuing analysis shows that there are significant differences between Addis Ababa road safety policies and Vision Zero in terms of how road safety problems are understood and in their responsibility ascriptions for improving road safety problems. It is argued that enhancing road safety in the city requires promoting a broader view of the causes and remedies of road safety problems. Moreover, given the magnitude and severity of road safety problems in the city, it is vital to emphasize the moral responsibility of actors responsible for the design and operation of the road system, and entities that procure and own large number of vehicles. 

The fourth article analyses equity and social justice considerations in Vision Zero efforts in New York City (NYC). Moreover, this study seeks to understand and assess how the city accounts for equity and social justice implications of road safety work. The result of the study shows that equity and social justice considerations played important roles in the initial adoption of Vision Zero policy in the city. Nonetheless, the study also shows that the adoption and implementation process gave rise to important equity and social justice issues which are primarily related to the method of prioritization used in road safety work in the city, equity and fairness in the distribution of life saving interventions, the socioeconomic impacts of road safety strategies, and the nature of community engagement in policy design and implementation. The findings of this study, among others, point to a need for Vision Zero practitioners to give due considerations to equity and social justice implications of Vision Zero policies and strategies. 

The fifth article analyzes the nature and moral acceptability of risk impositions from car driving in a low-income country context. It is shown that car driving involves an unfair and morally problematic risk imposition in which some stakeholders, namely those who decide on the nature of the risk in the road system and benefit the most from car driving, impose a significant risk of harm on others, who neither benefit from the risk imposition nor have decision-making role related to the risks they are exposed to. It is argued that addressing moral problems arising from the unfair risk imposition necessitates the promotion, on the part of beneficiaries and decision makers, of certain types of moral obligations related to the nature and magnitude of road crash risks. Importantly, those who benefit the most from car driving, and actors who decide on the risk level in the road system, have the moral obligation to implement effective risk reducing measures that protect those unfairly risk exposed, obligations to know more about road crash risks, obligations to compensate victims, obligations to communicate with the risk exposed and incorporate their concerns in policy making, and obligations to bring about attitudinal change. 

In this paper, the Addis Ababa city road safety work is examined and analysed based on the Vision Zero approach to road safety. Government policy documents and available research on the state of road safety in the city are explored and assessed in terms of how they compare with Vision Zero, concerning how road safety problems are conceptualized, the responsibility ascriptions promoted, the nature of goal setting with regards to road safety objectives, and the specific road safety interventions promoted. It is concluded that there is a big difference between the Vision Zero approach to road safety and the Addis Ababa road safety approach in terms how road safety problems are framed and how responsibility ascriptions are made. In Addis Ababa, road safety problems are mainly viewed as individual road user problems and, hence, the responsibility for traffic safety extended to other system components such as the vehicle and road design is very limited. It is argued that in order to find and secure long-term solutions for traffic safety in the city, a paradigm shift is needed, both regarding what are perceived to be the main causes of road safety problems in the city and who should be responsible for ensuring that road fatalities and injuries are prevented.

In this article, the Addis Ababa city road safety policies are examined and analysed based on the Vision Zero approach to road safety work. Three major policy documents are explored and assessed in terms of how they compare with Vision Zero policy in Sweden, concerning how road safety problems are conceptualised, the responsibility ascriptions promoted, the nature of goal setting concerning road safety objectives, and the specific road safety interventions promoted. It is concluded that there is a big difference between the Swedish Vision Zero approach to road safety work and the Addis Ababa road safety approach in terms of how road safety problems are framed and how responsibility ascriptions are made. In Addis Ababa, policy documents primarily frame road safety problems as individual road user problems and, hence, the responsibility for traffic safety is mainly left to the individual road users. The responsibility extended to other system components such as the vehicles, road design, and the operation of the traffic is growing but still very limited. It is argued that in order to find and secure long-term solutions for traffic safety in the city, a paradigm shift is needed, both regarding what are perceived to be the main causes of road safety problems in the city and who should be responsible for ensuring that road fatalities and injuries are prevented.

This paper provides an ethical analysis of risk impositions from car driving in a low-income country context. To this end, a model of ethical risk analysis is used in which stakeholders and their corresponding roles in relation to a risk imposition is used to identify the nature and moral acceptability of risk impositions. I argue that car driving involves a risk imposition in which some stakeholders who decide on and benefit from the risk impositions, impose an unfair risk of harm on other stakeholders who are neither beneficiaries from the risk imposition nor have a decisionmaking role related to the risks they are exposed to. Mainstream ethical theories lack feasible solutions to the moral dilemmas associated with the risk impositions. I argue that addressing the unfair and morally problematic risk impositions requires the promotion certain types of moral obligations associated with the nature and magnitude of the risk impositions. Accordingly, actors who decide on risk level in the road system and, those who benefit from the current risk impositions have the moral obligations to know more about the nature of the risk imposition, to communicate with the unfairly risk exposed, to compensate those who are harmed, and to bring about attitudinal change with regards to the causes and remedies of road safety problems, and to improve safety of those unfairly risk exposed. Most of all, enhancing the safety of children, and pedestrians requires a political and societal commitment to promote effective road safety measures that eliminate major risk factors affecting these groups of road users.

This licentiate thesis discusses moral issues associated with road safety work, with a particular emphasis on the Vision Zero (VZ) goal and its interventions. The licentiate thesis contains three articles and an introduction that briefly discusses issues and arguments presented in the articles.

The first article, identifies, systematically categorizes and evaluates arguments against VZ. Moral, operational, and rationality related criticisms against the adoption and implementation of VZ are identified and discussed.

 The second article in this thesis seeks to reconcile the methods of Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) and VZ in road safety decision making. CBA has been and still is a major decision making tool in road transport and traffic safety work. However, proponents of VZ question the use of CBA in road safety and transport decision making on methodological and ethical grounds. In this paper, we locate the philosophical roots of the conflicting views promoted by proponents of CBA and VZ. Then we try to identify ways through which the two methods can be made compatible.

The third and final paper uses VZ as a normative framework to explore and analyse the Addis Ababa road safety work. The aim of the paper is twofold. First, the paper seeks to examine how road safety problems are actually understood by those responsible for road safety at the local level. To this end, government policy documents, reports and other relevant sources where consulted to identify how road safety problems are framed, who is assigned responsibility for addressing road safety problems and through what interventions. Second, the paper aims to examine road safety work in the city from a normative point of view, i.e., what is the best, or most adequate, way of framing the problem, and who should be given the responsibility for addressing the problem and by what measures. It is argued that enhancing road safety in the city requires adopting a broader view of causes of road safety problems, and emphasizing the responsibility of actors that shape the design and operation of the traffic system and the safety of its components.

This paper analyses how Vision Zero (VZ) efforts in New York City (NYC) account for equity and social justice implications of road safety work. VZ policy documents, research literature, popular science and opinion articles on road safety work in the city were studied with a prime focus on equity and social justice. Twelve semi-structured interviews with stakeholders involved in road safety and transport planning in the city and at national level were conducted to gain an in-depth understanding of policy design, the adoption process, and the role of equity considerations in the city's road safety work. The results show that major equity and social justice issues arise in the adoption and implementation of VZ. These issues are primarily related to equity and fairness in the distribution of life saving interventions, the socio-economic impacts of road safety strategies, and the nature of community engagement in policy design and implementation. The findings point to a need for VZ practitioners to give due considerations to equity and social justice implications of VZ policies and strategies. Among others, it supports the need for understanding the nature of past equity and social justice problems in road safety and transport planning in the VZ policy design process. Moreover, the findings suggest the need for empirical studies on the socio-economic implications of VZ strategies and interventions.

This paper analyses how Vision Zero (VZ) efforts in New York City (NYC) account for equity and social justice implications of road safety work. VZ policy documents, research literature, popular science and opinion articles on road safety work in the city were studied with a prime focus on equity and social justice. Twelve semi-structured interviews with stakeholders involved in road safety and transport planning in the city and at national level were conducted to gain an in-depth understanding of policy design, the adoption process, and the role of equity considerations in the city’s road safety work. The results show that major equity and social justice issues arise in the adoption and implementation of VZ. These issues are primarily related to equity and fairness in the distribution of life saving interventions, the socio-economic impacts of road safety strategies, and the nature of community engagement in policy design and implementation. The findings point to a need for VZ practitioners to give due consideration to equity and social justice implications of VZ policies and strategies. Among others, it supports the need for understanding the nature of past equity and social justice problems in road safety and transport planning in the VZ policy design process. Moreover, the findings suggest the need for empirical studies on the socio-economic implications of VZ strategies and interventions.

Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and Vision Zero are often considered to be incompatible approaches to road traffic safety. The discord between the two can be traced back to basic incompatibilities between utilitarian and deontological modes of moral thinking. However, both have something to contribute. CBA is an expression of the reasonable principle that the resources available for improving traffic safety should be used as efficiently as possible, and Vision Zero expresses the equally reasonable principle that deaths and serious injuries in road traffic are always unacceptable. The two can be reconciled, if due attention is paid to the fact that Vision Zero accepts temporary compromises, albeit not end-goal compromises, and the efficiency analysis of CBA is disassociated from claims of optimality. We propose two ways to reconcile the two approaches. First, the results of a CBA can be presented not only for the currently used life-value but also for alternative, higher life-values. Secondly, essentially the same information can be presented in the form of cost-effectiveness safety analysis (CESA), which reports the economic costs per life saved. We propose that a CESA should be performed for all road traffic projects, not only those that have safety improvement as their main objective. In this way, an economically informed total overview of the impact of Vision Zero in traffic safety can be obtained.

Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and Vision Zero are often considered to be incompatible approaches to road traffic safety. The discord between the two can be traced back to basic incompatibilities between utilitarian and deontological modes of moral thinking. However, both have something to contribute. CBA is an expression of the reasonable principle that the resources available for improving traffic safety should be used as efficiently as possible, and Vision Zero expresses the equally reasonable principle that deaths and serious injuries in road traffic are always unacceptable. The two can be reconciled, if due attention is paid to the fact that Vision Zero accepts temporary compromises, albeit not end-goal compromises, and the efficiency analysis of CBA is disassociated from claims of optimality. We propose two ways to reconcile the two approaches. First, the results of a CBA can be presented not only for the currently used life-value but also for alternative, higher life-values. Secondly, essentially the same information can be presented in the form of cost-effectiveness safety analysis (CESA), which reports the economic costs per life saved. We propose that a CESA should be performed for all road traffic projects, not only those that have safety improvement as their main objective. In this way, an economically informed total overview of the impact of Vision Zero in traffic safety can be obtained.

Despite Vision Zero’s moral appeal and its expansion throughout the world, it has been criticized on different grounds. This chapter is based on an extensive literature search for criticism of Vision Zero, using the bibliographic databases Philosopher’s Index, Web of Science, Science Direct, Scopus, Google Scholar, PubMed, and Phil Papers, and by following the references in the collected documents. Even if the primary emphasis was on Vision Zero in road traffic, our search also included documents criticizing Vision Zero policies in other safety areas, such as public health, the construction and mining industries, and workplaces in general. Based on the findings, we identify and systematically characterize and classify the major arguments that have been put forward against Vision Zero. The most important arguments against Vision Zero can be divided into three major categories: moral arguments, arguments concerning the (goalsetting) rationality of Vision Zero, and arguments aimed at the practical implementation of the goals. We also assess the arguments. Of the thirteen identified main arguments, six were found to be useful for a constructive discussion on safety improvements.

This licentiate thesis is comprised of a “kappa” and two articles. The kappa includes an account of personal autonomy and informed consent, an explanation of how the concepts and articles relate to each other, and a summary in Swedish.

Article 1 treats one problem with the argument that a patient’s consent to treatment is valid only if it is authentic, i.e., if it is “genuine,” “truly her own,” “not out of character,” or similar. As interventions with a patient’s life and liberties must be justified, the argument presupposes that the authenticity of desires can be reliably determined. If the status of a desire in terms of authenticity cannot be reliably determined, discarding the desire-holder’s treatment decision on the basis that it is inauthentic is morally unjustified. In the article, I argue that no theory of authenticity that is present in the relevant literature can render reliably observable consequences. Therefore, the concept of authenticity, as it is understood in those theories, should not be part of informed consent practices.

Article 2 discusses the problem of what it is to consent or refuse voluntarily. In it, I argue that voluntariness should be more narrowly understood than what is common. My main point is that a conceptualization of voluntariness should be agent-centered, i.e., take into account the agent’s view of her actions. Among other things, I argue that an action is non-voluntary only if the agent thinks of it as such when being coerced. This notion, which at first look may seem uncontroversial, entails the counterintuitive conclusion that an action can be voluntary although the agent has been manipulated or coerced into doing it. In defense of the notion, I argue that if the agent’s point of view is not considered accordingly, describing her actions as non-voluntary can be alien to how she leads her life. There are other moral concepts available to describe what is wrong with manipulation and coercion, i.e., to make sense of the counterintuitive conclusion. Voluntariness should be reserved to fewer cases than what is commonly assumed.

It is sometimes argued that autonomous decision-making requires that the decision-maker’s desires are authentic, i.e., “genuine,” “truly her own,” “not out of character,” or similar. In this article, it is argued that a method to reliably determine the authenticity (or inauthenticity) of a desire cannot be developed. A taxonomy of characteristics displayed by different theories of authenticity is introduced and applied to evaluate such theories categorically, in contrast to the prior approach of treating them individually. The conclusion is drawn that, in practice, the authenticity of desires cannot be reliably determined. It is suggested that authenticity should therefore not be employed in informed consent practices in healthcare.

The notion of authenticity, i.e., being “genuine,” “real,” or “true to oneself,” is sometimes held as critical to a person’s autonomy, so that inauthenticity prevents the person from making autonomous decisions or leading an autonomous life. It has been pointed out that authenticity is difficult to observe in others. Therefore, judgments of inauthenticity have been found inadequate to underpin paternalistic interventions, among other things. This article delineates what justifies judgments of inauthenticity. It is argued that for persons who wish to live according to the prevailing social and moral standards and desires that are seriously undesirable according to those standards, it is justified to judge that a desire is inauthentic to the extent that it is due to causal factors that are alien to the person and to the extent that it deviates from the person’s practical identity. The article contributes to a tradition of thinking about authenticity which is known mainly from Frankfurt and Dworkin, and bridges the gap between theoretical ideals of authenticity and real authenticity-related problems in practical biomedical settings.

Respect for autonomy is a central moral principle in bioethics. The concept of autonomy can be construed in various ways. Under the non-ideal conceptualization proposed by Beauchamp and Childress, everyday choices of generally competent persons are autonomous to the extent that they are intentional and are made with understanding and without controlling influences. It is sometimes suggested that authenticity is important to personal autonomy, so that inauthenticity prevents otherwise autonomous persons from making autonomous decisions. Building from Beauchamp and Childress’s theory, this article develops a non-ideal authenticity-based conceptualization of personal autonomy. Factors that indicate inauthentic decision-making are explicated, and the full concept is defended from three expected objections. The theory is then tested on a paradigm case which has concerned theorists and practitioners for some time, namely the possible inauthenticity of anorexia nervosa patients’ decision-making. It is concluded that the theory seems to be fruitful in analyses of the degree of autonomy of patients’ decision-making, and that it succeeds in providing reliable action-guidance in practical contexts.

The aim of this doctoral thesis is to bridge the gap between theoretical ideals of authenticity and practical authenticity-related problems in healthcare. In this context, authenticity means being "genuine," "real," "true to oneself," or similar, and is assumed to be closely connected to the autonomy of persons. The thesis includes an introduction and four articles related to authenticity. The first article collects various theories intended to explain the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity in a taxonomy that enables oversight and analysis. It is argued that (in-)authenticity is difficult to observe in others. The second article offers a solution to this difficulty in one theory of authenticity. It is proposed that under certain circumstances, it is morally justified to judge that the desires underlying a person's decisions are inauthentic. The third article incorporates this proposition into an already established theory of personal autonomy. It is argued that the resulting conceptualization of autonomy is fruitful for action-guidance in authenticity-related problems in healthcare. The fourth article collects nine cases of possible authenticity-related problems in healthcare. The theory developed in the third article is applied to the problems, when this is allowed by the case-description, to provide guidance with regard to them. It is argued that there is not one universal authenticity-related problem but many different problems, and that there is thus likely not one universal solution to such problems but various particular solutions.

Respect for autonomy is a central moral principle in bioethics. It is sometimes argued that authenticity, i.e., being “real,” “genuine,” “true to oneself,” or similar, is crucial to a person’s autonomy. Patients sometimes make what appears to be inauthentic decisions, such as when (decision-competent) anorexia nervosa patients refuse treatment to avoid gaining weight, despite that the risk of harm is very high. If such decisions are inauthentic, and therefore non-autonomous, it may be the case they should be overridden for paternalist reasons. However, it is not clear what justifies the judgment that someone or something is inauthentic. This article discusses one recent theory of what justifies judgments of inauthenticity. It is argued that the theory is seriously limited, as it only provides guidance in three out of nine identified cases. There are at least six authenticity-related problems to be solved, and autonomy theorists thus have reason to engage with the topic of authenticity in practical biomedicine.

Much of contemporary research ethics was developed in the latter half of the twentieth century as a response to the unethical treatment of human beings in biomedical research. Research ethical considerations have subsequently been extended to cover topics in the sciences and technology such as data handling, precautionary measures, engineering codes of conduct, and more. However, moral issues in the humanities have gained less attention from research ethicists. This article proposes an ethical principle for reading for research purposes: Respect the author.

There is a growing need to implement anticipatory climate change adaptation measures, particularly in vulnerable sectors, such as in agriculture. However, setting goals to adapt is wrought with several challenges. This paper discusses two sets of challenges to goals of anticipatory adaptation, of (1) empirical and (2) normative character. The first set of challenges concern issues such as the extent to which the climate will change, the local impacts of such changes, and available adaptive responses. In the second set of uncertainties are issues such as the distribution of burdens to enhance adaptive capacities in vulnerable agents with a legitimate claim to such resources, and what anticipatory adaptation ideally should result in. While previous discussions have been limited to either discuss the first or second set of uncertainties, this paper suggests that both dimensions should be considered when setting goals in social planning with long time frames. A taxonomy will be suggested that combines both dimensions. Furthermore, strategies for managing situations in which there are either empirical, or normative, uncertainties will be proposed which could be used in social decision-making with long planning time-frames in which goals must be set.

In this thesis, the framework within which long-term goals are set and subsequently achieved or approached is analyzed. Sustainable development and climate change are areas in which goals have tobe set despite uncertainties. The analysis is divided into the normative motivations for setting such goals, what forms of goals could be set given the empirical and normative uncertainties, and how tomanage doubts regarding achievability or values after a goal has been set.

Paper I discusses a set of questions that moral theories intended to guide goal-setting should respond to. It is often claimed that existent normative theories provide only modest guidance regarding climate change, and consequently have to be revised or supplemented. Two such suggested revisions or supplements are analyzed in order to determine whether they provide such guidance.

Paper II applies the deep ecological framework to survey the extent to which it can be utilized to discuss issues concerning the management of climate change. It is suggested that the deep ecological framework can provide guidance by establishing a normative framework and an analysis of how the overarching values and principles can be specified to be relevant for actions.

Paper III is focused on normative political theory, and explicates the two dimensions of empirical and normative uncertainty. By applying recent discussions in normative political theory on ideal/non-ideal theory, political realism, and the relation between normative demands and empirical constraints,strategies for managing the proposed goals are suggested.

Paper IV suggests a form of goal that incorporates uncertainties. Cautious utopias allow greater uncertainty than realistic goals (goals that are known to be achievable or approachable, and desirable),but not to the same extent as utopian goals (goals wherein it is highly uncertain whether the goal can actually be achieved). Such goals have a performance-enhancing function. A definition and quality criteria for such goals are proposed.

Paper V considers whether a goal that is becoming all the more unlikely to be achievable should be reconsidered. The paper focuses on the two degrees Celsius target, and asks whether it could still be a sensible goal to aspire to. By applying the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, the role of such obligations is investigated.

Paper VI surveys how to treat circumstances in which an already set goal should be reconsidered and possibly revised, and what would evoke doubt in the belief upon which those goals have been set.Two situations are analyzed: (i) a problematic or surprising event occurs, upsetting confidence in one’s relevant beliefs, or (ii) respectable but dissenting views are voiced concerning one’s means and/or values. It is suggested that the validity of doubt has to be considered, in addition to the level in a goal-means hierarchy towards which doubt is raised.

Sustainable ecosystem management often requires setting goals despite uncertainty regarding the achievability and desirability of the intended state of affairs. Coming to doubt the achievability or desirability of a previously set goal might sometimes, but not always, require reconsidering that goal. There is, however, a need to strike a balance between responsiveness to new information and knowing when to retain goals despite doubts. By critically engaging with adaptive ecosystem management (AEM), as advocated by environmental pragmatist Bryan G. Norton, criteria for warranted reconsideration of long-term goals are investigated. 

Despite the awareness that climate change is an increasingly urgent issue to manage, little is being done to adequately achieve mitigation targets and ambitions. It has been suggested that this is due to ill-equipped normative frameworks and that common concepts, such as responsibility, harm, and justice, collapse when applied to climate change. One perspective has however been missing from this debate – the deep ecological perspective. The paper will investigate the deep ecological view and will argue that it can provide a valuable contribution to normative issues pertaining to climate change.

Social decision-making involving risks ideally results in obligations to avoid expected harms or keep them within acceptable limits. Ambitious goals aimed at avoiding or greatly reducing risks might not to be feasible, forcing the acceptance of higher degrees of risk (i.e., unrealistic levels of risk reduction are revised to comport with beliefs regarding abilities). In this paper, the philosophical principle ‘ought implies can’ is applied to the management of complex risks, exemplified by the risks associated with climate change. In its common interpretation, the principle states that we cannot expect an agent to perform something that lies beyond his or her abilities. However, it is here argued that this principle requires setting thresholds for legitimate claims of inabilities that justify the waiving of normative demands. This paper discuss three claims: (1) that caution is required before revising a risk-reducing goal that is perhaps exceedingly ambitious; (2) that claims on abilities are not only descriptive, but also value-laden; and (3) that the function of a goal has to be clarified before risk-reducing goals are revised. Risk-reducing goals that initially seem unrealistic arguably serve performance-enhancing purposes in risk management. Neglecting such goals could lead to choosing less desirable, but certainly feasible, risk-reducing goals.

The general aim of this licentiate thesis is to analyze the framework in which long-term goals are set and subsequently achieved. It is often claimed that goals should be realistic, meaning that they should be adjusted to known abilities. This thesis will argue that this might be very difficult in areas related to sustainable development and climate change adaptation, and that goals that are, to an acceptable degree, unrealistic, can have important functions.

Essay I discusses long-term goal setting. When there is a great temporal discrepancy between the point in time of setting and achieving a goal, many uncertainties have to be considered. The surrounding world and the agent’s abilities and values might change. This is an ontological uncertainty. We often form beliefs regarding how abilities and values might change, but this belief is always uncertain. This is an epistemological uncertainty. A form of goal called cautiously utopian goals is proposed, which incorporate such uncertainties, but enables goal setting with long time-frames.

Essay II discusses the issue of goals intended to reduce great risks. We cannot expect an agent to do something that lies beyond this agent’s abilities, as exemplified in the principle ‘ought implies can’. Adjusting goals to what we currently, with a high degree of certainty know could be done is difficult. If not including an estimation of how abilities can change, important performance-enhancing functions of goals might be lost. It is argued that very ambitious goals should be set. This is partly due to the great magnitude and likelihood of unwanted consequences and partly due to the difficulty of delineating what lies in agents’ capacity to manage complex risks.

Essay III discusses a decision-facilitating tool Sustainability Analysis to be used by Swedish municipal planners. One sub-part of the tool, Goal Conflict Analysis, can be used to identify how the consequences of a planned adaptation measure will affect other long-term municipal goals. Identified goal conflicts can then be used in order to determine whether the conflicts are acceptable, or whether a different adaptation measure should be worked out. The paper discusses a workshop in a Swedish municipality in which the tool has been tested.

Sustainable development is a common goal in the public sector but may be difficult to implement due to epistemic uncertainties and required long time frames. This paper proposes that some of these problems can be solved by formulating cautious utopias, entailing a relationship between means and goals differing from both utopian and realistic goal-setting. Cautiously utopian goals are believed, but not certain, to be achievable and to remain desirable, but are open to future adjustments due to changing desires and/or factual circumstances. Quality criteria for such goals are suggested.

It is commonly thought that transactions that are the result of voluntary gift-giving do not constitute exploitation. This paper argues that exploitation is indeed possible in such situations, by showing how gift-giving can fulfil the two commonly proposed criteria for exploitation, namely that in an interaction between two persons one receives disproportionally little and the other disproportionally much of the resulting benefits, and that this disproportion is caused by the latter making inappropriate use of a disadvantage of the former. A theoretical approach to what such inappropriate use would amount to in cases of gift-giving is lacking. The paper therefore aims at spelling out such an approach. The method of reflective equilibrium inspires this endeavour, which proceeds by testing intuitions about examples that embody a set of possible conditions. It is concluded that three of the conditions are necessary for exploitation of gift-giving, namely (1) the giver incurs a loss, (2) the recipient has aimed for the gift, and (3) the gift is undeserved.

Essay 1: Traffic research shares a fundamental dilemma with other areas of empirical research in which humans are potentially put at risk. Research is justified because it can improve safety in the long run. Nevertheless, people can be harmed in the research situation. Hence, we need to balance short-term risks against long-term safety improvements, much as in other areas of research with human subjects. In this paper we focus on ethical issues that arise when human beings are directly affected in the performance of research by examining how the ethical requirements in biomedical research can inform traffic research. After introducing the basic ethical requirements on biomedical research, each of the major requirements is discussed in relation to traffic research. We identify the main areas where biomedical research and traffic research differ, and where the ethical requirements from the former cannot easily be transferred to the latter. We then point to some of the issues that need to be addressed for a systematic approach to the ethics of traffic research.

Essay 2: The requirement of always obtaining participants’ informed consent in research with human subjects cannot always be met, for a variety of reasons. In this paper, research situations where informed consent is unobtainable are described and categorised. Some of these kinds of situations, common in biomedicine and psychology, have been previously much discussed, whereas others, more prevalent in for example infrastructure research, introduce new perspectives. The advancement of new technology may lead to an increase in research of these kinds. The paper also provides a review of methods intended to compensate for a lack of consent and their applicability and usefulness for the different categories of situations are discussed, thereby providing insights into one important aspect of relevance for the question of permitting research without informed consent: how well that which informed consent is meant to safeguard can be achieved by other means.

Essay 3: This paper starts with the assumption that it is morally problematic when people in need are offered money in exchange for research participation if the amount offered is unfair. Such offers are called “coercive”, and the degree of coerciveness is said to be determined by the offer’s potential to cause exploitation and its irresistibility. Depending on what view we take on the possibility to compensate for the sacrifices made by research participants, a wish to avoid “coercive offers” leads to policy recommendations concerning payment for participation. For sacrifices considered compensable we ought to offer either no payment or payment at a level deemed fair, while for sacrifices deemed incompensable we always ought to offer no payment.

Essay 4: It is commonly thought that transactions that are the result of voluntary gift-giving do not constitute exploitation. This paper argues that exploitation is indeed possible in such situations, by showing how gift-giving can fulfil the two commonly proposed criteria for exploitation, namely that in an interaction between two persons one receives disproportionally little and the other disproportionally much of the resulting benefits, and that this disproportion is caused by the latter making inappropriate use of a disadvantage of the former. A theoretical approach to what such inappropriate use would amount to in cases of gift-giving is lacking. The paper therefore aims at spelling out such an approach. The method of reflective equilibrium inspires this endeavour, which proceeds by testing intuitions about examples that embody a set of possible conditions. It is concluded that three of the conditions are necessary for exploitation of gift-giving, namely (1) the giver incurs a loss, (2) the recipient has aimed for the gift, and (3) the gift is undeserved.

It is commonly argued that cultural objects ought to be returned to their place of origin in order to remedy injustices committed in the past. In this paper, it is shown that significant challenges attach to this way of arguing. Although there is considerable intuitive appeal in the idea that if somebody wrongs another person then she ought to compensate for that injustice, the principle is difficult (albeit not impossible) to apply to wrongdoings committed many decades or centuries ago. It is not clear that historic injustices can meaningfully be corrected, or compensated for, and there are several arguments why, even in cases where there is a prima facie moral case for compensation, repatriation might not be a legitimate means of remedy. In order to bring analytical clarity to the issue, this paper discusses the various steps of the argument that must be addressed in order to ground a valid repatriation claim based on historic injustices.

This doctoral thesis analyses the concept of risk and how it functions as an organizing principle of discourse, paying close attention to actual linguistic practice.

          Article 1 analyses the concepts of risk, safety and security and their relations based on corpus data (the Corpus of Contemporary American English). Lexical, grammatical and semantic contexts of the nouns risk, safety and security, and the adjectives risky, safe and secure are analysed and compared. Similarities and differences are observed, suggesting partial synonymy between safety (safe) and security (secure) and semantic opposition to risk (risky). The findings both support and contrast theoretical assumptions about these concepts in the literature.

          Article 2 analyses the concepts of risk and danger and their relation based on corpus data (in this case the British National Corpus). Frame semantics is used to explore the assumptions of the sociologist Niklas Luhmann (and others) that the risk concept presupposes decision-making, while the concept of danger does not. Findings partly support and partly contradict this assumption.

          Article 3 analyses how newspapers represent risk and causality. Two theories are used: media framing and the philosopher John Mackie’s account of causality. A central finding of the study is that risks are “framed” with respect to causality in several ways (e.g. one and the same type of risk can be presented as resulting from various causes). Furthermore, newspaper reporting on risk and causality vary in complexity. In some articles, risks are presented without causal explanations, while in other articles, risks are presented as results from complex causal conditions. Considering newspaper reporting on an aggregated overall level, complex schemas of causal explanations emerge.

          Article 4 analyses how phenomena referred to by the term nano (e.g. nanotechnology, nanoparticles and nanorobots) are represented as risks in Swedish newspaper reporting. Theoretically, the relational theory of risk and frame semantics are used. Five main groups of nano-risks are identified based on the risk object of the article: (I) nanotechnology; (II) nanotechnology and its artefacts (e.g. nanoparticles and nanomaterials); (III) nanoparticles, without referring to nanotechnology; (IV) non-nanotechnological nanoparticles (e.g. arising from traffic); and (V) nanotechnology and nanorobots. Various patterns are explored within each group, concerning, for example, what is considered to be at stake in relation to these risk objects, and under what conditions. It is concluded that Swedish patterns of newspaper reporting on nano-risks follow international trends, influenced by scientific assessment, as well as science fiction.

          Article 5 analyses the construction and negotiation of risk in the Swedish controversy over the use of antibacterial silver in health care and consumer products (e.g. sports clothes and equipment). The controversy involves several actors: print and television news media, Government and parliament, governmental agencies, municipalities, non-government organisations, and companies. In the controversy, antibacterial silver is claimed to be a risk object that negatively affects health, the environment, and sewage treatment industry (objects at risk). In contrast, such claims are denied. Antibacterial silver is even associated with the benefit of mitigating risk objects (e.g. bacteria and micro-organisms) that threaten health and the environment (objects at risk). In other words, both sides of the controversy invoke health and the environment as objects at risk. Three strategies organising risk communication are identified: (i) representation of silver as a risk to health and the environment; (ii) denial of such representations; and (iii) benefit association, where silver is construed to mitigate risks to health and the environment.

The concepts of risk, safety, and security have received substantial academic interest. Several assumptions exist about their nature and relation. Besides academic use, the words risk, safety, and security are frequent in ordinary language, for example, in media reporting. In this article, we analyze the concepts of risk, safety, and security, and their relation, based on empirical observation of their actual everyday use. The "behavioral profiles" of the nouns risk, safety, and security and the adjectives risky, safe, and secure are coded and compared regarding lexical and grammatical contexts. The main findings are: (1) the three nouns risk, safety, and security, and the two adjectives safe and secure, have widespread use in different senses, which will make any attempt to define them in a single unified manner extremely difficult; (2) the relationship between the central risk terms is complex and only partially confirms the distinctions commonly made between the terms in specialized terminology; (3) whereas most attempts to define risk in specialized terminology have taken the term to have a quantitative meaning, nonquantitative meanings dominate in everyday language, and numerical meanings are rare; and (4) the three adjectives safe, secure, and risky are frequently used in comparative form. This speaks against interpretations that would take them as absolute, all-or-nothing concepts.

This paper considers electronic monitoring (EM) a promising alternative to imprisonment as a criminal sanction for a series of criminal offenses. However, little has been said about EM from an ethical perspective. To evaluate EM from an ethical perspective, six initial ethical challenges are addressed and discussed. It is argued that since EM is developing as a technology and a punitive means, it is urgent to discuss its ethical implications and incorporate moral values into its design and development.

This licentiate thesis consists of three essays which all concern the ethics of imprisonment and what constitutes an ethically defensible treatment of criminal offenders.

Paper 1 defends the claim that prisoners have a right to privacy. I argue that the right to privacy is important because of its connection to moral agency. For that reasons is the protection of inmates’ right to privacy also warranted by different established philosophical theories about the justification of legal punishment. I discuss the practical implications of this argument. Ultimately I argue the invasion of privacy should be minimized to the greatest extent possible without compromising other important values and rights to safety and security. In defending this position, I argue that respect for inmates’ privacy should be part of the objective of creating and upholding a secure environment to better effect in the long run.

Paper 2 discusses whether the collateral harm of imprisonment to the close family members and children of prison inmates may give rise to special moral obligations towards them. Several collateral harms, including decreased psychological wellbeing, financial costs, loss of economic opportunities, and intrusion and control over their private lives, are identified. Two competing perspectives in moral philosophy are applied in order to assess whether the harms are permissible. The first is consequentialist and the second is deontological, and it is argued that both of them fails and therefore it is hard to defend the position that allowing for these harms would be morally permissible, even for the sake of the overall aims of incarceration. Instead, it is argued that these harms imply that imprisonment should only be used as a last resort. Where it is necessary, imprisonment should give rise to special moral obligations towards families of prisoners. Using the notion of residual obligation, these obligations are defended, categorized and clarified.

Paper 3 evaluates electronic monitoring (EM) from an ethical perspective and discusses whether it could be a promising alternative to imprisonment as a criminal sanction for a series of criminal offenses. EM evaluated from an ethical perspective as six initial ethical challenges are addressed and discussed. It is argued that since EM is developing as a technology and a punitive means, it is urgent to discuss its ethical implications and incorporate moral values into its design and development.

This paper discusses an argument in defense of felon disenfranchisement originally proposed by Andrew Altman, which states that as a matter of democratic self-determination, members of a legitimate democratic community have a collective right to decide whether to disenfranchise felons. Although this argument-which is here referred to as the argument from democratic self-determination-is held to justify policies that are significantly broader in scope than many critics of existing disenfranchisement practices would allow for, it has received little attention from philosophers and political theorists. One exception is Claudio Lpez-Guerra, who recently raised several objections to the argument. In this paper, I argue that the argument from democratic self-determination can avoid Lpez-Guerra's objections. In responding to these, I explicate how and when it can be permissible for a legitimate democratic community to disenfranchise felons. I propose that this is the case only if the disenfranchisement of felons is not intended as a punishment, but as a way to express the view about citizenship one endorses as a democratic collective. I also discuss the implications of the argument in terms of offender reintegration.

This paper discusses whether the collateral harm of imprisonment to the close family members and children of prison inmates may give rise to special moral obligations towards them. Several collateral harms, including decreased psychological wellbeing, financial costs, loss of economic opportunities, and intrusion and control over their private lives, are identified. Two competing perspectives in moral philosophy are then applied in order to assess whether the harms are permissible. The first is consequentialist and the second is deontological. It is argued that both of them fails and therefore it is hard to defend the position that allowing for these harms would be morally permissible, even for the sake of the overall aims of incarceration. Instead, it is argued that these harms imply that imprisonment should only be used as a last resort. Where it is necessary, it should give rise to special moral obligations. Using the notion of residual obligation, these obligations are defended, categorized and clarified.

In this paper my concern is with the collective moral responsibility of criminal investigators for the outcomes of their investigations, bearing in mind that it is important to distinguish collective moral responsibility from, and relate it to, individual moral responsibility. In what sense, if any, are police detectives individually and collectively morally responsible for their success (or, for that matter, their failure) in gathering sufficient evidence to identify, arrest, and charge an offender who has committed a serious crime? Alternatively, in what sense are they morally responsible in cases where they identify, arrest, and charge an innocent person? And in what sense, if any, are police detectives individually and collectively morally responsible for the ultimate outcome of the trial, the finding by the courts of someone they have investigated and charged with a serious crime to be guilty or innocent?

This thesis provides an ethical analysis of imprisonment as a mode of punishment. Consisting in an introduction and four papers the thesis addresses several important questions concerning imprisonment from a number of different perspectives and theoretical starting points. One overall conclusion of this thesis is that imprisonment, as a mode of punishment, deserves more attention from moral and legal philosophers. It is also concluded that a more complete ethical assessment of prison conditions and prison management requires a broader focus. It must include an explicit discussion of both how imprisonment directly affects prison inmates and its negative side-effects on third parties. Another conclusion is that ethical discussions on prison conditions should not be too easily reduced to a question about how harsh or lenient is should be.

Paper 1 argues that prisoners have a right to privacy. It is argued that respect for inmates’ privacy is related to respect for them as moral agents. Consequently, respect for inmates’ privacy is called for by different established philosophical theories about the justification of legal punishment. Practical implications of this argument are discussed and it is argued that invasion of privacy should be minimized to the greatest extent possible, without compromising other important values or the rights to safety and security. It is also proposed that respect for privacy should be part of the objective of creating and upholding a secure environment.

Paper 2 discusses whether the collateral harm of imprisonment to the children and other close family members of prison inmates may give rise to special moral obligations towards them. Several collateral harms, including decreased psychological wellbeing, financial costs, loss of economic opportunities, and intrusion and control over their private lives, are identified. Two perspectives in moral philosophy, consequentialism and deontology, are then applied in order to assess whether these harms are permissible. It is argued that from either perspective it is hard to defend the claim that allowing for these harms are morally permissible. Consequently, imprisonment should be used only as a last resort. Where it is deemed necessary, it gives rise to special moral obligations. Using the notion of residual obligation, these obligations are then categorized and clarified.

Paper 3 focuses on an argument that has figured in the philosophical debate on felon disenfranchisement. This argument states that as a matter of democratic self-determination, a legitimate democratic collective has the collective right to decide whether to disenfranchise felons as a way of defining their political identity. Yet, such a collective’s right to self-determination is limited, since the choice to disenfranchise anyone must be connected to normative considerations of political significance. This paper defends this argument against three charges that has been raised to it. In doing so it also explores under what circumstances felon disenfranchisement can be permissible.

Paper 4 explores the question of whether prison inmates suffering from ADHD should be administered psychopharmacological intervention (methylphenidate) for their condition. The theoretical starting point for the discussion is the communicative theory of punishment, which understands criminal punishment   as a form of secular penance. Viewed through the lens of the communicative theory it is argued that the provision of pharmacological treatment to offenders with ADHD need not necessarily be conceived of as an alternative to punishment, but as an aid to achieving the penological ends of secular penance. Thus, in this view offenders diagnosed with ADHD should have the option to undergo pharmacological treatment.

There is an ongoing debate about the value of virtual friendship. In contrast to previous authorships, this paper argues that virtual friendship can have independent value. It is argued that within an Aristotelian framework, some friendships that are perhaps impossible offline can exist online, i.e., some offline unequals can be online equals and thus form online friendships of independent value.

This article discusses gift authorship, the practice where co-authorship is awarded to a person who has not contributed significantly to the study. From an ethical point of view, gift authorship raises concerns about desert, fairness, honesty and transparency, and its prevalence in research is rightly considered a serious ethical concern. We argue that even though misuse of authorship is always bad, there are instances where accepting requests of gift authorship may nevertheless be the right thing to do. More specifically, we propose that researchers may find themselves in a situation much similar to the problem of dirty hands, which has been frequently discussed in political philosophy and applied ethics. The problem of dirty hands is relevant to what we call hostage authorship, where the researchers include undeserving authors unwillingly, and only because they find it unavoidable in order to accomplish a morally important research goal. 

The connectives of classical propositional logic are given an analysis in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions of acceptance and rejection, i.e. the connectives are analyzed within an expressivist bilateral meaning-is-use framework. It is explained how such a framework differs from standard (bilateral) inferentialist frameworks and it is argued that it is better suited to address the particular issues raised by the expressivist thesis that the meaning of a sentence is determined by the mental state that it is conventionally used to express. Furthermore, it is shown that the classical requirements governing the connectives completely characterize classical logic, are conservative (indeed make the connectives redundant) and separable, are in bilateral harmony, are structurally preservative with respect to the classical coordination requirements and resolve the categoricity problem. These results are taken to show that one can give an expressivist bilateral meaning-is-use analysis of the connectives that confer on them a determinate coherent classical interpretation.

It is argued that truth value of a sentence containing free variables in a context of use (or the truth value of the proposition it expresses in a context of use), just as the reference of the free variables concerned, depends on the assumptions and posits given by the context. However, context may under-determine the reference of a free variable and the truth value of sentences in which it occurs. It is argued that in such cases a free variable has indeterminate reference and a sentence in which it occurs may have indeterminate truth value. On letting, say, x be such that x(2) = 4, the sentence 'Either x = 2 or x = -2' is true but the sentence 'x = 2' has an indeterminate truth value: it is determinate that the variable x refers to either 2 or -2, but it is indeterminate which of the two it refers to, as a result 'x = 2' has a truth value but its truth value is indeterminate. The semantic indeterminacy is analysed in a 'radically' supervaluational (or plurivaluational) semantic framework closely analogous to the treatment of vagueness in McGee and McLaughlin (South J Philos 33: 203-251, 1994, Linguist Philos 27: 123-136, 2004) and Smith (Vagueness and degrees of truth, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008), which saves bivalence, the T-schema and the truth-functional analysis of the boolean connectives. It is shown that on such an analysis the modality 'determinately' is quite clearly not an epistemic modality, avoiding a potential objection raised by Williamson (Vagueness, Routledge, London, 1994) against such 'radically' supervaluational treatments of vagueness, and that determinate truth (rather than truth simpliciter) is the semantic value preserved in classically valid arguments. The analysis is contrasted with the epistemicist proposal of Breckenridge and Magidor (Philos Stud 158: 377-400, 2012) which implies that (in the given context) 'x = 2' has a determinate but unknowable truth value.

It is argued that expressivists can solve their problems in accounting for the unity and autonomy of logic - logic is topic independent and does not derive from a general logic' of mental states - by (1) adopting an analysis of the logical connectives that takes logically complex sentences to express complex combinations of simple attitudes like belief and disapproval and dispositions to form such simple attitudes upon performing suppositional acts, and (2) taking acceptance and rejection of sentences to be the common mental denominator in descriptive and evaluative discourse, and structural requirements governing these to be the basis for logic. Such an account requires that attitudes like belief, intention and disapproval can come in hypothetical mode - plausibly linked to the capacity to mentally simulate or emulate one's own attitudes - and, if correct, suggests that these form the basic building blocks for our capacity to understand logically complex sentences.

Vann McGee has proposed a counterexample to the Ramsey Test. In the counterexample, a seemingly trustworthy source has testified that p and that if not-p, then q. If one subsequently learns not-p (and so learns that the source is wrong about p), then one has reason to doubt the trustworthiness of the source (perhaps even the identity of the source) and so, the argument goes, one has reason to doubt the conditional asserted by the source. Since what one learns is that the antecedent of the conditional holds, these doubts are contrary to the Ramsey Test. We argue that the counterexample fails. It rests on a principle of testimonial dependence that is not applicable when a source hedges his or her claims.

Science, technology, and innovation play crucial roles in the society. Studies on science-technology relationships primarily serve for innovation, competitiveness, and policy. Nevertheless, science-technology relationships in the evolution have been disputed in studies from academic and practical circles, especially from the philosophy of technology. This project aims to investigate science-technology relationships in Sino-Western philosophies of technology, and the hints for innovation, competitiveness, and policy. This paper launches and argues on a theoretical framework for science-technology relationships: (i) technology emerges earlier than science; (ii) science and technology are different but closely connected; (iii) science and technology engage in dynamic interaction; (iv) science-technology interaction takes various forms in its complex progress of nonlinearity and diversification; and (v) science-technology integration is presentational. This study applies a systems-theoretic approach to the interdependent policy issues relating to science, technology, innovation, and competitiveness. This article examines how endogenous and exogenous developments of science and technology in China and the West based on science-technology relationships have influenced science and technology innovations, national competitiveness, and science and technology policies. The results reveal cognitive progress and cultural diversity. National competitiveness is preferentially strengthened in real productivities by technological invention and innovation, assisted by scientific research and innovation. This study recommends shifting the centers of science policy and technology policy from exogenous developments to endogenous developments. This article proposes proper reforms from exogenous growth to endogenous growth in science and technology innovations, national competitiveness, and science and technology policies for policy making.

Computer simulation models can generate large numbers of scenarios, far more than can be effectively utilized in most decision support applications. How can one best select a small number of scenarios to consider? One approach calls for choosing scenarios that illuminate vulnerabilities of proposed policies. Another calls for choosing scenarios that span a diverse range of futures. This paper joins these two approaches for the first time, proposing an optimization-based method for choosing a small number of relevant scenarios that combine both vulnerability and diversity. The paper applies the method to a real case involving climate resilient infrastructure for three African river basins (Volta, Orange and Zambezi). Introducing selection criteria in a stepwise manner helps examine how different criteria influence the choice of scenarios. The results suggest that combining vulnerability- and diversity-based criteria can provide a systematic and transparent method for scenario selection.