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  • 1.
    Cantwell, John
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    A Formal Model of Multi-Agent Belief-Interaction2006In: Journal of Logic, Language and Information, ISSN 0925-8531, E-ISSN 1572-9583, Vol. 15, no 4, p. 303-329Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    A semantics is presented for belief revision in the face of common announcements to a group of agents that have beliefs about each other's beliefs. The semantics is based on the idea that possible worlds can be viewed as having an internal-structure, representing the belief independent features of the world, and the respective belief states of the agents in a modular fashion. Modularity guarantees that changing one aspect of the world (a belief independent feature or a belief state) has no effect on any other aspect of the world. This allows us to employ an AGM-style selection function to represent revision. The semantics is given a complete axiomatisation (identical to the axiomatisation found by Gerbrandy and Groeneveld for a semantics based on non-wellfounded set theory) for the special case of expansion.

  • 2.
    Cantwell, John
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    A model for updates in a multi-agent setting2007In: Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics, ISSN 1166-3081, E-ISSN 1958-5780, Vol. 17, no 2, p. 183-196Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 3.
    Cantwell, John
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    An Expressivist Bilateral Meaning-is-Use Analysis of Classical Propositional Logic2014In: Journal of Logic, Language and Information, ISSN 0925-8531, E-ISSN 1572-9583, Vol. 24, no 1, p. 27-51Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The connectives of classical propositional logic are given an analysis in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions of acceptance and rejection, i.e. the connectives are analyzed within an expressivist bilateral meaning-is-use framework. It is explained how such a framework differs from standard (bilateral) inferentialist frameworks and it is argued that it is better suited to address the particular issues raised by the expressivist thesis that the meaning of a sentence is determined by the mental state that it is conventionally used to express. Furthermore, it is shown that the classical requirements governing the connectives completely characterize classical logic, are conservative (indeed make the connectives redundant) and separable, are in bilateral harmony, are structurally preservative with respect to the classical coordination requirements and resolve the categoricity problem. These results are taken to show that one can give an expressivist bilateral meaning-is-use analysis of the connectives that confer on them a determinate coherent classical interpretation.

  • 4.
    Cantwell, John
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Changing the modal context2008In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5825, E-ISSN 1755-2567, Vol. 74, no 4, p. 331-351Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Conditionals that contain a modality in the consequent give rise to a particular semantic phenomenon whereby the antecedent of the conditional blocks possibilities when interpreting the modality in the consequent. This explains the puzzling logical behaviour of constructions like "If you don't buy a lottery ticket, you can't win", "If you eat that poison, it is unlikely that you will survive the day" and "If you kill Harry, you ought to kill him gently". In this paper it is argued that a semantic version of the Ramsey Test provides a key in the analysis of such constructions. The logic for this semantics is axiomatized and some examples are studied, among them a well-known puzzle for contrary-to-duty obligations.

  • 5.
    Cantwell, John
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Conditionals in causal decision theory2013In: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, E-ISSN 1573-0964, Vol. 190, no 4, p. 661-679Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper explores the possibility that causal decision theory can be formulated in terms of probabilities of conditionals. It is argued that a generalized Stalnaker semantics in combination with an underlying branching time structure not only provides the basis for a plausible account of the semantics of indicative conditionals, but also that the resulting conditionals have properties that make them well-suited as a basis for formulating causal decision theory. Decision theory (at least if we omit the frills) is not an esoteric science, however unfamiliar it may seem to an outsider. Rather it is a systematic exposition of the consequences of certain well-chosen platitudes about belief, desire, preference and choice. It is the very core of our common-sense theory of persons, dissected out and elegantly systematized. (David Lewis, Synthese 23:331-344, 1974, p. 337). A small distortion in the analysis of the conditional may create spurious problems with the analysis of other concepts. So if the facts about usage favor one among a number of subtly different theories, it may be important to determine which one it is.

  • 6.
    Cantwell, John
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy.
    Conditionals in reasoning2009In: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, E-ISSN 1573-0964, Vol. 171, no 1, p. 47-75Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The paper presents a non-monotonic inference relation on a language containing a conditional that satisfies the Ramsey Test. The logic is a weakening of classical logic and preserves many of the 'paradoxes of implication' associated with the material implication. It is argued, however, that once one makes the proper distinction between supposing that something is the case and accepting that it is the case, these 'paradoxes' cease to be counterintuitive. A representation theorem is provided where conditionals are given a non-bivalent semantics and epistemic states are represented via preferential models.

  • 7.
    Cantwell, John
    Royal Institute of Technology KTH.
    Expressivism detrivialized2015In: Logique et Analyse, ISSN 0024-5836, E-ISSN 2295-5836, Vol. 58, no 232, p. 487-508Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    It is argued that David Lewis' two triviality results (the probability of the conditional cannot be the conditional probability; desire cannot be belief) both present a potential problem for expressivism, are related, and can both be resolved in the same way: by allowing for gappy propositions (propositions that can lack truth value). In particular, a semantics for 'A is good' is provided that allows one to embrace the major premises leading up to Lewis' triviality result while avoiding its conclusion.

  • 8.
    Cantwell, John
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    First Order Expressivist Logic2013In: Erkenntnis, ISSN 0165-0106, E-ISSN 1572-8420, Vol. 78, no 6, p. 1381-1403Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper provides finitary jointly necessary and sufficient acceptance and rejection conditions for the logical constants of a first order quantificational language. By introducing the notion of making an assignment as a distinct object level practice-something you do with a sentence-(as opposed to a meta-level semantic notion) and combining this with the practice of (hypothetical and categorical) acceptance and rejection and the practice of making suppositions one gains a structure that is sufficiently rich to fully characterize the class of classical first order theories. The analysis thus provides a way of characterizing classical first order quantification by expressivist means.

  • 9.
    Cantwell, John
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Indicative conditionals: Factual or Epistemic2008In: Studia Logica: An International Journal for Symbolic Logic, ISSN 0039-3215, E-ISSN 1572-8730, Vol. 88, no 1, p. 157-194Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    It is argued that indicative conditionals are best viewed as having truthconditions (and so they are in part factual) but that these truth conditions are ‘gappy’which leaves an explanatory gap that can only be filled by epistemic considerations (and soindicative conditionals are in part epistemic). This dual nature of indicative conditionalsgives reason to rethink the relationship between logic viewed as a descriptive discipline(focusing on semantics) and logic viewed as a discipline with a normative import (focusingon epistemic notions such as ‘reasoning’, ‘beliefs’ and ‘assumptions’). In particular, it isargued that the development of formal models for epistemic states can serve as a startingpoint for exploring logic when viewed as a normative discipline.

  • 10. Cantwell, John
    Logics of belief change without linearity2000In: Journal of Symbolic Logic (JSL), ISSN 0022-4812, E-ISSN 1943-5886, Vol. 65, no 4, p. 1556-1575Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Ever since [4]. systems of spheres have been considered to give an intuitive and elegant way to give a semantics for logics of theory- or belief- change, Several authors [5.11] have considered giving up the rather strong assumption that systems of spheres be linearly ordered by inclusion, These more general structures are called hypertheories after [8]. It is shown that none of the proposed logics induced by these weaker structures are compact and thus cannot be given a strongly complete axiomatization in a finitary logic, Complete infinitary axiomatizations are given for several intuitive logics based on hypertheories that are not linearly ordered bq inclusion.

  • 11.
    Cantwell, John
    Philosophy and History, KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy. Swedish Coll Adv Study, Thunbergsvagen 2, SE-75238 Uppsala, Sweden..
    Making sense of (in)determinate truth: the semantics of free variables2018In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 175, no 11, p. 2715-2741Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    It is argued that truth value of a sentence containing free variables in a context of use (or the truth value of the proposition it expresses in a context of use), just as the reference of the free variables concerned, depends on the assumptions and posits given by the context. However, context may under-determine the reference of a free variable and the truth value of sentences in which it occurs. It is argued that in such cases a free variable has indeterminate reference and a sentence in which it occurs may have indeterminate truth value. On letting, say, x be such that x(2) = 4, the sentence 'Either x = 2 or x = -2' is true but the sentence 'x = 2' has an indeterminate truth value: it is determinate that the variable x refers to either 2 or -2, but it is indeterminate which of the two it refers to, as a result 'x = 2' has a truth value but its truth value is indeterminate. The semantic indeterminacy is analysed in a 'radically' supervaluational (or plurivaluational) semantic framework closely analogous to the treatment of vagueness in McGee and McLaughlin (South J Philos 33: 203-251, 1994, Linguist Philos 27: 123-136, 2004) and Smith (Vagueness and degrees of truth, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008), which saves bivalence, the T-schema and the truth-functional analysis of the boolean connectives. It is shown that on such an analysis the modality 'determinately' is quite clearly not an epistemic modality, avoiding a potential objection raised by Williamson (Vagueness, Routledge, London, 1994) against such 'radically' supervaluational treatments of vagueness, and that determinate truth (rather than truth simpliciter) is the semantic value preserved in classically valid arguments. The analysis is contrasted with the epistemicist proposal of Breckenridge and Magidor (Philos Stud 158: 377-400, 2012) which implies that (in the given context) 'x = 2' has a determinate but unknowable truth value.

  • 12.
    Cantwell, John
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy.
    On an alleged counter-example to causal decision theory2010In: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, E-ISSN 1573-0964, Vol. 173, no 2, p. 127-152Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    An alleged counterexample to causal decision theory, put forward by Andy Egan, is studied in some detail. It is argued that Egan rejects the evaluation of causal decision theory on the basis of a description of the decision situation that is different from-indeed inconsistent with-the description on which causal decision theory makes its evaluation. So the example is not a counterexample to causal decision theory. Nevertheless, the example shows that causal decision theory can recommend unratifiable acts (acts that once decided upon appear sub-optimal) which presents a problem in the dynamics of intentions (as a decision is the forming of an intention to act). It is argued that we can defuse this problem if we hold that decision theory is a theory of rational decision making rather than a theory of rational acts. It is shown how decisions can have epistemic side-effects that are not mediated by the act and that there are cases where one can only bring oneself to perform the best act by updating by imaging rather than by conditioning. This provides a pragmatic argument for updating by imaging rather than by conditioning in these cases.

  • 13.
    Cantwell, John
    KTH, Superseded Departments, History of Science and Technology.
    On the foundations of pragmatic arguments2003In: Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0022-362X, E-ISSN 1939-8549, Vol. 100, no 8, p. 383-402Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 14.
    Cantwell, John
    Philosophy and History, KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    The laws of non-bivalent probability2006In: Logic and Logical Philosophy, ISSN 1425-3305, E-ISSN 2300-9802, Vol. 15, p. 163-171Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Non-bivalent languages (languages containing sentences that canbe true, false or neither) are given a probabilitistic interpretation in termsof betting quotients. Necessary and sufficient conditions for avoiding Dutchbooks—the laws of non-bivalent probability—in such a setting are provided.

  • 15.
    Cantwell, John
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    The Logic of Conditional Negation2008In: Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, ISSN 0029-4527, E-ISSN 1939-0726, Vol. 49, no 3, p. 245-260Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    It is argued that the "inner" negation ∼ familiar from 3-valued logic can be interpreted as a form of "conditional" negation: ∼A is read 'A is false if it has a truth value'. It is argued that this reading squares well with a particular 3-valued interpretation of a conditional that in the literature has been seen as a serious candidate for capturing the truth conditions of the natural language indicative conditional (e.g., "If Jim went to the party he had a good time"). It is shown that the logic induced by the semantics shares many familiar properties with classical negation, but is orthogonal to both intuitionistic and classical negation: it differs from both in validating the inference from A→∼B to ∼(A→B).

  • 16.
    Cantwell, John
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy.
    The logic of dominance reasoning2006In: Journal of Philosophical Logic, ISSN 0022-3611, E-ISSN 1573-0433, Vol. 35, no 1, p. 41-63Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The logic of dominance arguments is analyzed using two different kinds of conditionals: indicative (epistemic) and subjunctive (counter-factual). It is shown that on the indicative interpretation an assumption of independence is needed for a dominance argument to go through. It is also shown that on the subjunctive interpretation no assumption of independence is needed once the standard premises of the dominance argument are true, but that independence plays an important role in arguing for the truth of the premises of the dominance argument. A key feature of the analysis is the interpretation of the doubly conditional comparative I will get a better outcome if A than if B which is taken to have the structure (the outcome if A) is better than (the outcome if B).

  • 17.
    Cantwell, John
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Unity and Autonomy in Expressivist Logic2014In: Dialectica, ISSN 0012-2017, E-ISSN 1746-8361, Vol. 68, no 3, p. 443-457Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    It is argued that expressivists can solve their problems in accounting for the unity and autonomy of logic - logic is topic independent and does not derive from a general logic' of mental states - by (1) adopting an analysis of the logical connectives that takes logically complex sentences to express complex combinations of simple attitudes like belief and disapproval and dispositions to form such simple attitudes upon performing suppositional acts, and (2) taking acceptance and rejection of sentences to be the common mental denominator in descriptive and evaluative discourse, and structural requirements governing these to be the basis for logic. Such an account requires that attitudes like belief, intention and disapproval can come in hypothetical mode - plausibly linked to the capacity to mentally simulate or emulate one's own attitudes - and, if correct, suggests that these form the basic building blocks for our capacity to understand logically complex sentences.

  • 18.
    Cantwell, John
    et al.
    Philosophy and History, KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Lindström, S.
    Rabinowicz, W.
    McGee's Counterexample to the Ramsey Test2017In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5825, E-ISSN 1755-2567, Vol. 83, no 2, p. 154-168Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Vann McGee has proposed a counterexample to the Ramsey Test. In the counterexample, a seemingly trustworthy source has testified that p and that if not-p, then q. If one subsequently learns not-p (and so learns that the source is wrong about p), then one has reason to doubt the trustworthiness of the source (perhaps even the identity of the source) and so, the argument goes, one has reason to doubt the conditional asserted by the source. Since what one learns is that the antecedent of the conditional holds, these doubts are contrary to the Ramsey Test. We argue that the counterexample fails. It rests on a principle of testimonial dependence that is not applicable when a source hedges his or her claims.

  • 19.
    Cantwell, John
    et al.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History. SCAS Uppsala, Uppsala, Sweden.
    Rott, Hans
    SCAS Uppsala, Uppsala, Sweden ; University of Regensburg, Regensburg, Germany.
    Probability, coherent belief and coherent belief changes2019In: Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, ISSN 1012-2443, E-ISSN 1573-7470, Vol. 87, p. 259-291Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper is about the statics and dynamics of belief states that are represented by pairs consisting of an agent’s credences (represented by a subjective probability measure) and her categorical beliefs (represented by a set of possible worlds). Regarding the static side, we argue that the latter proposition should be coherent with respect to the probability measure and that its probability should reach a certain threshold value. On the dynamic side, we advocate Jeffrey conditionalisation as the principal mode of changing one’s belief state. This updating method fits the idea of the Lockean Thesis better than plain Bayesian conditionalisation, and it affords a flexible method for adding and withdrawing categorical beliefs. We show that it fails to satisfy the traditional principles of Inclusion and Preservation for belief revision and the principle of Recovery for belief withdrawals, as well as the Levi and Harper identities. We take this to be a problem for the latter principles rather than for the idea of coherent belief change.

  • 20.
    Clausen Mork, Jonas
    et al.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology.
    Cantwell, John
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Reasoning with Safety Factor Rules2007In: Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology, ISSN 1091-8264, Vol. 11, no 1, p. 55-70Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Safety factor rules are used for drawing putatively reasonable conclusions from incomplete datasets. The paper attempts to provide answers to four questions: “How are safety factors used?”, “When are safety factors used?”, “Why are safety used?” and “How do safety factor rules relate to decision theory?”. The authors conclude that safety factor rules should be regarded as decision methods rather than as criteria of rightness and that they can be used in both practical and theoretical reasoning. Simplicity of application and inability or unwillingness to defer judgment appear to be important factors in explaining why the rules are used.

  • 21.
    Edvardsson Björnberg, Karin
    et al.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Cantwell, John
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Hansson, Sven Ove
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Self-Defeating GoalsArticle in journal (Other academic)
  • 22.
    Hansson, Sven Ove
    et al.
    Philosophy and History, KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Edvardsson Björnberg, Karin
    Philosophy and History, KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Cantwell, John
    Philosophy and History, KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Self-Defeating Goals2016In: Dialectica, ISSN 0012-2017, E-ISSN 1746-8361, Vol. 70, no 4, p. 491-512Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The typical function of goals is to regulate action in a way that furthers goal achievement. Goals are typically set on the assumption that they will help bring the agent(s) closer to the desired state of affairs. However, sometimes endorsement of a goal, or the processes by which the goal is set, can obstruct its achievement. When this happens, the goal is self-defeating. Self-defeating goals are common in both private and social decision-making but have not received much attention by decision theorists. In this paper, we investigate different variants of three major types of self-defeating mechanisms: (1) The goal can be an obstacle to its own fulfilment (self-defeating goal endorsement), (2) goal-setting activities can impede goal achievement (self-defeating goal-setting), and (3) disclosure of the goal can interfere with its attainment (self-defeating goal disclosure). Different strategies against self-defeasance are tentatively explored, and their efficiency against different types of self-defeasance is investigated.

  • 23.
    Hansson, Sven Ove
    et al.
    KTH, Superseded Departments, History of Science and Technology.
    Ferme, E. L.
    Cantwell, John
    KTH, Superseded Departments, History of Science and Technology.
    Falappa, M. A.
    Credibility limited revision2001In: Journal of Symbolic Logic (JSL), ISSN 0022-4812, E-ISSN 1943-5886, Vol. 66, no 4, p. 1581-1596Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Five types of constructions are introduced for non-prioritized belief revision, ie:, belief revision in which the input sentence is not always accepted. These constructions include generalizations of entrenchment-based and sphere-based revision. Axiomatic characterizations are provided, and close interconnections are shown to hold between the different constructions.

  • 24. Schubert, Johan
    et al.
    Cantwell, John
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Computationally efficient multiple hypothesis association of intelligence reports2006In: 2006 9th International Conference on Information Fusion, Vols 1-4, 2006, p. 961-966Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper we develop a computationally efficient multiple hypothesis association algorithm for generation of alternative association hypotheses regarding cluster memberships of intelligence reports represented as belief functions. We have previously an O((NK2)-K-2) clustering algorithm using a measure of pairwise conflicts, and a fast algorithm for classification of clusters using a more advanced measure. As these measures are similar but not identical and may have different minima we generate additional multiple association hypotheses around the solution found by the clustering algorithm. These hypotheses may then be evaluated by the classification algorithm in order to find the best overall classification of all clusters. In order to maintain the computational complexity we will investigate algorithms that run in no worse than O((NK2)-K-2) time.

1 - 24 of 24
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