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  • 1.
    Aurell, Alexander
    KTH, Skolan för teknikvetenskap (SCI), Matematik (Inst.), Matematisk statistik.
    Mean-Field Type Games between Two Players Driven by Backward Stochastic Differential Equations2018Inngår i: Games, ISSN 2073-4336, E-ISSN 2073-4336, Vol. 9, nr 5Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper, mean-field type games between two players with backward stochastic dynamics are defined and studied. They make up a class of non-zero-sum, non-cooperating, differential games where the players’ state dynamics solve backward stochastic differential equations (BSDE) that depend on the marginal distributions of player states. Players try to minimize their individual cost functionals, also depending on the marginal state distributions. Under some regularity conditions, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of Nash equilibria. Player behavior is illustrated by numerical examples, and is compared to a centrally planned solution where the social cost, the sum of playercosts, is minimized. The inefficiency of a Nash equilibrium, compared to socially optimal behavior, is quantified by the so-called price of anarchy. Numerical simulations of the price of anarchy indicate how the improvement in social cost achievable by a central planner depends on problem parameters.

  • 2.
    Aurell, Alexander
    et al.
    KTH, Skolan för teknikvetenskap (SCI), Matematik (Inst.), Matematisk statistik.
    Djehiche, Boualem
    KTH, Skolan för teknikvetenskap (SCI), Matematik (Inst.), Matematisk statistik.
    Mean-field type modeling of nonlocal crowd aversion in pedestrian crowd dynamics2018Inngår i: SIAM Journal of Control and Optimization, ISSN 0363-0129, E-ISSN 1095-7138, Vol. 56, nr 1, s. 434-455Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    We extend the class of pedestrian crowd models introduced by Lachapelle and Wolfram [Transp. Res. B: Methodol., 45 (2011), pp. 1572–1589] to allow for nonlocal crowd aversion and arbitrarily but finitely many interacting crowds. The new crowd aversion feature grants pedestrians a “personal space” where crowding is undesirable. We derive the model from a particle picture and treat it as a mean-field type game. Solutions to the mean-field type game are characterized via a Pontryagin-type maximum principle. The behavior of pedestrians acting under nonlocal crowd aversion is illustrated by a numerical simulation.

  • 3.
    Aurell, Alexander
    et al.
    KTH, Skolan för teknikvetenskap (SCI), Matematik (Inst.), Matematisk statistik.
    Djehiche, Boualem
    KTH, Skolan för teknikvetenskap (SCI), Matematik (Inst.), Matematisk statistik.
    Modeling tagged pedestrian motion: A mean-field type game approach2019Inngår i: Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, ISSN 0191-2615, E-ISSN 1879-2367, Vol. 121, s. 168-183Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper suggests a model for the motion of tagged pedestrians: Pedestrians moving towards a specified targeted destination, which they are forced to reach. It aims to be a decision-making tool for the positioning of fire fighters, security personnel and other services in a pedestrian environment. Taking interaction with the surrounding crowd into account leads to a differential nonzero-sum game model where the tagged pedestrians compete with the surrounding crowd of ordinary pedestrians. When deciding how to act, pedestrians consider crowd distribution-dependent effects, like congestion and crowd aversion. Including such effects in the parameters of the game, makes it a mean-field type game. The equilibrium control is characterized, and special cases are discussed. Behavior in the model is studied by numerical simulations.

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