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  • 1.
    Björkman, Barbro
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy.
    Different Types, Different Rights: Distinguishing Between Different Perspectives on Ownership of Biological Material2007In: Science and Engineering Ethics, ISSN 1353-3452, E-ISSN 1471-5546, Vol. 13, no 2, p. 221-233Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Drawing on a social construction theory of ownership in biological material this paper discusses which differences in biological material might motivate differences in treatment and ownership rights. The analysis covers both the perspective of the person from whom the material originates and that of the potential recipient. Seven components of bundles of rights, drawing on the analytical tradition of Tony Honore, and their relationship to various types of biological material are investigated. To exemplify these categories the cases of a heart, a kidney, stem cells and hair are used.

  • 2.
    Björkman, Barbro
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology.
    Ethical aspects of owning human biological material2005Licentiate thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
  • 3.
    Björkman, Barbro
    Philosophy and History, KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Etiska aspekter på samhällets riskhantering2005In: Filosofins Nya Möten / [ed] K. Edvardsson, S.O. Hansson & J. Nihlén Fahlquist, Hedemora: Gidlunds Förlag , 2005, p. 103-111Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 4.
    Björkman, Barbro
    Philosophy and History, KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    How agencies inspect: A comparative study of inspectionpolicies in eight Swedish government agencies2003Report (Other academic)
  • 5.
    Björkman, Barbro
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy.
    On the Necessary Self-regarding Aspects of Other-regarding VirtuesArticle in journal (Other academic)
  • 6.
    Björkman, Barbro
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy.
    Virtue Ethics, Bioethics, and the Ownership of Biological Material2008Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary (Other scientific)
    Abstract [en]

    The overall aim of this thesis is to show how some ideas in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics can be interpreted and used as a productive way to approach a number of pressing issues in bioethics. Articles I-II introduce, and endorse, a social constructivist perspective on rights (as opposed to the more traditional natural rights idea). It is investigated if the existence of property-like rights to biological material would include the moral right to commodification and even commercialisation. Articles III-V discuss similar questions and more specifically champion the application of an Aristotelian virtue ethics perspective. The articles are preceded by an introductory essay on some of the central themes in the Nicomachean Ethics. This section also includes a very brief account of what the connection between virtue ethics and a theory of social construction, including rights, could look like. The thesis seeks to show that if read somewhat creatively many of the ideas in the Nicomachean Ethics make for a highly useful approach to modern moral problems. It should be noted, however, that this thesis in no way claims to be an exegetic, or a complete, study of the Nicomachean Ethics.

    Article I deals with ownership of biological material from a philosophical, as opposed to a legal, perspective. It is argued that a strand in liberal political theory that treats property relations as socially constructed bundles of rights, as developed by e.g. Felix Cohen and Tony Honoré, is well suited for discussions on ownership of biological material.

    Article II investigates which differences in biological material might motivate differences in treatment and ownership rights. The article draws on the social constructivist theory of ownership which was developed in Article I.

    Article III employs virtue ethics to explain why it is morally permissible to donate but not to sell organs such as kidneys. It is suggested that the former action will bring the agent closer to a state of human flourishing.

    Article IV argues that virtues like philia, justice, beneficence and generosity — traditionally all seen as other-regarding — contain strong self-regarding aspects. The central claim is that these self-regarding aspects of the other-regarding virtues are necessary components of complete virtue and thus that the fully virtuous agent has to act virtuously both in her dealings with herself and others.

    Article V applies the ideas that were developed in Article IV to the case of living organ donations to next of kin. It is proposed that such an act, although noble and fine, is supererogatory, rather than obligatory, as the donor is morally entitled to be partial to herself. This argument is made against the backdrop of a discussion on some Aristotelian ideas on philia and partiality.

  • 7.
    Björkman, Barbro
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy.
    Why Organ Donation from the Living is a Supererogatory Act: A Discussion on Philia and the Moral Right to Favour OneselfArticle in journal (Other academic)
  • 8.
    Björkman, Barbro
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Why We are Not Allowed to Sell that Which We are Encouraged to Donate2006In: Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, ISSN 0963-1801, E-ISSN 1469-2147, Vol. 15, no 1, p. 60-70Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 9.
    Björkman, Barbro
    et al.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy.
    Hansson, Sven Ove
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy.
    Bodily Rights and Property Rights2006In: Journal of Medical Ethics, ISSN 0306-6800, E-ISSN 1473-4257, Vol. 32, no 4, p. 209-214Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Whereas previous discussions on ownership of biological material have been much informed by the natural rights tradition, insufficient attention has been paid to the strand in liberal political theory represented by Felix Cohen, Tony Honore, and others, which treats property relations as socially constructed bundles of rights. In accordance with that tradition, we propose that the primary normative issue is what combination of rights a person should have to a particular item of biological material. Whether that bundle qualifies to be called `` property'' or `` ownership'' is a secondary, terminological issue. We suggest five principles of bodily rights and show how they can be applied to the construction of ethically appropriate bundles of rights to biological material.

  • 10.
    Fröding, Barbro
    Lincoln College, Oxford.
    Cognitive Enhancement, Virtue Ethics and the Good Life2011In: Neuroethics, ISSN 1874-5490, E-ISSN 1874-5504, Vol. 4, no 3, p. 223-234Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article explores the respective roles that medical and technological cognitive enhancements, on the one hand, and the moral and epistemic virtues traditionally understood, on the other, can play in enabling us to lead the good life. It will be shown that neither the virtues nor cognitive enhancements (of the kind we have access to today or in the foreseeable future) on their own are likely to enable most people to lead the good life. While the moral and epistemic virtues quite plausibly are both necessary and sufficient for the good life in theory, virtue ethics is often criticised for being elitist and unachievable in practice for the vast majority. Some cognitive enhancements, on the other hand, might be necessary for the good life but are far from sufficient for such an existence. Here it will be proposed that a combination of virtue and some cognitive enhancements is preferable.

  • 11.
    Fröding, Barbro
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Hope as a virtue in an Aristotelian contextIn: The Journal of Philosophy, Psychiatry, & PsychologyArticle in journal (Refereed)
  • 12.
    Fröding, Barbro
    Philosophy and History, KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    On the Importance of Treating Oneself Well2010In: Polish Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 1897-1652, E-ISSN 2154-3747, Vol. 4, no 1Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 13.
    Fröding, Barbro
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Vem kan äga en cell (Who can Own a Cell?)2005In: Filosofins Nya Möten (The Novel Terrains of Philosophy), Gidlunds förlag, 2005Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 14.
    Fröding, Barbro
    Philosophy and History, KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Virtue Ethics and Human Enhancement2013Book (Refereed)
  • 15.
    Fröding, Barbro
    Philosophy and History, KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Virtue Ethics and Partiality to Oneself: Organ donation within families2010In: Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research, ISSN 0970-7794, Vol. XXVII, no 3, p. 1-20Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 16.
    Fröding, Barbro
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Why We Are Not Allowed to Sell That Which We Are Encouraged to Donate2009In: Contemporary Bioethics: A Reader with Cases / [ed] Jessica Pierce, George Randels, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 17.
    Fröding, Barbro
    et al.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology.
    Juth, Niklas
    Cognitive Enhancement and the Principle of Need2015In: Neuroethics, ISSN 1874-5490, E-ISSN 1874-5504, Vol. 8, no 3, p. 231-242Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this article we argue that (i) the principle of need, on some interpretations, could be used to justify the spending of publically funded health care resources on cognitive enhancement and (ii) that this also holds true for individuals whose cognitive capacities are considered normal. The increased, and to an extent, novel demands that the modern technology and information society places on the cognitive capacities of agents, e.g., regarding good and responsible decision-making, have blurred the line between treatment and enhancement. More specifically, it has shifted upwards. As a consequence, principles of need on their most reasonable interpretations can be used to support publically funded cognitive enhancement. At least this is so, if broader aims than curing and ameliorating diseases are included in the goals of health care. We suggest that it would be plausible to see health care as accepting such broader goals already today.

  • 18.
    Fröding, Barbro
    et al.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Osika, W.
    Neuroenhancement: How mental training and meditation can promote epistemic virtue2015Book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This book explores how one can bring about changes in the brain through meditation, both through attention-focus training and through compassion training. Recent findings in the natural sciences have confirmed that it is possible for humans to achieve these structural and functional changes through various life-style practices. It is argued that meditation enables us to influence some aspects of our biological make-up and, for example, could boost our cognitive flexibility as well as our ability to act compassionate. Such changes are likely to facilitate the instilling of a number of epistemic virtues which have great bearing on our quality of life. This book offers the reader an accessible introduction to a set of neuro-enhancement methods, with a special focus on meditation techniques, and explores how such practices could contribute to make us better decision-makers and improve our moral virtues. The book is suitable for anyone looking for a text discussing the effects of neuro-enhancement from a secular ethics perspective.

  • 19.
    Fröding, Barbro
    et al.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy. Lincoln College Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom.
    Peterson, M.
    How to be a virtuous recipient of a transplant organ2015In: Organ Transplantation in Times of Donor Shortage: Challenges and Solutions, Springer Netherlands, 2015, Vol. 59, p. 89-98Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 20.
    Fröding, Barbro
    et al.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Peterson, M.
    Why computer games can be essential for human flourishing2013In: Journal of Information, Communication and Ethics in Society, ISSN 1477-996X, E-ISSN 1758-8871, Vol. 11, no 2, p. 81-91Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to argue that playing computer games for lengthy periods of time, even in a manner that will force the player to forgo certain other activities normally seen as more important, can be an integral part of human flourishing. Design/methodology/approach: The authors' claim is based on a modern reading of Aristotle's Nichomacean Ethics. It should be emphasized that the authors do not argue that computer gaming and other similar online activities are central to all people under all circumstances; but only seek to show that the claim holds true for some people under some circumstances and the authors try to spell out the relevant circumstances in detail. Findings: The authors provide a list of situations in which playing computer games for lengthy periods of time, in a manner that will force the player to forgo certain other activities normally seen as more important, is an integral part of human flourishing. Originality/value: The paper puts some novel pressure on the widely-held belief that playing computer games for lengthy periods of time, in a manner that will force the player to forgo certain other activities normally seen as more important. The paper claims that playing some computer games and partaking in some forms of online activities could be highly conducive to what it actually means in practice to take care of oneself and, to paraphrase Aristotle, to be eager for fine actions.

  • 21.
    Fröding, Barbro
    et al.
    Faculty of philosophy, University of Oxford.
    Peterson, Martin
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Animal Ethics Based on Friendship2011In: Journal of Animal Ethics, ISSN 2156-5414, Vol. 1, no 1, p. 58-69Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 22.
    Fröding, Barbro
    et al.
    Faculty of philosophy, University of Oxford.
    Peterson, Martin
    Animals and Friendship: a reply to Rowlands2011In: Journal of Animal Ethics, ISSN 2156-5414, Vol. 1, no 2, p. 187-189Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 23.
    Fröding, Barbro
    et al.
    Lincoln College, Oxford.
    Peterson, Martin
    Section of Philosophy and Ethics, Eindhoven University of Technology.
    Virtuous Choice and Parity2012In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, ISSN 1386-2820, E-ISSN 1572-8447, Vol. 15, no 1, p. 71-82Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article seeks to contribute to the discussion on the nature of choice in virtue theory. If several different actions are available to the virtuous agent, they are also likely to vary in their degree of virtue, at least in some situations. Yet, it is widely agreed that once an action is recognised as virtuous there is no higher level of virtue. In this paper we discuss how the virtue theorist could accommodate both these seemingly conflicting ideas. We discuss this issue from a modern Aristotelian perspective, as opposed to a purely exegetic one. We propose a way of resolving what seems to be a major clash between two central features of virtue ethics. Our proposal is based on the notion of parity, a concept which recently has received considerable attention in the literature on axiology. Briefly put, two alternatives are on a par (or are 'roughly equal') if they are comparable, although it is not the case that one is better than the other, nor that they are equally good. The advantages of applying the concept of parity to our problem are twofold. Firstly, it sheds new light on the account of choice in virtue theory. Secondly, some of the criticisms that have been mounted against the possibility of parity can be countered by considering the notion of choice from a virtue theory perspective.

  • 24.
    Fröding, Barbro
    et al.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Peterson, Martin
    Why virtual friendship is no genuine friendship2012In: Ethics and Information Technology, ISSN 1388-1957, E-ISSN 1572-8439, Vol. 14, no 3, p. 201-207Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Based on a modern reading of Aristotle's theory of friendship, we argue that virtual friendship does not qualify as genuine friendship. By 'virtual friendship' we mean the type of friendship that exists on the internet, and seldom or never is combined with real life interaction. A 'traditional friendship' is, in contrast, the type of friendship that involves substantial real life interaction, and we claim that only this type can merit the label 'genuine friendship' and thus qualify as morally valuable. The upshot of our discussion is that virtual friendship is what Aristotle might have described as a lower and less valuable form of social exchange.

  • 25.
    Hansson, Sven Ove
    et al.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Björkman, Barbro
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Bioethics in Sweden2006In: Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, ISSN 0963-1801, E-ISSN 1469-2147, Vol. 15, no 3, p. 285-293Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 26. Lindblom, L
    et al.
    Clausen, J
    Edvardsson Björnberg, Karin
    KTH, Superseded Departments, History of Science and Technology.
    Hayenhielm, M
    Fröding, Barbro
    KTH, Superseded Departments, History of Science and Technology.
    Nihlén Fahlquist, Jessica
    KTH, Superseded Departments, History of Science and Technology.
    Palm, Elin
    KTH, Superseded Departments, History of Science and Technology.
    Rudén, Christina
    KTH, Superseded Departments, History of Science and Technology.
    Wikman, P
    Hansson, Sven Ove
    KTH, Superseded Departments, History of Science and Technology.
    How Agencies inspect: A comparative study of inspection policies in eight Swedish government agencies2003Report (Other academic)
1 - 26 of 26
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