Change search
Refine search result
1 - 4 of 4
CiteExportLink to result list
Permanent link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
Rows per page
  • 5
  • 10
  • 20
  • 50
  • 100
  • 250
Sort
  • Standard (Relevance)
  • Author A-Ö
  • Author Ö-A
  • Title A-Ö
  • Title Ö-A
  • Publication type A-Ö
  • Publication type Ö-A
  • Issued (Oldest first)
  • Issued (Newest first)
  • Created (Oldest first)
  • Created (Newest first)
  • Last updated (Oldest first)
  • Last updated (Newest first)
  • Disputation date (earliest first)
  • Disputation date (latest first)
  • Standard (Relevance)
  • Author A-Ö
  • Author Ö-A
  • Title A-Ö
  • Title Ö-A
  • Publication type A-Ö
  • Publication type Ö-A
  • Issued (Oldest first)
  • Issued (Newest first)
  • Created (Oldest first)
  • Created (Newest first)
  • Last updated (Oldest first)
  • Last updated (Newest first)
  • Disputation date (earliest first)
  • Disputation date (latest first)
Select
The maximal number of hits you can export is 250. When you want to export more records please use the Create feeds function.
  • 1.
    Eriksson, Henrik
    et al.
    KTH, Superseded Departments, Numerical Analysis and Computer Science, NADA.
    Eriksson, Kimmo
    Karlander, Johan
    KTH, Superseded Departments, Numerical Analysis and Computer Science, NADA.
    Svensson, Lars Erik
    KTH, Superseded Departments, Mathematics.
    Wästlund, Johan
    KTH, Superseded Departments, Mathematics.
    Sorting a bridge hand2001In: Discrete Mathematics, ISSN 0012-365X, E-ISSN 1872-681X, Vol. 241, no 1-3, p. 289-300Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Sorting a permutation by block moves is a task that every bridge player has to solve every time she picks up a new hand of cards. It is also a problem for the computational biologist, for block moves are a fundamental type of mutation that can explain why genes common to two species do not occur in the same order in the chromosome, It is not known whether there exists an optimal sorting procedure running in polynomial time. Bafna and Pevzner gave a polynomial time algorithm that sorts any permutation of length n in at most 3n/4 moves. Our new algorithm improves this to [(2n - 2)/3] for n greater than or equal to 9. For the reverse permutation, we give an exact expression for the number of moves needed, namely [(n + 1)/2]. Computations of Bafha and Pevzner up to n = 10 seemed to suggest that this is the worst case; but as it turns out, a first counterexample occurs for n = 13, i.e. the bridge player's case. Professional card players never sort by rank, only by suit. For this case, we give a complete answer to the optimal sorting problem.

  • 2. Eriksson, K.
    et al.
    Karlander, Johan
    KTH, Superseded Departments, Numerical Analysis and Computer Science, NADA.
    Stable matching in a common generalization of the marriage and assignment models2000In: Discrete Mathematics, ISSN 0012-365X, E-ISSN 1872-681X, Vol. 217, no 3-Jan, p. 135-156Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In the theory of two-sided matching markets there are two well-known models: the marriage model (where no money is involved) and the assignment model (where payments are involved). Roth and Sotomayor, Two-Sided Matching, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990, asked for an explanation for the similarities in behavior between those two models. We address this question by introducing a common generalization that preserves the two important features: the existence of a stable outcome and the lattice property of the set of stable outcomes.

  • 3. Eriksson, K.
    et al.
    Karlander, Johan
    KTH, Superseded Departments, Numerical Analysis and Computer Science, NADA.
    Stable outcomes of the roommate game with transferable utility2000In: International Journal of Game Theory, ISSN 0020-7276, E-ISSN 1432-1270, Vol. 29, no 4, p. 555-569Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We consider the TU version of Gale and Shapley's roommate game. We find several results that: are analogous to known results for the NTU game, such as a characterization of stable outcomes by forbidden miners, a characterization of the extreme points of the core, and a median property of stable outcomes. The TU roommate game is a special case of the TU partitioning game of Kaneko and Wooders. Bondareva and Shapley's balancedness condition for the core of such games is the starting point for our forbidden miners approach.

  • 4. Eriksson, K.
    et al.
    Karlander, Johan
    KTH, Superseded Departments, Numerical Analysis and Computer Science, NADA.
    Oller, L. E.
    Becker's assortative assignments: stability and fairness2000In: Mathematical Social Sciences, ISSN 0165-4896, E-ISSN 1879-3118, Vol. 39, no 2, p. 109-118Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Inspired by Roth and Sotomayor we make a deeper mathematical study of the assortative matching markets defined by Becker, finding explicit results on stability and fairness. We note that in the limit, when the size of the market tends to infinity. we obtain the continuous model of Sattinger and retrieve his characterization of the core of the game in this limit case. We also find that the most egalitarian core solution for employees is the employer-optimal assignment.

1 - 4 of 4
CiteExportLink to result list
Permanent link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf