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  • 1. Barton, A.
    et al.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    From Libertarian Paternalism to Nudging—and Beyond2015In: Review of Philosophy and Psychology, ISSN 1878-5158, E-ISSN 1878-5166, Vol. 6, no 3, p. 341-359Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 2.
    Grune-Yanoff, Till
    Philosophy and History, KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy. Helsinki University, Finland.
    Interdisciplinary success without integration2016In: European Journal for Philosophy of Science, ISSN 1879-4912, E-ISSN 1879-4920, Vol. 6, no 3, p. 343-360Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Some scholars see interdisciplinarity as a special case of a broader unificationist program. They accept the unification of the sciences as a regulative ideal, and derive from this the normative justification of interdisciplinary research practices. The crucial link for this position is the notion of integration: integration increases the cohesion of concepts and practices, and more specifically of explanations, ontologies, methods and data. Interdisciplinary success then consists in the integration of fields or disciplines, and this constitutes success in the sense that unification is epistemically desirable. In contrast to this account, I defend the thesis that successful interdisciplinary interaction does not necessarily imply the integration of these disciplines. I show this at the hand of two cases. In both the case of evolutionary game theory and the case of hyperbolic discounting, genuine interdisciplinary exchange took place. From both exchanges, the respective economic fields emerged substantially altered - it wasn't just a juxtaposition of disciplines in which disciplinary identities remained unchanged. Yet in neither case did the disciplines integrate. Rather, they developed their own concepts and methods, their own explanations, own ontologies, and their own views of what proper data standards were. Furthermore, the fields that emerged from these exchanges were very successful, if measured at the hand of properties like explanatory success, increase of control, bibliometrics and grant yields. Thus, I argue, there are cases of interdisciplinary success without integration.

  • 3.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    Philosophy and History, KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy. Royal Inst Technol, Dept Philosophy & Hist Technol, Stockholm, Sweden..
    A cooperative species: human reciprocity and its evolution2015In: Journal of economic methodology, ISSN 1350-178X, E-ISSN 1018-5070, Vol. 22, no 1, p. 128-134Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 4. Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    Action explanations are not inherently normative2008In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5817, E-ISSN 1558-5816, Vol. 74, no 1, p. 60-78Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Inherent normativity is the claim that intentional action explanations necessarily have to comply with normatively understood rationality constraints on the ascribed propositional attitudes. This paper argues against inherent normativity in three steps. First, it presents three examples of actions successfully explained with propositional attitudes, where the ascribed attitudes violate relevant rationality constraints. Second, it argues that the inference rules that systematise propositional attitudes are qualitatively different from rationality constraints both in their justification and their recipients. Third, it rejects additional conditions on propositional attitudes, which purport to necessitate a normative commitment. Thus, inherent normativity is rejected; and with it the claim that intentional action explanations differ substantially from other explanations because they are inherently normative.

  • 5.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    University of Helsinki, Finland.
    Agent-Based Models as Policy Decision Tools: The Case of Smallpox Vaccination2011In: Simulation and Gaming: An Interdisciplinary Journal, ISSN 1046-8781, Vol. 42, no 2, p. 225-242Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Agent-based simulation (ABS) studies have recently been employed to support policy decisions. This article addresses the particular potentials and problems that ABS faces in this usage. First, the author warns against taking "familiarity" with specific ABS as a criterion for having confidence in the model's policy recommendations. Second, he shows that specific epistemic issues-in particular the high number of detailed simulated systems-require additional reflection on which decision rules to choose for policy decisions based on ABS. Third, the author points out directions in which the construction and uses of ABS in policy decision could be improved. Each of these issues is illustrated by simulation studies undertaken to investigate smallpox vaccination policies.

  • 6.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Appraising Models Nonrepresentationally2013In: Philosophy of science (East Lansing), ISSN 0031-8248, E-ISSN 1539-767X, Vol. 80, no 5, p. 850-861Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Many scientific models lack an established representation relation to actual targets andinstead refer to merely possible processes, background conditions, and results. This articleshows how such models can be appraised. On the basis of the discussion of how-possiblyexplanations, five types of learning opportunities are distinguished. For each of thesetypes, an example—from economics, biology, psychology, and sociology—is discussed.Contexts and purposes are identified in which the use of a model offers a genuine opportunityto learn. These learning opportunities offer novel justifications for modeling practicesthat fall between the cracks of standard representationalist appraisals of models.

  • 7.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Artificial Worlds and Simulation2011In: Sage Handbook of Philosophy of Social Science / [ed] Ian C. Jarvie and Jesus Zamora Bonilla, Sage Publications, 2011, p. 613-631Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 8.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    Philosophy and History, KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Behavioural Public Policy2015In: Economics and Philosophy, ISSN 0266-2671, E-ISSN 1474-0028, Vol. 31, no 3, p. 500-506Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 9.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    Philosophy and History, KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Boosts vs. nudges from a welfarist perspective2018In: Revue d' Economie politique, ISSN 0373-2630, E-ISSN 2105-2883, Vol. 128, no 2, p. 209-224Article, review/survey (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper compares two kinds of behavioral policies, boost and nudges, with respect to the normative questions they need to answer. Both policies are committed to welfarism - i.e. to respecting individuals' subjective reflected attitudes as the basis of judgment about what is good for them. However, because the two policy types affect behavior change in different ways, different normative requirements arise from this commitment. Nudges affect the choice context so as to change behavior, making use of behavioral evidence for stable relations between contextual features and behavioral outcomes. This intervention works irrespective of the nudged individual's understanding, evaluation or participation. Consequently, it is the nudge proponent who must argue that in the planned intervention, the nudge corrects a mistake and leads to a better outcome that is not compromised by the nudging procedure. Boosts, in contrast, affect behavior by training people in the use of decision tools. This intervention works only with the boosted individual's understanding, approval and active participation. Consequently, the boost proponent does not need to answer the difficult normative questions of mistake, welfare improvement or procedural compromise. Although it might be that nudge proponents can answer these questions for many situations, they constitute a normative burden for nudges that boosts can avoid. In this regard, boosts are therefore preferable to nudges.

  • 10.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Bounded Rationality2007In: Philosophy Compass, ISSN 1747-9991, E-ISSN 1747-9991, Vol. 2, no 3, p. 534-563Article, review/survey (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The notion of bounded rationality has recently gained considerable popularity in the behavioural and social sciences. This article surveys the different usages of the term, in particular the way ‘anomalosus’ behavioural phenomena are elicited, how these phenomena are incorporated in model building, and what sort of new theories of behaviour have been developed to account for bounded rationality in choice and in deliberation. It also discusses the normative relevance of bounded rationality, in particular as a justifier of non-standard reasoning and deliberation heuristics. For each of these usages, the overview discusses the central methodological problems.

  • 11.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Cognitive economics. An interdisciplinary approach2006In: Economics and Philosophy, ISSN 0266-2671, E-ISSN 1474-0028, Vol. 22, no 3, p. 448-455Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 12.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    University of Helsinki.
    Dancing at gunpoint: A review of Herbert Gintis's The bounds of reason: game theory and the unification of the behavioral sciences2010In: Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, ISSN 1876-9098, E-ISSN 1876-9098, Vol. 3, no 2, p. 111-118Article, book review (Refereed)
  • 13.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    University of Helsinki, Finland.
    Economic Models as Credible Worlds or as Isolating Tools?2009Collection (editor) (Refereed)
  • 14. Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    Evolutionary Game Theory, Interpersonal Comparisons and Natural Selection: A Dilemma2011In: Philosophy and Biology, ISSN 0169-3867, Vol. 26, no 5, p. 637-654Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    When social scientists began employing evolutionary game theory (EGT) in their disciplines, the question arose what the appropriate interpretation of the formal EGT framework would be. Social scientists have given different answer, of which I distinguish three basic kinds. I then proceed to uncover the conceptual tension between the formal framework of EGT, its application in the social sciences, and these three interpretations. First, I argue that EGT under the biological interpretation has a limited application in the social sciences, chiefly because strategy replication often cannot be sensibly interpreted as strategy bearer reproduction in this domain. Second, I show that alternative replication mechanisms imply interpersonal comparability of strategy payoffs. Giving a meaningful interpretation to such comparisons is not an easy task for many social situations, and thus limits the applicability of EGT in this domain. Third, I argue that giving a new interpretation both to strategy replication and selection solves the issue of interpersonal comparability, but at the costs of making the new interpretation incompatible with natural selection interpretations of EGT. To the extent that social scientists seek such a natural selection interpretation, they face a dilemma: either face the challenge that interpersonal comparisons pose, or give up on the natural selection interpretation. By identifying these tensions, my analysis pleas for greater awareness of the specific purposes of EGT modelling in the social sciences, and for greater sensitivity to the underlying microstructure on which the evolutionary dynamics and other EGT solution concepts supervene.

  • 15.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    University of Helsinki.
    Game Theory2008In: Internet Encyclopaedia of PhilosophyArticle, review/survey (Refereed)
  • 16.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Genuineness resolved: A reply to Reiss' purported paradox2013In: Journal of economic methodology, ISSN 1350-178X, E-ISSN 1018-5070, Vol. 20, no 3, p. 255-261Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This response to Reiss 'explanatory paradox' argues that some economic models might be true, and that many economic models are not intended for providing how-actually explanations, but rather how-possibly explanations. Therefore, two assumptions of Reiss' paradox are not true, and the paradox disappears.

  • 17. Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    Isolation is Not Characteristic of Models2011In: International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, ISSN 0269-8595, E-ISSN 1469-9281, Vol. 25, no 2, p. 119-137Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Modelling cannot be characterized as isolating, nor models as isolations. This article presents three arguments to that effect, against Uskali Maki's account of models. First, while isolation proceeds through a process of manipulation and control, modelling typically does not proceed through such a process. Rather, modellers postulate assumptions, without seeking to justify them by reference to a process of isolation. Second, while isolation identifies an isolation basea concrete environment it seeks to control and manipulatemodelling typically does not identify such a base. Rather, modellers construct their models without reference to concrete environments, and only later seek to connect their models to concrete situations of the real world. Third, Maki argues that isolation employs idealization to control for disturbing factors, but does not affect the factors or mechanisms that are supposed to be isolated. However, models typically make idealizing assumptions about the factors and mechanisms that are the focus of investigation. Thus, even the product of modelling often cannot be characterized as isolation.

  • 18. Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    Learning from Minimal Economic Models2009In: Erkenntnis, ISSN 0165-0106, E-ISSN 1572-8420, Vol. 70, no 1, p. 81-99Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    It is argued that one can learn from minimal economic models. Minimal models are models that are not similar to the real world, do not resemble some of its features, and do not adhere to accepted regularities. One learns from a model if constructing and analysing the model affects one's confidence in hypotheses about the world. Economic models, I argue, are often assessed for their credibility. If a model is judged credible, it is considered to be a relevant possibility. Considering such relevant possibilities may affect one's confidence in necessity or impossibility hypotheses. Thus, one can learn from minimal economic models.

  • 19. Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    Mismeasuring the Value of Statistical Life2009In: Journal of economic methodology, ISSN 1350-178X, E-ISSN 1018-5070, Vol. 16, no 2, p. 109-123Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The value of a statistical life (VSL) is an important tool for cost-benefit analysis of regulatory policies that concern fatality risks. Its proponents claim that it measures people's risk preferences, and that VSL therefore is a tool of vicarious governance. This paper criticizes the revealed preference method for measuring VSL. It specifies three minimal conditions for vicarious governance: sensitivity, fairness and hypothetical compromise, and shows that the VSL measure, in its common application in policy formation and analysis, violates these conditions. It therefore concludes that the revealed preference VSL measure, in its current form, is not a tool of vicarious governance.

  • 20.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Models as Products of Interdisciplinary Exchange: Evidence from Evolutionary Game Theory2011In: Studies in history and philosophy of science, ISSN 0039-3681, E-ISSN 1879-2510, Vol. 42, no 2, p. 386-397Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The development of evolutionary game theory (EGT) is closely linked with two interdisciplinary exchanges: the import of game theory into biology, and the import of biologists' version of game theory into economics. This paper traces the history of these two import episodes. In each case the investigation covers what exactly was imported, what the motives for the import were, how the imported elements were put to use, and how they related to existing practices in the respective disciplines. Two conclusions emerged from this study. First, concepts derived from the unity of science discussion or the unification accounts of explanation are too strong and too narrow to be useful for analysing these interdisciplinary exchanges. Secondly, biology and economics at least in relation to EGT show significant differences in modelling practices: biologists seek to link EGT models to concrete empirical situations, whereas economists pursue conceptual exploration and possible explanation.

  • 21.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Models of Mechanisms: The Case of the Replicator Dynamics2013In: Mechanism and Causality in Biology and Economics / [ed] Hsiang-Ke Chao, Szu-Ting Chen, Roberta L. Millstein, Springer Berlin/Heidelberg, 2013, p. 83-100Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The general replicator dynamics (RD) is a formal equation that is used in biology to represent biological mechanisms and in the social sciences to represent social mechanisms. For either of these purposes, I show that substantial idealisations have to be made – idealisations that differ for the respective disciplines. These create a considerable idealisation gap between the biologically interpreted RD and the learning interpretations of the RD. I therefore argue that these interpretations represent different mechanisms, even though they are interpretations of the same formal RD equation. Furthermore, I argue that this idealisation gap between the biological and economic models is too wide for the respective mechanisms to share a common abstract causal structure that could be represented by the general RD model.

  • 22.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy. TINT Finnish Ctr Excellence Philosophy Social Sci, Helsinki, Finland.
    Models of Temporal Discounting 1937-2000: An Interdisciplinary Exchange between Economics and Psychology2015In: Science in Context, ISSN 0269-8897, E-ISSN 1474-0664, Vol. 28, no 4, p. 675-713Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Argument Today's models of temporal discounting are the result of multiple interdisciplinary exchanges between psychology and economics. Although these exchanges did not result in an integrated discipline, they had important effects on all disciplines involved. The paper describes these exchanges from the 1930s onwards, focusing on two episodes in particular: an attempted synthesis by psychiatrist George Ainslie and others in the 1970s; and the attempted application of this new discounting model by a generation of economists and psychologists in the 1980s, which ultimately ended in the diversity of measurements disappointment. I draw four main conclusions. First, multiple notions of temporal discounting must be conceptually distinguished. Second, behavioral economics is not an integration or unification of psychology and economics. Third, the analysis identifies some central disciplinary markers that distinguish modeling strategies in economics and psychology. Finally, it offers a case of interdisciplinary success that does not fit the currently dominant account of interdisciplinarity as integration.

  • 23.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology.
    Mäki’s three notions of isolation2013In: Economics for Real: Uskali Mäki and the Place of Truth in Economics / [ed] Aki Lehtinen , Jaakko Kuorikoski and Petri Ylikoski, Taylor & Francis, 2013, p. 96-111Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 24.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Old Wine In New Casks: Libertarian Paternalism Still Violates Liberal Principles2012In: Social Choice and Welfare, ISSN 0176-1714, E-ISSN 1432-217X, Vol. 38, no 4, p. 635-645Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Libertarian Paternalism (LP) purports to be a kind of paternalism that is "liberty-preserving" and hence compatible with liberal principles. In this paper, I argue against this compatibility claim. I show that LP violates core liberal principles, first because it limits freedom, and secondly because it fails to justify these limitations in ways acceptable to liberal positions. In particular, Libertarian Paternalists argue that sometimes it is legitimate to limit people's liberties if it improves their welfare. A closer look at the welfare notions used, however, reveals that they respect neither the subjectivity nor the plurality of people's values. Thus its justification of the liberty-welfare trade-off is not compatible with liberal principles. I conclude that to justify LP policies, one must appeal to traditional paternalistic principles-and thus, there is no categorical difference between "libertarian" and other forms of paternalism.

  • 25.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    Epistemology, Decision Theory, Ethics, and Social Implications of Risk.
    Paradoxes of Rational Choice Theory2012In: Handbook of Risk Theory: Epistemology, Decision Theory, Ethics, and Social Implications of Risk / [ed] R. Hillerbrand, P. Sandin, S. Roeser, M. Peterson, Dordrecht: Springer, 2012Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 26. Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    Philosophy of Simulation2010In: Simulation and Gaming: An Interdisciplinary Journal, ISSN 1046-8781, Vol. 41, no 1, p. 1-31Article, review/survey (Refereed)
  • 27.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    Helsinki Collegium of Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki.
    Preference Change and Conservatism: comparing the Bayesian and the AGM models of preference revision2012In: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, E-ISSN 1573-0964, Vol. 190, no 14, p. 2623-2641Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Richard Bradley's Bayesian model of preference kinematics is compared with Sven Ove Hansson's AGM-style model of preference revision. Both seek to model the revision of preference orders as a consequence of retaining consistency when some preferences change. Both models are often interpreted normatively, as giving advice on how an agent should revise her preferences. I raise four criticisms of the Bayesian model: it is unrealistic; it neglects an important change mechanism; it disregards endogenous information relevant to preference change, in particular about similarity and incompleteness; and its representational framework, when expanded with similarity comparisons, may give misleading advice. These criticisms are based on a principle of conservatism, and on two proposals of similarity metrics for the Bayesian model. The performance of the Bayesian model, with and without the similarity metrics, is then tested in three different cases of preference change, and compared to the performance of the AGM model.

  • 28.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Proposition-Preferences and World-Preferences: Connecting the Two Levels2006In: Proceedings of the XXI World Congress of Philosophy / [ed] Stephen Voss, Berna Kilinc, and Gürol Irzik, 2006Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 29. Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    Rational Choice Theory and Bounded Rationality2010In: Religion, Economy, and Evolution / [ed] Ilkka Pyysiäinen, Berlin: De Gruyter , 2010Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 30.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    Philosophy and History, KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Reflections on the 2017 Nobel memorial prize awarded to Richard Thaler2017In: Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, ISSN 1876-9098, E-ISSN 1876-9098, Vol. 10, no 2, p. 61-75Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 31.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Relations Between Theory and Model in Psychology and Economics2013In: Perspectives on Science, ISSN 1063-6145, E-ISSN 1530-9274, Vol. 21, no 2, p. 196-201Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This commentary discusses Nurmi's account of the relation of "theories" and "models," and compares it to methodological discussions in economics. I differentiate between two styles of modeling, "theoryfirst" v. "datafirst," and argue that Nurmi's recent work falls in the "theoryfirst" category. This implies that models at any level can function as agents of change that may unidirectionally affect models at other levels.

  • 32.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    London Sch Econ, London, England.
    Review of Machine Dreams: Economics Becomes a Cyborg Science by P. Mirowski2004In: Economica, ISSN 0013-0427, E-ISSN 1468-0335, Vol. 71, no 284, p. 694-696Article, book review (Refereed)
  • 33.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Review of The Elgar Companion to Economics and Philosophy by J. B. Davis, A. Marciano and J. Runde2006In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5817, E-ISSN 1558-5816, Vol. 72, no 3, p. 253-258Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 34.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Review of The Structure of Values and Norms, by S.O. Hansson2004In: Economics and Philosophy, ISSN 0266-2671, E-ISSN 1474-0028, Vol. 20, no 2, p. 396-403Article, book review (Refereed)
  • 35.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    Philosophy and History, KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Seven problems with massive simulation models for policy decision-making2017In: The Science and Art of Simulation I: Exploring - Understanding - Knowing, Springer, 2017, p. 85-101Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Policymakers increasingly draw on scientific methods, including simulation modeling, to justify their decisions. For these purposes, scientist and policymakers face an extensive choice of modeling strategies. This paper distinguishes two types of strategies: Massive Simulation Models (MSMs) and Abstract Simulation Models (ASMs), and discusses how to justify strategy choice with reference to the core characteristics of the respective strategies. In particular, I argue that MSMs might have more severe problems than ASMs in determining the accuracy of the model; that MSMs might have more severe problems than ASMs in dealing with inevitable uncertainty; and that MSMs might have more severe problems than ASMs with misinterpretation and misapplication due to their format. While this in no way excludes the prospect that some MSMs provide good justifications for policy decisions, my arguments caution against a general preference for MSM over ASMs for policy decision purposes.

  • 36.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Teaching philosophy of science to scientists: Why, what and how2014In: European Journal for Philosophy of Science, ISSN 1879-4912, E-ISSN 1879-4920, Vol. 4, no 1, p. 115-134Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper provides arguments to philosophers, scientists, administrators and students for why science students should be instructed in a mandatory, custom-designed, interdisciplinary course in the philosophy of science. The argument begins by diagnosing that most science students are taught only conventional methodology: a fixed set of methods whose justification is rarely addressed. It proceeds by identifying seven benefits that scientists incur from going beyond these conventions and from acquiring abilities to analyse and evaluate justifications of scientific methods. It concludes that teaching science students these skills makes them better scientists. Based on this argument, the paper then analyses the standard philosophy of science curriculum, and in particular its adequacy for teaching science students. It is argued that the standard curriculum on the one hand lacks important analytic tools relevant for going beyond conventional methodology-especially with respect to non-epistemic normative aspects of scientific practice-while on the other hand contains many topics and tools that are not relevant for the instruction of science students. Consequently, the optimal way of training science students in the analysis and evaluation of scientific methods requires a revision of the standard curriculum. Finally, the paper addresses five common characteristics of students taking such a course, which often clash with typical teaching approaches in philosophy. Strategies how best to deal with these constraints are offered for each of these characteristics.

  • 37.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    The Explanatory Potential of Artificial Societies2001In: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, E-ISSN 1573-0964, Vol. 169, p. 539-555Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 38.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    KTH, Superseded Departments, History of Science and Technology.
    The problems of testing preference axioms with revealed preference theory2004In: Analyse & Kritik. Zeitung für linke Debatte und Praxis, ISSN 0171-5860, E-ISSN 2365-9858, Vol. 26, no 2, p. 382-397Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 39.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    University of Helsinki, Finland.
    Welfare Notions for Soft Paternalism2009In: Papers on Economics and Evolution, ISSN 1430-4716, no 917Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 40.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    Philosophy and History, KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Why behavioural policy needs mechanistic evidence2016In: Economics and Philosophy, ISSN 0266-2671, E-ISSN 1474-0028, Vol. 32, no 3, p. 463-483Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Proponents of behavioural policies seek to justify them as evidence-based'. Yet they typically fail to show through which mechanisms these policies operate. This paper shows - at the hand of examples from economics and psychology - that without sufficient mechanistic evidence, one often cannot determine whether a given policy in its target environment will be effective, robust, persistent or welfare-improving. Because these properties are important for justification, policies that lack sufficient support from mechanistic evidence should not be called evidence-based'.

  • 41.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Why Don't You Want to Be Rich?: Preference Explanations on the Basis of Causal Structure2007In: Causation and Explanation: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, vol. 4 / [ed] Keim Campbell, O'Rourke and Silverstein, MIT Press, 2007, p. 217-240Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 42.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    et al.
    University of Helsinki, Finland.
    Hansson, Sven Ove
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    From Belief Revision to Preference Change2009In: Preference Change: Approaches from Philosophy, Economics and Psychology / [ed] Grüne-Yanoff, Till and S. O. Hansson, Dordrecht: Springer, 2009, p. 159-184Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 43.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    et al.
    University of Helsinki, Finland.
    Hansson, Sven Ove
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Preference Change: An Introduction2009In: Preference Change: Approaches from Philosophy, Economics and Psychology / [ed] Grüne-Yanoff, Till and S. O. Hansson, Dordrecht: Springer, 2009Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 44.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    et al.
    University of Helsinki, Finland.
    Hansson, Sven OveKTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Preference Change: Approaches from Philosophy, Economics and Psychology2009Collection (editor) (Refereed)
  • 45.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    et al.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Hansson, Sven Ove
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Preferences2006In: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy / [ed] Edward N. Zalta, Stanford: The Metaphysics Research Lab , 2006Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 46.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    et al.
    Philosophy and History, KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Hansson, Sven Ove
    Philosophy and History, KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Procedural exclusion criteria for adaptive preferences2013In: Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, Springer International Publishing , 2013, p. 167-182Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    A preference is said to be adaptive if it is formed or changed in response to the agent’s feasible options (Elster 1985, Bruckner 2009). Adaptive preferences are major candidates for being discounted (or entirely dismissed) in welfarist accounts of the good (Elster 1985, Bovens 1992, Nussbaum 2001). In this paper, we refine this basic intuition in two ways. First, we show that not all adaptive preferences should be thus discounted. Second, we provide a general framework for determining which preferences should be discounted due to their adaptiveness, including a set of procedural exclusion criteria to be used for this purpose. 

  • 47.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    et al.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology.
    Hertwig, Ralph
    Nudge Versus Boost: How Coherent are Policy and Theory?2016In: Minds and Machines, ISSN 0924-6495, E-ISSN 1572-8641, Vol. 26, no 1-2, p. 149-183Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    If citizens' behavior threatens to harm others or seems not to be in their own interest (e.g., risking severe head injuries by riding a motorcycle without a helmet), it is not uncommon for governments to attempt to change that behavior. Governmental policy makers can apply established tools from the governmental toolbox to this end (e.g., laws, regulations, incentives, and disincentives). Alternatively, they can employ new tools that capitalize on the wealth of knowledge about human behavior and behavior change that has been accumulated in the behavioral sciences (e.g., psychology and economics). Two contrasting approaches to behavior change are nudge policies and boost policies. These policies rest on fundamentally different research programs on bounded rationality, namely, the heuristics and biases program and the simple heuristics program, respectively. This article examines the policy-theory coherence of each approach. To this end, it identifies the necessary assumptions underlying each policy and analyzes to what extent these assumptions are implied by the theoretical commitments of the respective research program. Two key results of this analysis are that the two policy approaches rest on diverging assumptions and that both suffer from disconnects with the respective theoretical program, but to different degrees: Nudging appears to be more adversely affected than boosting does. The article concludes with a discussion of the limits of the chosen evaluative dimension, policy-theory coherence, and reviews some other benchmarks on which policy programs can be assessed.

  • 48.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    et al.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Lindblom, Lars
    The Interactive Nature of Work Incentives2008In: Perspectives on Work: Problems, Insights, Challenges / [ed] Otto Neumaier, Gottfried Schweiger, Clemens Sedmak, Münster-Hamburg-London: LIT Publisher Group , 2008, p. 51-62Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 49.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    et al.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Marchionni, C.
    Moscati, I.
    Introduction: methodologies of bounded rationality2014In: Journal of economic methodology, ISSN 1350-178X, E-ISSN 1018-5070, Vol. 21, no 4, p. 325-342Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The modelling of bounded rationality is currently pursued by approaches that exhibit a wide diversity of methodologies. This special issue collects five contributions that discuss different methodological aspects of these approaches. In our introduction, we map the variety of methodological positions with respect to three questions. First, what kinds of evidence do the respective approaches consider relevant for modelling bounded rationality? Second, what kind of modelling desiderata do the respective approaches focus on? And third, how do the respective approaches justify the normative validity of bounded rationality? To broaden the picture, we not only discusss the five contributions of this issue, but also include relevant positions from the extant literature.

  • 50.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    et al.
    Philosophy and History, KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Marchionni, Caterina
    Univ Helsinki, Fac Social Sci, Pract Philosophy, Helsinki, Finland..
    Modeling model selection in model pluralism2018In: Journal of economic methodology, ISSN 1350-178X, E-ISSN 1018-5070, Vol. 25, no 3, p. 265-275Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In his recent book, Rodrik [(2015). Economics rules. Why economics works, when it fails, and how to tell the difference. Oxford University Press] proposes an account of model pluralism according to which multiple models of the same target are acceptable as long as one model is more useful for one purpose and another is more useful for another purpose. How, then, is the right model for the purpose selected? Rodrik roughly outlines a selection procedure, which we formalize to enhance understanding of his account of model pluralism and to advance the critical discussion.

12 1 - 50 of 59
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