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  • 201.
    Fröding, Barbro
    et al.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History, Philosophy.
    Osika, W.
    Conclusions2015In: SpringerBriefs in Ethic, Springer Nature , 2015, p. 99-110Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    On providing a brief summary of the arguments presented in the book Chap. 6 turns to discuss the potential for combining a wider range of life-style practices for greater effects. Examples include classical education, physical as well as mental training and playing specialized computer games. A brief resume of Aristotle’s account of eudaimonia including the idea that agents who are successful in instilling virtues plausibly can be taken to lead happier lives than those who fail to do so is presented. This Chapter also comments on the potential of embedding structures and how such measures might incentivize more pro-social behavior.

  • 202.
    Fröding, Barbro
    et al.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History, Philosophy.
    Osika, W.
    Introduction2015In: SpringerBriefs in Ethic, Springer Nature , 2015, p. 1-22Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This chapter provides a background and a schematic overview of the book. In this volume we argue that meditation enables us to influence some aspects of our biological make-up and could, for example, boost our cognitive flexibility as well as our ability (and propensity) to act compassionately. Then we proceed to seek to connect a number of such changes to an improved capacity for instilling and maintaining a range of character traits (primarily epistemic virtues) as identified by Aristotle and some modern virtue epistemologists. Cultivating the virtues is of course beneficial for the individual but it seems likely that it also has a positive effect on the surrounding society and their fellow citizens.

  • 203.
    Fröding, Barbro
    et al.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History, Philosophy.
    Osika, W.
    Neuroenhancement: How mental training and meditation can promote epistemic virtue2015Book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This book explores how one can bring about changes in the brain through meditation, both through attention-focus training and through compassion training. Recent findings in the natural sciences have confirmed that it is possible for humans to achieve these structural and functional changes through various life-style practices. It is argued that meditation enables us to influence some aspects of our biological make-up and, for example, could boost our cognitive flexibility as well as our ability to act compassionate. Such changes are likely to facilitate the instilling of a number of epistemic virtues which have great bearing on our quality of life. This book offers the reader an accessible introduction to a set of neuro-enhancement methods, with a special focus on meditation techniques, and explores how such practices could contribute to make us better decision-makers and improve our moral virtues. The book is suitable for anyone looking for a text discussing the effects of neuro-enhancement from a secular ethics perspective.

  • 204.
    Fröding, Barbro
    et al.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History, Philosophy.
    Osika, W.
    Some Key Elements of Virtue Ethics2015In: SpringerBriefs in Ethic, Springer Nature , 2015, p. 73-98Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The purpose of this chapter is two-fold. In Part A we explain some key aspects of virtue ethics e.g. including eudaimonia (the good life), the concept of the virtues and the development of stable character traits. For space reasons this will be very brief but should provide some theoretical background for the more general discussion in this book. To be clear, this is not intended as an authoritative, or exegetic, reading of Aristotle. Rather, our aspiration is to suggest that many of the ideas in the Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle’s central work on ethics) make for a highly useful approach to modern moral problems. In Part B we focus on epistemic virtues, both traditional and modern, and provide examples of their role in decision-making. We also show how the cognitive improvements from previous chapters can both increase the commitment to the type of life described by Aristotle, and boost the capacity for cultivation the necessary epistemic virtues.

  • 205.
    Fröding, Barbro
    et al.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History, Philosophy.
    Osika, W.
    The Methods2015In: SpringerBriefs in Ethic, Springer Nature , 2015, p. 41-61Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Chapter 1 introduced the key ideas and identified the need for cognitive improvements. The first half of Chap. 2 consisted of a schematic review of the neurophysiological background for the development of such capacities. It was, for example, explained that the adult brain is plastic enough for both functional and structural changes to take place. The latter half of Chap. 2 was devoted to exploring three types of mental training techniques which, in evidence based studies, have been shown to have a positive, lasting and generalizable effect on cognitive capacities. Evidently these techniques are not without problems, nor are they the only methods around. The present chapter discusses some alternative methods for improving cognitive capacities. It includes an introductory account of how some pharmaceuticals and certain types of technology can be used to improve our cognitive skills and what risks that might attach to such practices.

  • 206.
    Fröding, Barbro
    et al.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History, Philosophy.
    Osika, W.
    The Neurophysiological Background2015In: SpringerBriefs in Ethic, Springer Nature , 2015, p. 23-39Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This chapter begins by providing a schematic review of the neurophysiological background for the development of a set of capacities e.g. cognitive flexibility, meta awareness and emotional regulation. This includes a brief account of the evidence based scientific studies showing that we can change—i.e. that the adult human brain is plastic enough. We have our biological set up, and it is probably a pre-requisite that we are getting to know our limitations as well as our possibilities, in order to perform the changes that are warranted. Then we turn to the question of how to bring about such changes. In this chapter we examine the changes that regular mental training in the form of meditation can have on the adult brain and behavior.

  • 207.
    Fröding, Barbro
    et al.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History, Philosophy.
    Peterson, M
    Friendly AI2020In: Ethics and Information Technology, ISSN 1388-1957, E-ISSN 1572-8439Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper we discuss what we believe to be one of the most important features of near-future AIs, namely their capacity to behave in a friendly manner to humans. Our analysis of what it means for an AI to behave in a friendly manner does not presuppose that proper friendships between humans and AI systems could exist. That would require reciprocity, which is beyond the reach of near-future AI systems. Rather, we defend the claim that social AIs should be programmed to behave in a manner that mimics a sufficient number of aspects of proper friendship. We call this “as-if friendship”. The main reason for why we believe that ‘as if friendship’ is an improvement on the current, highly submissive behavior displayed by AIs is the negative effects the latter can have on humans. We defend this view partly on virtue ethical grounds and we argue that the virtue-based approach to AI ethics outlined in this paper, which we call “virtue alignment”, is an improvement on the traditional “value alignment” approach.

  • 208.
    Fröding, Barbro
    et al.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Peterson, M.
    Why computer games can be essential for human flourishing2013In: Journal of Information, Communication and Ethics in Society, ISSN 1477-996X, E-ISSN 1758-8871, Vol. 11, no 2, p. 81-91Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to argue that playing computer games for lengthy periods of time, even in a manner that will force the player to forgo certain other activities normally seen as more important, can be an integral part of human flourishing. Design/methodology/approach: The authors' claim is based on a modern reading of Aristotle's Nichomacean Ethics. It should be emphasized that the authors do not argue that computer gaming and other similar online activities are central to all people under all circumstances; but only seek to show that the claim holds true for some people under some circumstances and the authors try to spell out the relevant circumstances in detail. Findings: The authors provide a list of situations in which playing computer games for lengthy periods of time, in a manner that will force the player to forgo certain other activities normally seen as more important, is an integral part of human flourishing. Originality/value: The paper puts some novel pressure on the widely-held belief that playing computer games for lengthy periods of time, in a manner that will force the player to forgo certain other activities normally seen as more important. The paper claims that playing some computer games and partaking in some forms of online activities could be highly conducive to what it actually means in practice to take care of oneself and, to paraphrase Aristotle, to be eager for fine actions.

  • 209.
    Fröding, Barbro
    et al.
    Faculty of philosophy, University of Oxford.
    Peterson, Martin
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Animal Ethics Based on Friendship2011In: Journal of Animal Ethics, ISSN 2156-5414, Vol. 1, no 1, p. 58-69Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 210.
    Fröding, Barbro
    et al.
    Faculty of philosophy, University of Oxford.
    Peterson, Martin
    Animals and Friendship: a reply to Rowlands2011In: Journal of Animal Ethics, ISSN 2156-5414, Vol. 1, no 2, p. 187-189Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 211.
    Fröding, Barbro
    et al.
    Lincoln College, Oxford.
    Peterson, Martin
    Section of Philosophy and Ethics, Eindhoven University of Technology.
    Virtuous Choice and Parity2012In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, ISSN 1386-2820, E-ISSN 1572-8447, Vol. 15, no 1, p. 71-82Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article seeks to contribute to the discussion on the nature of choice in virtue theory. If several different actions are available to the virtuous agent, they are also likely to vary in their degree of virtue, at least in some situations. Yet, it is widely agreed that once an action is recognised as virtuous there is no higher level of virtue. In this paper we discuss how the virtue theorist could accommodate both these seemingly conflicting ideas. We discuss this issue from a modern Aristotelian perspective, as opposed to a purely exegetic one. We propose a way of resolving what seems to be a major clash between two central features of virtue ethics. Our proposal is based on the notion of parity, a concept which recently has received considerable attention in the literature on axiology. Briefly put, two alternatives are on a par (or are 'roughly equal') if they are comparable, although it is not the case that one is better than the other, nor that they are equally good. The advantages of applying the concept of parity to our problem are twofold. Firstly, it sheds new light on the account of choice in virtue theory. Secondly, some of the criticisms that have been mounted against the possibility of parity can be countered by considering the notion of choice from a virtue theory perspective.

  • 212.
    Fröding, Barbro
    et al.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Peterson, Martin
    Why virtual friendship is no genuine friendship2012In: Ethics and Information Technology, ISSN 1388-1957, E-ISSN 1572-8439, Vol. 14, no 3, p. 201-207Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Based on a modern reading of Aristotle's theory of friendship, we argue that virtual friendship does not qualify as genuine friendship. By 'virtual friendship' we mean the type of friendship that exists on the internet, and seldom or never is combined with real life interaction. A 'traditional friendship' is, in contrast, the type of friendship that involves substantial real life interaction, and we claim that only this type can merit the label 'genuine friendship' and thus qualify as morally valuable. The upshot of our discussion is that virtual friendship is what Aristotle might have described as a lower and less valuable form of social exchange.

  • 213.
    Gabrielsson, Catharina
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Architecture.
    Folded ground: escape from Cape Town2016In: Deleuze and the City / [ed] Frichot, H., Gabrielsson, C., Metzger, J., Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016, p. 209-223Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 214.
    Gabrielsson, Catharina
    et al.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Architecture.
    Frichot, Hélène
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Architecture.
    Metzger, Jonathan
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Urban Planning and Environment, Urban and Regional Studies.
    Deleuze and the City2016 (ed. 1)Book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Uses the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari to interrogate what cities can do

    Defining the lives of a majority of the world’s population, the question of ‘the city’ has risen to the fore as one the most urgent issues of our time – uniting concerns across the terrain of climate policies, global financing, localised struggles and multi-disciplinary research.

    Deleuze and the City rests on a conviction that philosophy is crucially important for advancing knowledge on cities, and for allowing us to envisage new forms of urban life toward a more sustainable future. It gathers some of the most original thinkers and accomplished scholars in contemporary urban studies, showing how Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophical project is essential for our thinking through the multi-scalar, uneven and contested landscapes that constitute ‘the city’ today.

    Dispelling the old question of what the city is, this collection provides a nuanced mapping of situations emerging in concrete urban settings across the globe, ranging from the ‘laboratory urbanism' of an Austrian ski resort and a ‘sustainable’ Swedish shopping mall to the ‘urbicidal’ refurbishments of Haifa.

  • 215.
    Gabrielsson, Catharina
    et al.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Architecture.
    Frichot, Hélène
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Architecture.
    Metzger, Jonathan
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Urban Planning and Environment, Urban and Regional Studies.
    Introduction: What a City Can Do2016In: Deleuze and the City / [ed] Frichot, H., Gabrielsson, C., Metzger, J., Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016, p. 1-12Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 216.
    Godman, Marion
    et al.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Hansson, Sven Ove
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Public advice on the development of nanobiotechnology: Final report of four european convergence seminars2007Report (Other academic)
  • 217. Gouldson, A
    et al.
    Lidskog, Rolf
    Wester, Misse
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    The battle for hearts and minds?: Evolutions in corporate approaches to environmental risk communication2007In: Environment and Planning. C, Government and Policy, ISSN 0263-774X, E-ISSN 1472-3425, Vol. 25, no 1, p. 56-72Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In recent years there has been a great deal of discussion on the potential for a shift away from modernistic or technocratic approaches to decisionmaking on risk towards more open, inclusive, and deliberative approaches. The authors consider (a) the reasons why some companies have taken the first step in this transition by exploring the potential of more open and communicative approaches to environmental risk management, and (b) the effects that opening up can have, particularly on perceived levels of trust between corporations and stakeholders on matters relating to environmental risk. For the companies surveyed, the nature of their activities, the significance of formative events, and the failure of more traditional forms of risk communication to reduce conflict and to build trust amongst stakeholders have impelled them to experiment with new approaches to risk communication. It is found that, in the short term, such experiments are seen by managers to have had mixed effects: in contexts where trust had already been lost, open engagement can lead to an initial deterioration in relations between companies and stakeholders. However, it is also argued that in the longer term trust can be built through such open engagements. It is suggested, therefore, that opening up and engaging on matters relating to environmental risk may lead to a 'j-curve effect', with an initial deterioration in levels of trust being followed by a gradual improvement in levels of credibility and shared understanding over time.

  • 218.
    Grange, Kristina
    Chalmers tekniska högskola, Arkitekturens teori och historia.
    Kris i byggbranschen?: Om behovet av att re-designa praktiken2004In: Nordisk arkitekturforskning, ISSN 1102-5824, no 3, p. 59-72Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 219.
    Grill, Kalle
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Against anti-paternalismManuscript (Other academic)
  • 220.
    Grill, Kalle
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology.
    Anti-paternalism2006Licentiate thesis, comprehensive summary (Other scientific)
    Abstract [en]

    This is a thesis about anti-paternalism – the liberal doctrine that we may not interfere with a person’s liberty for her own good. Empirical circumstances and moral values may certainly give us reason to avoid benevolent interference. Anti-paternalism as a normative doctrine should, however, be rejected.

    Essay I concerns the definitions of paternalism and anti-paternalism. It is argued that only a definition of paternalism in terms of compound reason-actions can accommodate its special moral properties. Definitions in terms of actions, common in the literature, cannot. It is argued, furthermore, that in specifying the reason-actions in further detail, the notion of what is self-regarding, as opposed to other-regarding, is irrelevant, contrary to received opinion.

    Essay II starts out with the definition of paternalism defended in essay I and claims that however this very general definition is specified, anti-paternalism is unreasonable and should be rejected. Anti-paternalism is the position that certain reasons – referring one way or the other to the good of a person, give no valid normative support to certain actions – some kind of interferences with the same person. Since the reasons in question are normally quite legitimate and important reasons for action, a convincing argument for anti-paternalism must explain why they are invalid in cases of interference. A closer look at the reasons and actions in question provides no basis for such an explanation.

    Essay III considers a concrete case of benevolent interference – the withholding of information concerning uncertain threats to public health in the public’s best interest. Such a policy has been suggested in relation to the European Commission’s proposed new system for the Registration, Evaluation, and Authorisation of Chemicals (REACH). Information about uncertain threats to health from chemicals would allegedly spread anxiety and depression and thus do more harm than good. The avoidance of negative health effects is accepted as a legitimate and good reason for withholding of information, thus respecting the conclusion of essay II, that anti-paternalism should be rejected. Other reasons, however, tip the balance in favour of making the information available. These reasons include the net effects on knowledge, psychological effects, effects on private decisions and effects on political decisions.

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  • 221.
    Grill, Kalle
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology.
    Anti-paternalism and Invalidation of ReasonsManuscript (preprint) (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
    Abstract [en]

    Anti-paternalism can fruitfully be interpreted as a principle of invalidation of reasons. That a reason for an action is invalid means that the reason is blocked from influencing the moral status of the action. More specifically, anti-paternalism blocks personal good reasons from influencing the moral status of certain interfering actions. Actions are only interfering in this sense if they target choice or action that is sufficiently voluntary. Antipaternalism so interpreted is unreasonable on three grounds. First, it essentially entails that the degree to which a person acts voluntarily determines whether or not her good provides reasons for action. This leads to wrong answers to moral questions. Second, anti-paternalism entails peculiar jumps in justifiability at the threshold of voluntary enough. Third, anti-paternalism imposes a distinction in kind between the value of respecting choices that are sufficiently voluntary and choices that are not. This distinction is untenable and diverts our attention away from the relative strength of reasons. Invalidation in general is unreasonable on the same grounds.

  • 222.
    Grill, Kalle
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology.
    Anti-paternalism and Public Health Policy2009Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This thesis is an attempt to constructively interpret and critically evaluate the liberal doctrine that we may not limit a person’s liberty for her own good, and to discuss its implications and alternatives in some concrete areas of public health policy. The thesis starts theoretical and goes ever more practical. The first paper is devoted to positive interpretation of anti-paternalism with special focus on the reason component – personal good. A novel generic definition of paternalism is proposed, intended to capture, in a generous fashion, the object of traditional liberal resistance to paternalism – the invocation of personal good reasons for limiting of or interfering with a person’s liberty. In the second paper, the normative aspect of this resistance is given a somewhat technical interpretation in terms of invalidation of reasons – the blocking of reasons from influencing the moral status of actions according to their strength. It is then argued that normative anti-paternalism so understood is unreasonable, on three grounds: 1) Since the doctrine only applies to sufficiently voluntary action, voluntariness determines validity of reasons, which is unwarranted and leads to wrong answers to moral questions. 2) Since voluntariness comes in degrees, a threshold must be set where personal good reasons are invalidated, leading to peculiar jumps in the justifiability of actions. 3) Anti-paternalism imposes an untenable and unhelpful distinction between the value of respecting choices that are sufficiently voluntary and choices that are not. The third paper adds to this critique the fourth argument that none of the action types typically proposed to specify the action component of paternalism is such that performing an action of that type out of benevolence is essentially morally problematic. The fourth paper ignores the critique in the second and third papers and proposes, in an anti-paternalistic spirit, a series of rules for the justification of option-restricting policies aimed at groups where some members consent to the policy and some do not. Such policies present the liberal with a dilemma where the value of not restricting people’s options without their consent conflicts with the value of allowing people to shape their lives according to their own wishes. The fifth paper applies the understanding of anti-paternalism developed in the earlier papers to product safety regulation, as an example of a public health policy area. The sixth paper explores in more detail a specific public health policy, namely that of mandatory alcohol interlocks in all cars, proposed by the former Swedish government and supported by the Swedish National Road Administration. The policy is evaluated for cost-effectiveness, for possible diffusion of individual responsibility, and for paternalistic treatment of drivers. The seventh paper argues for a liberal policy in the area of dissemination of information about uncertain threats to public health. The argument against paternalism is based on common sense consequentialist considerations, avoiding any appeal to the normative anti-paternalism rejected earlier in the thesis.

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  • 223.
    Grill, Kalle
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology.
    Anti-paternalism and Public Health Policy: The Case of Product Safety Legislation2009In: Annual Conference of the Society-for-Applied-Philosophy, Farnham: Ashgate , 2009, p. 101-110Conference paper (Other academic)
  • 224.
    Grill, Kalle
    KTH.
    Anti-paternalism and public health policy: The case of product safety legislation2012In: The Philosophy of Public Health, Ashgate Publishing Ltd , 2012, p. 101-110Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 225.
    Grill, Kalle
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Liberalism, Altruism and Group Consent2009In: Public Health Ethics, ISSN 1754-9973, E-ISSN 1754-9981, Vol. 2, no 2, p. 146-157Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article first describes a dilemma for liberalism: On the one hand restricting their own options is an important means for groups of people to shape their lives. On the other hand, group members are typically divided over whether or not to accept option-restricting solutions or policies. Should we restrict the options of all members of a group even though some consent and some do not? This dilemma is particularly relevant to public health policy, which typically target groups of people with no possibility for individuals to opt out. The article then goes on to propose and discuss a series of aggregation rules for individual into group consent. Consideration of a number of scenarios shows that such rules cannot be formulated only in terms of fractions of consenters and non-consenters, but must incorporate their motives and how much they stand to win or lose. This raises further questions, including what is the appropriate impact of altruistic consenters and non-consenters, what should be the impact of costs and benefits and whether these should be understood as gross or net. All these issues are dealt with in a liberal, anti-paternalistic spirit, in order to explore whether group consent can contribute to the justification of option-restricting public health policy.

  • 226.
    Grill, Kalle
    KTH.
    Paternalism2012In: Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics, Elsevier BV , 2012, 2, p. 359-369Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Paternalism means, roughly, benevolent interference - benevolent because it aims at promoting or protecting a person's good, and interference because it restricts a person's liberty without his consent. The paternalist believes herself superior in that she can secure some benefit for the person that he himself will not secure. Paternalism is opposed by the liberal tradition, at least when it targets sufficiently voluntary behavior. In legal contexts, policies may be paternalistic for some and not for others, forcing trade-offs. In medical contexts, paternalism can be an open or hidden aspect of the relationship between caregiver and patient.

  • 227.
    Grill, Kalle
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Paternalism and private spheresManuscript (Other academic)
  • 228.
    Grill, Kalle
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology.
    Paternalistic InterferenceManuscript (preprint) (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    In order that paternalism, understood as benevolent interference, should be a morally relevant category, there would have to be something morally significant about the combination of benevolence and interference that goes beyond that of interference as such. In the context of paternalism, interference is almost universally defined in terms of either liberal values such as liberty, autonomy or sovereignty, or a self-regarding sphere of life, or operationalizations of the liberal values in terms of choice, decision or agency, or coercion, or wronging. A survey of these five accounts shows that none provide a definition on which paternalism is morally relevant. We should therefore understand paternalism as a conflict between typical liberal values and other values for a person, which but must be resolved in different ways in different contexts.

  • 229.
    Grill, Kalle
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    The legalization of drugs2007In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5825, E-ISSN 1755-2567, Vol. 73, p. 248-255Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 230.
    Grill, Kalle
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology.
    The Normative Core of Paternalism2007In: Res Publica, ISSN 1356-4765, E-ISSN 1572-8692, Vol. 13, no 4, p. 441-458Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The philosophical debate on paternalism is conducted as if the property of being paternalistic should be attributed to actions. Actions are typically deemed to be paternalistic if they amount to some kind of interference with a person and if the rationale for the action is the good of the person interfered with. This focus on actions obscures the normative issues involved. In particular, it makes it hard to provide an analysis of the traditional liberal resistance to paternalism. Given the fact that actions most often have mixed rationales, it is not clear how we should categorize and evaluate interfering actions for which only part of the rationale is the good of the person. The preferable solution is to attribute the property of being paternalistic not to actions, but to compounds of reasons and actions. The framework of action–reasons provides the tools for distinguishing where exactly paternalism lies in the complex web of reasons and actions.

  • 231.
    Grill, Kalle
    et al.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology.
    Hansson, Sven Ove
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology.
    Epistemic Paternalism in Public Health2005In: Journal of Medical Ethics, ISSN 0306-6800, E-ISSN 1473-4257, Vol. 31, no 11, p. 648-653Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Receiving information about threats to one’s health can contribute to anxiety and depression. In contemporary medical ethics there is considerable consensus that patient autonomy, or the patient’s right to know, in most cases outweighs these negative effects of information. Worry about the detrimental effects of information has, however, been voiced in relation to public health more generally. In particular, information about uncertain threats to public health, from—for example, chemicals—are said to entail social costs that have not been given due consideration. This criticism implies a consequentialist argument for withholding such information from the public in their own best interest. In evaluating the argument for this kind of epistemic paternalism, the consequences of making information available must be compared to the consequences of withholding it. Consequences that should be considered include epistemic effects, psychological effects, effects on private decisions, and effects on political decisions. After giving due consideration to the possible uses of uncertain information and rebutting the claims that uncertainties imply small risks and that they are especially prone to entail misunderstandings and anxiety, it is concluded that there is a strong case against withholding of information about uncertain threats to public health.

  • 232.
    Grill, Kalle
    et al.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology.
    Nihlén Fahlquist, Jessica
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology.
    Responsibility, Paternalism and Alcohol InterlocksIn: Ethics of Health Promotion, SpringerChapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Drink driving causes great suffering and material destruction. The alcohol interlock promises to eradicate this problem by technological design. Traditional counter-measures to drink driving such as policing and punishment and information campaigns have proven insufficient. Extensive policing is expensive and arguably intrusive. Severe punishment may be disproportionate to the risks created in most single cases. If the interlock becomes inexpensive and convenient enough, and if there are no convincing moral objections to the device, it may prove the only feasible as well as the only justifiable solution to the problem of drink driving. Taking this to heart, the former Swedish government, supported by the National Road Administration and a 2006 final report of the Alcohol Interlock Commission, proposed that interlocks should be required as standard equipment in all cars. This article assesses two possible moral objections to a policy of mandatory interlocks: 1) That it displaces the responsibility of individual drivers, and 2) that it constitutes a paternalistic interference with drivers. The first objection is found unconvincing, while the second has only limited bite and may be neutralized if paternalism is accepted for the sake of greater net liberty. If technological development can make mandatory interlocks cost-efficient, the proposed policy seems a commendable public health measure.

  • 233.
    Grill, Kalle
    et al.
    Uppsala Univ, Sweden.
    Nihlén Fahlquist, Jessica
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Responsibility, Paternalism and Alcohol Interlocks2012In: Public Health Ethics, ISSN 1754-9973, E-ISSN 1754-9981, Vol. 5, no 2, p. 116-127Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Drink driving causes great suffering and material destruction. The alcohol interlock promises to eradicate this problem by technological design. Traditional counter-measures to drink driving such as policing and punishment and information campaigns have proven insufficient. Extensive policing is expensive and intrusive. Severe punishment is disproportionate to the risks created in most single cases. If the interlock becomes inexpensive and convenient enough, and if there are no convincing moral objections to the device, it may prove the only feasible as well as the only justifiable solution to the problem of drink driving. A policy of universal alcohol interlocks, in all cars, has been proposed by several political parties in Sweden and is supported by the National Road Administration and the 2006 Alcohol Interlock Commission. This article assesses two possible moral objections to a policy of universal interlocks: (i) that it displaces the responsibility of individual drivers and (ii) that it constitutes a paternalistic interference with drivers. The first objection is found unconvincing, while the second has only limited bite and may be neutralized if paternalism is accepted for the sake of greater net liberty. Given the expected technological development, the proposed policy seems a commendable health promotion measure for the near future.

  • 234.
    Grillner, Katja
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Architecture, Critical Studies in Architecture.
    Att drömma om regnbågens slut och horisontens faktiska vara.1996In: Arkitektur, Vol. 1996:2, s. 49-51 : ill.Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 235.
    Grillner, Katja
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Architecture, Critical Studies in Architecture.
    Four essays framed: (questions of imagination, interpretation and representation in architecture)1997Book (Other academic)
  • 236.
    Grillner, Katja
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Architecture, Critical Studies in Architecture.
    The primacy of perplexion: working architecture through a distracted order of experience : part I - fictional reality in search...1995In: Nordisk arkitekturforskning, Vol. 1995 (8:1), s. 55-67 : ill.Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 237.
    Grune-Yanoff, Till
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History, Philosophy. Helsinki University, Finland.
    Interdisciplinary success without integration2016In: European Journal for Philosophy of Science, ISSN 1879-4912, E-ISSN 1879-4920, Vol. 6, no 3, p. 343-360Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Some scholars see interdisciplinarity as a special case of a broader unificationist program. They accept the unification of the sciences as a regulative ideal, and derive from this the normative justification of interdisciplinary research practices. The crucial link for this position is the notion of integration: integration increases the cohesion of concepts and practices, and more specifically of explanations, ontologies, methods and data. Interdisciplinary success then consists in the integration of fields or disciplines, and this constitutes success in the sense that unification is epistemically desirable. In contrast to this account, I defend the thesis that successful interdisciplinary interaction does not necessarily imply the integration of these disciplines. I show this at the hand of two cases. In both the case of evolutionary game theory and the case of hyperbolic discounting, genuine interdisciplinary exchange took place. From both exchanges, the respective economic fields emerged substantially altered - it wasn't just a juxtaposition of disciplines in which disciplinary identities remained unchanged. Yet in neither case did the disciplines integrate. Rather, they developed their own concepts and methods, their own explanations, own ontologies, and their own views of what proper data standards were. Furthermore, the fields that emerged from these exchanges were very successful, if measured at the hand of properties like explanatory success, increase of control, bibliometrics and grant yields. Thus, I argue, there are cases of interdisciplinary success without integration.

  • 238. Grune-Yanoff, Till
    et al.
    Rosencrantz, Holger
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Beneficial safety decreases2011In: Theory and Decision, ISSN 0040-5833, E-ISSN 1573-7187, Vol. 70, no 2, p. 195-213Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We construct a model of rational choice under risk with biased risk judgement. On its basis, we argue that sometimes, a regulator aiming at maximising social welfare should affect the environment in such a way that it becomes 'less safe' in common perception. More specifically, we introduce a bias into each agent's choice of optimal risk levels: consequently, in certain environments, agents choose a behaviour that realises higher risks than intended. Individuals incur a welfare loss through this bias. We show that by deteriorating the environment, the regulator can motivate individuals to choose behaviour that is less biased, and hence realises risk levels closer to what individuals intended. We formally investigate the conditions under which such a Beneficial Safety Decrease-i.e. a deteriorating intervention that has a positive welfare effect-exists. Finally, we discuss three applications of our model.

  • 239.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History, Philosophy. Royal Inst Technol, Dept Philosophy & Hist Technol, Stockholm, Sweden..
    A cooperative species: human reciprocity and its evolution2015In: Journal of economic methodology, ISSN 1350-178X, E-ISSN 1018-5070, Vol. 22, no 1, p. 128-134Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 240. Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    Action explanations are not inherently normative2008In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5817, E-ISSN 1558-5816, Vol. 74, no 1, p. 60-78Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Inherent normativity is the claim that intentional action explanations necessarily have to comply with normatively understood rationality constraints on the ascribed propositional attitudes. This paper argues against inherent normativity in three steps. First, it presents three examples of actions successfully explained with propositional attitudes, where the ascribed attitudes violate relevant rationality constraints. Second, it argues that the inference rules that systematise propositional attitudes are qualitatively different from rationality constraints both in their justification and their recipients. Third, it rejects additional conditions on propositional attitudes, which purport to necessitate a normative commitment. Thus, inherent normativity is rejected; and with it the claim that intentional action explanations differ substantially from other explanations because they are inherently normative.

  • 241.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    University of Helsinki, Finland.
    Agent-Based Models as Policy Decision Tools: The Case of Smallpox Vaccination2011In: Simulation and Gaming: An Interdisciplinary Journal, ISSN 1046-8781, Vol. 42, no 2, p. 225-242Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Agent-based simulation (ABS) studies have recently been employed to support policy decisions. This article addresses the particular potentials and problems that ABS faces in this usage. First, the author warns against taking "familiarity" with specific ABS as a criterion for having confidence in the model's policy recommendations. Second, he shows that specific epistemic issues-in particular the high number of detailed simulated systems-require additional reflection on which decision rules to choose for policy decisions based on ABS. Third, the author points out directions in which the construction and uses of ABS in policy decision could be improved. Each of these issues is illustrated by simulation studies undertaken to investigate smallpox vaccination policies.

  • 242.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Appraising Models Nonrepresentationally2013In: Philosophy of science (East Lansing), ISSN 0031-8248, E-ISSN 1539-767X, Vol. 80, no 5, p. 850-861Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Many scientific models lack an established representation relation to actual targets andinstead refer to merely possible processes, background conditions, and results. This articleshows how such models can be appraised. On the basis of the discussion of how-possiblyexplanations, five types of learning opportunities are distinguished. For each of thesetypes, an example—from economics, biology, psychology, and sociology—is discussed.Contexts and purposes are identified in which the use of a model offers a genuine opportunityto learn. These learning opportunities offer novel justifications for modeling practicesthat fall between the cracks of standard representationalist appraisals of models.

  • 243.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Artificial Worlds and Simulation2011In: Sage Handbook of Philosophy of Social Science / [ed] Ian C. Jarvie and Jesus Zamora Bonilla, Sage Publications, 2011, p. 613-631Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 244.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History.
    Behavioral Public Policy: One Name, Many Types. A Mechanistic Perspective2021In: The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Economics, Informa UK Limited , 2021, p. 480-493Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Behavioral public policy (BPP) is often treated as a single type, as witnessed, for example, in the popular use of the “nudge” label to encompass all BPP and also in the academic discussion of the pros and cons of BPP generally. A municipality might offer consumers a choice of energy providers, setting a slightly more expensive but more sustainable provider as the default. A lot of evidence for such context sensitivities can be found in experimental studies of BPP. Most experiments investigate the effect size of an intervention on subjects’ behavior, either in a laboratory or in some specific field context. Recorded effect sizes for many behavioral interventions vary widely. Information policies are not equally sensitive to all of these factors, though. Information about consequences is not likely to be sensitive to technological access, nor is procedural information to peer network. 

  • 245.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History, Philosophy.
    Behavioural Public Policy2015In: Economics and Philosophy, ISSN 0266-2671, E-ISSN 1474-0028, Vol. 31, no 3, p. 500-506Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 246.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History, Philosophy.
    Boosts: A Remedy for Rizzo and Whitman's Panglossian Fatalism2021In: Review of Behavioral Economics, ISSN 2326-6198, E-ISSN 2326-6201, Vol. 8, no 3-4, p. 285-303Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    I identify two problematic conclusions that remain somewhat implicit in Rizzo and Whitman's book: the Panglossian conclusion that whatever the individual thinks or wants is best for her, and the Fatalistic conclusion that there are no justified paternalistic interventions. Against the first conclusion, I critically discuss the authors' arguments against consistency-based rationality. Against the second, I show that there is a whole class of paternalistic interventions, Boosts, that do not require Rizzo and Whitman's demanding epistemic preconditions in order to be successful.

  • 247.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History, Philosophy.
    Boosts vs. nudges from a welfarist perspective2018In: Revue d' Economie politique, ISSN 0373-2630, E-ISSN 2105-2883, Vol. 128, no 2, p. 209-224Article, review/survey (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper compares two kinds of behavioral policies, boost and nudges, with respect to the normative questions they need to answer. Both policies are committed to welfarism - i.e. to respecting individuals' subjective reflected attitudes as the basis of judgment about what is good for them. However, because the two policy types affect behavior change in different ways, different normative requirements arise from this commitment. Nudges affect the choice context so as to change behavior, making use of behavioral evidence for stable relations between contextual features and behavioral outcomes. This intervention works irrespective of the nudged individual's understanding, evaluation or participation. Consequently, it is the nudge proponent who must argue that in the planned intervention, the nudge corrects a mistake and leads to a better outcome that is not compromised by the nudging procedure. Boosts, in contrast, affect behavior by training people in the use of decision tools. This intervention works only with the boosted individual's understanding, approval and active participation. Consequently, the boost proponent does not need to answer the difficult normative questions of mistake, welfare improvement or procedural compromise. Although it might be that nudge proponents can answer these questions for many situations, they constitute a normative burden for nudges that boosts can avoid. In this regard, boosts are therefore preferable to nudges.

  • 248.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Bounded Rationality2007In: Philosophy Compass, E-ISSN 1747-9991, Vol. 2, no 3, p. 534-563Article, review/survey (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The notion of bounded rationality has recently gained considerable popularity in the behavioural and social sciences. This article surveys the different usages of the term, in particular the way ‘anomalosus’ behavioural phenomena are elicited, how these phenomena are incorporated in model building, and what sort of new theories of behaviour have been developed to account for bounded rationality in choice and in deliberation. It also discusses the normative relevance of bounded rationality, in particular as a justifier of non-standard reasoning and deliberation heuristics. For each of these usages, the overview discusses the central methodological problems.

  • 249.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    University of Helsinki.
    Dancing at gunpoint: A review of Herbert Gintis's The bounds of reason: game theory and the unification of the behavioral sciences2010In: Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, E-ISSN 1876-9098, Vol. 3, no 2, p. 111-118Article, book review (Refereed)
  • 250.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    University of Helsinki, Finland.
    Economic Models as Credible Worlds or as Isolating Tools?2009Collection (editor) (Refereed)
2345678 201 - 250 of 1036
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