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  • 251. Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    Evolutionary Game Theory, Interpersonal Comparisons and Natural Selection: A Dilemma2011In: Philosophy and Biology, ISSN 0169-3867, Vol. 26, no 5, p. 637-654Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    When social scientists began employing evolutionary game theory (EGT) in their disciplines, the question arose what the appropriate interpretation of the formal EGT framework would be. Social scientists have given different answer, of which I distinguish three basic kinds. I then proceed to uncover the conceptual tension between the formal framework of EGT, its application in the social sciences, and these three interpretations. First, I argue that EGT under the biological interpretation has a limited application in the social sciences, chiefly because strategy replication often cannot be sensibly interpreted as strategy bearer reproduction in this domain. Second, I show that alternative replication mechanisms imply interpersonal comparability of strategy payoffs. Giving a meaningful interpretation to such comparisons is not an easy task for many social situations, and thus limits the applicability of EGT in this domain. Third, I argue that giving a new interpretation both to strategy replication and selection solves the issue of interpersonal comparability, but at the costs of making the new interpretation incompatible with natural selection interpretations of EGT. To the extent that social scientists seek such a natural selection interpretation, they face a dilemma: either face the challenge that interpersonal comparisons pose, or give up on the natural selection interpretation. By identifying these tensions, my analysis pleas for greater awareness of the specific purposes of EGT modelling in the social sciences, and for greater sensitivity to the underlying microstructure on which the evolutionary dynamics and other EGT solution concepts supervene.

  • 252.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History, Philosophy.
    Framing2016In: Logic, Argumentation and Reasoning, Springer Science and Business Media B.V. , 2016, p. 189-215Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The concept of framing, experimental evidence supporting framing effects, and models and theories of decision-making sensitive to framing play important roles in policy analysis. First, they are used to caution about various elements of uncertainty that are introduced through framing into policy interventions. Second, framing is often referred to in order to justify certain policy interventions, as framing effects are often seen as sources of irrationality in need of correction. Third, framing effects are often used as instruments for policy-making, as they are seen as effective ways to influence behaviour. This review discusses the different concepts of framing, surveys some of the experimental evidence, describes the dominant descriptive theories and the main attempts to assess the rationality or irrationality of behaviour sensitive to framing in order to clarify how exactly framing is relevant for policy making.

  • 253.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    University of Helsinki.
    Game Theory2008In: Internet Encyclopaedia of PhilosophyArticle, review/survey (Refereed)
  • 254.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Genuineness resolved: A reply to Reiss' purported paradox2013In: Journal of economic methodology, ISSN 1350-178X, E-ISSN 1018-5070, Vol. 20, no 3, p. 255-261Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This response to Reiss 'explanatory paradox' argues that some economic models might be true, and that many economic models are not intended for providing how-actually explanations, but rather how-possibly explanations. Therefore, two assumptions of Reiss' paradox are not true, and the paradox disappears.

  • 255. Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    Isolation is Not Characteristic of Models2011In: International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, ISSN 0269-8595, E-ISSN 1469-9281, Vol. 25, no 2, p. 119-137Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Modelling cannot be characterized as isolating, nor models as isolations. This article presents three arguments to that effect, against Uskali Maki's account of models. First, while isolation proceeds through a process of manipulation and control, modelling typically does not proceed through such a process. Rather, modellers postulate assumptions, without seeking to justify them by reference to a process of isolation. Second, while isolation identifies an isolation basea concrete environment it seeks to control and manipulatemodelling typically does not identify such a base. Rather, modellers construct their models without reference to concrete environments, and only later seek to connect their models to concrete situations of the real world. Third, Maki argues that isolation employs idealization to control for disturbing factors, but does not affect the factors or mechanisms that are supposed to be isolated. However, models typically make idealizing assumptions about the factors and mechanisms that are the focus of investigation. Thus, even the product of modelling often cannot be characterized as isolation.

  • 256. Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    Learning from Minimal Economic Models2009In: Erkenntnis, ISSN 0165-0106, E-ISSN 1572-8420, Vol. 70, no 1, p. 81-99Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    It is argued that one can learn from minimal economic models. Minimal models are models that are not similar to the real world, do not resemble some of its features, and do not adhere to accepted regularities. One learns from a model if constructing and analysing the model affects one's confidence in hypotheses about the world. Economic models, I argue, are often assessed for their credibility. If a model is judged credible, it is considered to be a relevant possibility. Considering such relevant possibilities may affect one's confidence in necessity or impossibility hypotheses. Thus, one can learn from minimal economic models.

  • 257. Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    Mismeasuring the Value of Statistical Life2009In: Journal of economic methodology, ISSN 1350-178X, E-ISSN 1018-5070, Vol. 16, no 2, p. 109-123Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The value of a statistical life (VSL) is an important tool for cost-benefit analysis of regulatory policies that concern fatality risks. Its proponents claim that it measures people's risk preferences, and that VSL therefore is a tool of vicarious governance. This paper criticizes the revealed preference method for measuring VSL. It specifies three minimal conditions for vicarious governance: sensitivity, fairness and hypothetical compromise, and shows that the VSL measure, in its common application in policy formation and analysis, violates these conditions. It therefore concludes that the revealed preference VSL measure, in its current form, is not a tool of vicarious governance.

  • 258.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki, Fabianinkatu 24 (P.O. Box 4), 00014, Finland.
    Models as Products of Interdisciplinary Exchange: Evidence from Evolutionary Game Theory2011In: Studies in history and philosophy of science, ISSN 0039-3681, E-ISSN 1879-2510, Vol. 42, no 2, p. 386-397Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The development of evolutionary game theory (EGT) is closely linked with two interdisciplinary exchanges: the import of game theory into biology, and the import of biologists' version of game theory into economics. This paper traces the history of these two import episodes. In each case the investigation covers what exactly was imported, what the motives for the import were, how the imported elements were put to use, and how they related to existing practices in the respective disciplines. Two conclusions emerged from this study. First, concepts derived from the unity of science discussion or the unification accounts of explanation are too strong and too narrow to be useful for analysing these interdisciplinary exchanges. Secondly, biology and economics at least in relation to EGT show significant differences in modelling practices: biologists seek to link EGT models to concrete empirical situations, whereas economists pursue conceptual exploration and possible explanation.

  • 259.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Models of Mechanisms: The Case of the Replicator Dynamics2013In: Mechanism and Causality in Biology and Economics / [ed] Hsiang-Ke Chao, Szu-Ting Chen, Roberta L. Millstein, Springer Berlin/Heidelberg, 2013, p. 83-100Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The general replicator dynamics (RD) is a formal equation that is used in biology to represent biological mechanisms and in the social sciences to represent social mechanisms. For either of these purposes, I show that substantial idealisations have to be made – idealisations that differ for the respective disciplines. These create a considerable idealisation gap between the biologically interpreted RD and the learning interpretations of the RD. I therefore argue that these interpretations represent different mechanisms, even though they are interpretations of the same formal RD equation. Furthermore, I argue that this idealisation gap between the biological and economic models is too wide for the respective mechanisms to share a common abstract causal structure that could be represented by the general RD model.

  • 260.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History, Philosophy. TINT Finnish Ctr Excellence Philosophy Social Sci, Helsinki, Finland.
    Models of Temporal Discounting 1937-2000: An Interdisciplinary Exchange between Economics and Psychology2015In: Science in Context, ISSN 0269-8897, E-ISSN 1474-0664, Vol. 28, no 4, p. 675-713Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Argument Today's models of temporal discounting are the result of multiple interdisciplinary exchanges between psychology and economics. Although these exchanges did not result in an integrated discipline, they had important effects on all disciplines involved. The paper describes these exchanges from the 1930s onwards, focusing on two episodes in particular: an attempted synthesis by psychiatrist George Ainslie and others in the 1970s; and the attempted application of this new discounting model by a generation of economists and psychologists in the 1980s, which ultimately ended in the diversity of measurements disappointment. I draw four main conclusions. First, multiple notions of temporal discounting must be conceptually distinguished. Second, behavioral economics is not an integration or unification of psychology and economics. Third, the analysis identifies some central disciplinary markers that distinguish modeling strategies in economics and psychology. Finally, it offers a case of interdisciplinary success that does not fit the currently dominant account of interdisciplinarity as integration.

  • 261.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Old Wine In New Casks: Libertarian Paternalism Still Violates Liberal Principles2012In: Social Choice and Welfare, ISSN 0176-1714, E-ISSN 1432-217X, Vol. 38, no 4, p. 635-645Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Libertarian Paternalism (LP) purports to be a kind of paternalism that is "liberty-preserving" and hence compatible with liberal principles. In this paper, I argue against this compatibility claim. I show that LP violates core liberal principles, first because it limits freedom, and secondly because it fails to justify these limitations in ways acceptable to liberal positions. In particular, Libertarian Paternalists argue that sometimes it is legitimate to limit people's liberties if it improves their welfare. A closer look at the welfare notions used, however, reveals that they respect neither the subjectivity nor the plurality of people's values. Thus its justification of the liberty-welfare trade-off is not compatible with liberal principles. I conclude that to justify LP policies, one must appeal to traditional paternalistic principles-and thus, there is no categorical difference between "libertarian" and other forms of paternalism.

  • 262.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    Epistemology, Decision Theory, Ethics, and Social Implications of Risk.
    Paradoxes of Rational Choice Theory2012In: Handbook of Risk Theory: Epistemology, Decision Theory, Ethics, and Social Implications of Risk / [ed] R. Hillerbrand, P. Sandin, S. Roeser, M. Peterson, Dordrecht: Springer, 2012Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 263. Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    Philosophy of Simulation2010In: Simulation and Gaming: An Interdisciplinary Journal, ISSN 1046-8781, Vol. 41, no 1, p. 1-31Article, review/survey (Refereed)
  • 264.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    Helsinki Collegium of Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki.
    Preference Change and Conservatism: comparing the Bayesian and the AGM models of preference revision2012In: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, E-ISSN 1573-0964, Vol. 190, no 14, p. 2623-2641Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Richard Bradley's Bayesian model of preference kinematics is compared with Sven Ove Hansson's AGM-style model of preference revision. Both seek to model the revision of preference orders as a consequence of retaining consistency when some preferences change. Both models are often interpreted normatively, as giving advice on how an agent should revise her preferences. I raise four criticisms of the Bayesian model: it is unrealistic; it neglects an important change mechanism; it disregards endogenous information relevant to preference change, in particular about similarity and incompleteness; and its representational framework, when expanded with similarity comparisons, may give misleading advice. These criticisms are based on a principle of conservatism, and on two proposals of similarity metrics for the Bayesian model. The performance of the Bayesian model, with and without the similarity metrics, is then tested in three different cases of preference change, and compared to the performance of the AGM model.

  • 265.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Proposition-Preferences and World-Preferences: Connecting the Two Levels2006In: Proceedings of the XXI World Congress of Philosophy / [ed] Stephen Voss, Berna Kilinc, and Gürol Irzik, 2006Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 266. Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    Rational Choice Theory and Bounded Rationality2010In: Religion, Economy, and Evolution / [ed] Ilkka Pyysiäinen, Berlin: De Gruyter , 2010Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 267.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History, Philosophy.
    Reflections on the 2017 Nobel memorial prize awarded to Richard Thaler2017In: Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, E-ISSN 1876-9098, Vol. 10, no 2, p. 61-75Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 268.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    London Sch Econ, London, England.
    Review of Machine Dreams: Economics Becomes a Cyborg Science by P. Mirowski2004In: Economica, ISSN 0013-0427, E-ISSN 1468-0335, Vol. 71, no 284, p. 694-696Article, book review (Refereed)
  • 269.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Review of The Elgar Companion to Economics and Philosophy by J. B. Davis, A. Marciano and J. Runde2006In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5817, E-ISSN 1558-5816, Vol. 72, no 3, p. 253-258Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 270.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Review of The Structure of Values and Norms, by S.O. Hansson2004In: Economics and Philosophy, ISSN 0266-2671, E-ISSN 1474-0028, Vol. 20, no 2, p. 396-403Article, book review (Refereed)
  • 271.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History, Philosophy.
    Seven problems with massive simulation models for policy decision-making2017In: The Science and Art of Simulation I: Exploring - Understanding - Knowing, Springer, 2017, p. 85-101Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Policymakers increasingly draw on scientific methods, including simulation modeling, to justify their decisions. For these purposes, scientist and policymakers face an extensive choice of modeling strategies. This paper distinguishes two types of strategies: Massive Simulation Models (MSMs) and Abstract Simulation Models (ASMs), and discusses how to justify strategy choice with reference to the core characteristics of the respective strategies. In particular, I argue that MSMs might have more severe problems than ASMs in determining the accuracy of the model; that MSMs might have more severe problems than ASMs in dealing with inevitable uncertainty; and that MSMs might have more severe problems than ASMs with misinterpretation and misapplication due to their format. While this in no way excludes the prospect that some MSMs provide good justifications for policy decisions, my arguments caution against a general preference for MSM over ASMs for policy decision purposes.

  • 272.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History, Philosophy.
    Teaching philosophy of science to scientists: Why, what and how2014In: European Journal for Philosophy of Science, ISSN 1879-4912, E-ISSN 1879-4920, Vol. 4, no 1, p. 115-134Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper provides arguments to philosophers, scientists, administrators and students for why science students should be instructed in a mandatory, custom-designed, interdisciplinary course in the philosophy of science. The argument begins by diagnosing that most science students are taught only conventional methodology: a fixed set of methods whose justification is rarely addressed. It proceeds by identifying seven benefits that scientists incur from going beyond these conventions and from acquiring abilities to analyse and evaluate justifications of scientific methods. It concludes that teaching science students these skills makes them better scientists. Based on this argument, the paper then analyses the standard philosophy of science curriculum, and in particular its adequacy for teaching science students. It is argued that the standard curriculum on the one hand lacks important analytic tools relevant for going beyond conventional methodology-especially with respect to non-epistemic normative aspects of scientific practice-while on the other hand contains many topics and tools that are not relevant for the instruction of science students. Consequently, the optimal way of training science students in the analysis and evaluation of scientific methods requires a revision of the standard curriculum. Finally, the paper addresses five common characteristics of students taking such a course, which often clash with typical teaching approaches in philosophy. Strategies how best to deal with these constraints are offered for each of these characteristics.

  • 273.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    The Explanatory Potential of Artificial Societies2001In: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, E-ISSN 1573-0964, Vol. 169, p. 539-555Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 274.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    KTH, Superseded Departments (pre-2005), History of Science and Technology.
    The problems of testing preference axioms with revealed preference theory2004In: Analyse & Kritik. Zeitung für linke Debatte und Praxis, ISSN 0171-5860, E-ISSN 2365-9858, Vol. 26, no 2, p. 382-397Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 275.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    University of Helsinki, Finland.
    Welfare Notions for Soft Paternalism2009In: Papers on Economics and Evolution, ISSN 1430-4716, no 917Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 276.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History, Philosophy.
    Why behavioural policy needs mechanistic evidence2016In: Economics and Philosophy, ISSN 0266-2671, E-ISSN 1474-0028, Vol. 32, no 3, p. 463-483Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Proponents of behavioural policies seek to justify them as evidence-based'. Yet they typically fail to show through which mechanisms these policies operate. This paper shows - at the hand of examples from economics and psychology - that without sufficient mechanistic evidence, one often cannot determine whether a given policy in its target environment will be effective, robust, persistent or welfare-improving. Because these properties are important for justification, policies that lack sufficient support from mechanistic evidence should not be called evidence-based'.

  • 277.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Why Don't You Want to Be Rich?: Preference Explanations on the Basis of Causal Structure2007In: Causation and Explanation: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, vol. 4 / [ed] Keim Campbell, O'Rourke and Silverstein, MIT Press, 2007, p. 217-240Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 278.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    et al.
    University of Helsinki, Finland.
    Hansson, Sven Ove
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    From Belief Revision to Preference Change2009In: Preference Change: Approaches from Philosophy, Economics and Psychology / [ed] Grüne-Yanoff, Till and S. O. Hansson, Dordrecht: Springer, 2009, p. 159-184Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 279.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    et al.
    University of Helsinki, Finland.
    Hansson, Sven Ove
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Preference Change: An Introduction2009In: Preference Change: Approaches from Philosophy, Economics and Psychology / [ed] Grüne-Yanoff, Till and S. O. Hansson, Dordrecht: Springer, 2009Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 280.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    et al.
    University of Helsinki, Finland.
    Hansson, Sven OveKTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Preference Change: Approaches from Philosophy, Economics and Psychology2009Collection (editor) (Refereed)
  • 281.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    et al.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Hansson, Sven Ove
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Preferences2006In: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy / [ed] Edward N. Zalta, Stanford: The Metaphysics Research Lab , 2006Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 282.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    et al.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Lindblom, Lars
    The Interactive Nature of Work Incentives2008In: Perspectives on Work: Problems, Insights, Challenges / [ed] Otto Neumaier, Gottfried Schweiger, Clemens Sedmak, Münster-Hamburg-London: LIT Publisher Group , 2008, p. 51-62Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 283.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    et al.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History, Philosophy.
    Marchionni, C.
    Moscati, I.
    Introduction: methodologies of bounded rationality2014In: Journal of economic methodology, ISSN 1350-178X, E-ISSN 1018-5070, Vol. 21, no 4, p. 325-342Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The modelling of bounded rationality is currently pursued by approaches that exhibit a wide diversity of methodologies. This special issue collects five contributions that discuss different methodological aspects of these approaches. In our introduction, we map the variety of methodological positions with respect to three questions. First, what kinds of evidence do the respective approaches consider relevant for modelling bounded rationality? Second, what kind of modelling desiderata do the respective approaches focus on? And third, how do the respective approaches justify the normative validity of bounded rationality? To broaden the picture, we not only discusss the five contributions of this issue, but also include relevant positions from the extant literature.

  • 284.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    et al.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History, Philosophy.
    Marchionni, Caterina
    Univ Helsinki, Ctr Philosophy Social Sci, Dept Polit & Econ Studies, Unioninkatu 40A, FIN-00014 Helsinki, Finland..
    Feufel, Markus A.
    Tech Univ Berlin, Dept Psychol & Ergon, Div Ergon, Marchstr 23,MAR 3-2, D-10587 Berlin, Germany..
    TOWARD A FRAMEWORK FOR SELECTING BEHAVIOURAL POLICIES: HOW TO CHOOSE BETWEEN BOOSTS AND NUDGES2018In: Economics and Philosophy, ISSN 0266-2671, E-ISSN 1474-0028, Vol. 34, no 2, p. 243-266Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper, we analyse the difference between two types of behavioural policies - nudges and boosts. We distinguish them on the basis of the mechanisms through which they are expected to operate and identify the contextual conditions that are necessary for each policy to be successful. Our framework helps judging which type of policy is more likely to bring about the intended behavioural outcome in a given situation.

  • 285.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    et al.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    McClennen, Edward
    Hume's Framework for a Natural History of the Passions2007In: David Hume's Political Economy / [ed] Carl Wennerlind and Margaret Schabas, London: Routledge, 2007, p. 86-104Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 286. Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    et al.
    Ruphy, Stephanie
    Simpson, John
    Weirich, Paul
    Philosophical and Epistemological Issues in Simulation and Gaming2011In: Journal Simulation & Gaming, ISSN 1046-8781, E-ISSN 1552-826X, Vol. 42, no 2, p. 151-154Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Philosophy finds simulation and gaming intriguing because of the epistemological issues that they raise. For example, how do simulations of a phenomenon help to explain that phenomenon? This collection of essays addresses such issues and hopes to stimulate additional investigations in this fascinating area.

  • 287. Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    et al.
    Schweinzer, Paul
    The Roles of Stories in Applying Game Theory2008In: Journal of economic methodology, ISSN 1350-178X, E-ISSN 1018-5070, Vol. 15, no 2, p. 131-146Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Game-theoretic models consist of a formal game structure and an informal model narrative or story. When game theory is employed to model economic situations, the stories play a central role in interpreting, constructing and solving game structures. We analyse the architecture of game theory and distinguish between game models and the theory proper. We present the different functions of the model narrative in the application of game models to economic situations. In particular, we show how model narratives support the choice of solution concepts defined and provided by the theory proper. We further argue that the narrative's role in interpretation, construction and solution makes it a necessary part of a game model that is intended to be a model of an economic situation. We conclude that game theory is not a universal theory of rationality, but only offers tools to model specific situations at varying degrees and kinds of rationality.

  • 288.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    et al.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History, Philosophy.
    Verreault-Julien, P.
    How-possibly explanations in economics: anything goes?2021In: Journal of economic methodology, ISSN 1350-178X, E-ISSN 1018-5070, Vol. 28, no 1, p. 114-123Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The recent literature on economic models has rejected the traditional requirement that their epistemic value necessary depended on them offering actual explanations of phenomena. Contributors to that literature have argued that many models do not aim at providing how-actually explanations, but instead how-possibly explanations. However, how to assess the epistemic value of HPEs remains an open question. We present a programmatic approach to answering it. We first introduce a conceptual framework that distinguishes how-actually explanations from how-possibly explanations and that further differentiates between epistemic and objective how-possibly explanations. Secondly, we show how that framework can be used for methodological appraisal as well as for understanding methodological controversies.

  • 289.
    Gurov, Dilian
    et al.
    KTH, School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (EECS), Computer Science, Theoretical Computer Science, TCS.
    Westman, Jonas
    KTH, School of Industrial Engineering and Management (ITM), Machine Design (Dept.), Mechatronics. Systems Development Division, Scania AB, Södertälje, Sweden.
    A Hoare Logic Contract Theory: An Exercise in Denotational Semantics2018In: Principled Software Development: Essays Dedicated to Arnd Poetzsch-Heffter on the Occasion of his 60th Birthday, Springer Nature , 2018, p. 119-127Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    We sketch a simple theory of Hoare logic contracts for programs with procedures, presented in denotational semantics. In particular, we give a simple semantic justification of the usual procedure-modular treatment of such programs. The justification is given by means of a proof of soundness of a contract-relative denotational semantics against the standard denotational semantics of procedures in the context of procedure declarations. The suggested formal development can be used as an inspiration for more ambitious contract theories.

  • 290.
    Gustafsson, Johan E.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    A Money-Pump for Acyclic Intransitive Preferences2010In: Dialectica, ISSN 0012-2017, E-ISSN 1746-8361, Vol. 64, no 2, p. 251-257Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The standard argument for the claim that rational preferences are transitive is the pragmatic money-pump argument. However, a money-pump only exploits agents with cyclic strict preferences. In order to pump agents who violate transitivity but without a cycle of strict preferences, one needs to somehow induce such a cycle. Methods for inducing cycles of strict preferences from non-cyclic violations of transitivity have been proposed in the literature, based either on offering the agent small monetary transaction premiums or on multi-dimensional preferences. This paper argues that previous proposals have been flawed and presents a new approach based on the dominance principle.

  • 291.
    Gustafsson, Johan E.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    A Note in Defence of Ratificationism2011In: Erkenntnis, ISSN 0165-0106, E-ISSN 1572-8420, Vol. 75, no 1, p. 147-150Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Andy Egan argues that neither evidential nor causal decision theorygives the intuitively right recommendation in the cases The Smoking Lesion, ThePsychopath Button, and The Three-Option Smoking Lesion. Furthermore, Eganargues that we cannot avoid these problems by any kind of ratificationism. Thispaper develops a new version of ratificationism that gives the right recommendations.Thus, the new proposal has an advantage over evidential and casual decisiontheory and standard ratificationist evidential decision theory.

  • 292.
    Gustafsson, Johan E.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    An extended framework for preference relations2011In: Economics and Philosophy, ISSN 0266-2671, E-ISSN 1474-0028, Vol. 27, no 2, p. 101-108Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In order to account for non-traditional preference relations the present paper develops a new, richer framework for preference relations. This new framework provides characterizations of non-traditional preference relations, such as incommensurateness and instability, that may hold when neither preference nor indifference do. The new framework models relations with swaps, which are conceived of as transfers from one alternative state to another. The traditional framework analyses dyadic preference relations in terms of a hypothetical choice between the two compared alternatives. The swap framework extends this approach by analysing dyadic preference relations in terms of two hypothetical choices: the choice between keeping the first of the compared alternatives or swapping it for the second; and the choice between keeping the second alternative or swapping it for the first.

  • 293.
    Gustafsson, Johan E.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Erratum: AN EXTENDED FRAMEWORK FOR PREFERENCE RELATIONS (vol 27, pg 101, 2011)2011In: Economics and Philosophy, ISSN 0266-2671, E-ISSN 1474-0028, Vol. 27, no 3, p. 359-367Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 294.
    Gustafsson, Johan E.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology.
    Essays on value, preference and freedom2009Licentiate thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Essay I develops a new framework for preference relations, that makes further preference relations beyond the trichotomy of preference, dispreference and indifference conceptually possible. The new framework models relations in terms of swaps, which are conceived of as transfers from one alternative state to another. With this new preference framework the essay presents a fitting-attitude analysis of new value relations that avoids some problems of earlier proposals.

    Essay II examines the small-improvement argument that is usually considered the most powerful argument against comparability, that is, the view that for any two alternatives an agent is rationally required to either prefer one of the alternatives to the other or be indifferent between them. The essay argues that while there might be reasons to believe each of the premises in the small-improvement argument, there is a conflict between these reasons. The conflict is such that we are not provided with a reason to believe the conjunction of the premises.

    Essay III develops a new measure of freedom of choice based on the proposal that a set offers more freedom of choice than another if, and only if, the expected degree of dissimilarity between a random alternative from the set of possible alternatives and the most similar offered alternative in the set is smaller. Furthermore, a version of this measure is developed that is able to take into account the values of the possible options.

  • 295.
    Gustafsson, Johan E.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology.
    Freedom of choice and expected compromise2010In: Social Choice and Welfare, ISSN 0176-1714, E-ISSN 1432-217X, Vol. 35, no 1, p. 65-79Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article develops a new measure of freedom of choice based on the proposal that a set offers more freedom of choice than another if, and only if, the expected degree of dissimilarity between a random alternative from the set of possible alternatives and the most similar offered alternative in the set is smaller. Furthermore, a version of this measure is developed, which is able to take into account the values of the possible options.

  • 296.
    Gustafsson, Johan E.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Phenomenal Continuity and the Bridge Problem2011In: Philosophia, ISSN 0048-3893, E-ISSN 1574-9274, Vol. 39, no 2, p. 289-296Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Any theory that analyses personal identity in terms of phenomenal continuity needs to deal with the ordinary interruptions of our consciousness that it is commonly thought that a person can survive. This is the bridge problem. The present paper offers a novel solution to the bridge problem based on the proposal that dreamless sleep need not interrupt phenomenal continuity. On this solution one can both hold that phenomenal continuity is necessary for personal identity and that persons can survive dreamless sleep.

  • 297.
    Gustafsson, Johan E.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Preference and Choice2011Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
    Download full text (pdf)
    Thesis
  • 298.
    Gustafsson, Johan E.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology.
    Value and Preference Relations in Terms of Swapping2009Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 299.
    Gustafsson, Johan E.
    et al.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology.
    Espinoza, Nicolas
    Conflicting Reasons in the Small-Improvement Argument2010In: The Philosophical Quarterly, ISSN 0031-8094, E-ISSN 1467-9213, Vol. 60, no 241, p. 754-763Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The small-improvement argument is usually considered the most powerful argument against comparability, viz the view that for any two alternatives an agent is rationally required either to prefer one of the alternatives to the other or to be indifferent between them. We argue that while there might be reasons to believe each of the premises in the small-improvement argument, there is a conflict between these reasons. As a result, the reasons do not provide support for believing the conjunction of the premises. Without support for the conjunction of the premises, the small-improvement argument for incomparability fails.

  • 300.
    Gustafsson, Johan E.
    et al.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
    Peterson, Martin
    A computer simulation of the argument from disagreement2012In: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, E-ISSN 1573-0964, Vol. 184, no 3, p. 387-405Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper we shed new light on the Argument from Disagreement by putting it to test in a computer simulation. According to this argument widespread and persistent disagreement on ethical issues indicates that our moral opinions are not influenced by any moral facts, either because no such facts exist or because they are epistemically inaccessible or inefficacious for some other reason. Our simulation shows that if our moral opinions were influenced at least a little bit by moral facts, we would quickly have reached consensus, even if our moral opinions were affected by factors such as false authorities, external political shifts, and random processes. Therefore, since no such consensus has been reached, the simulation gives us increased reason to take seriously the Argument from Disagreement. Our conclusion is however not conclusive; the simulation also indicates what assumptions one has to make in order to reject the Argument from Disagreement. The simulation algorithm we use builds on the work of Hegselmann and Krause (J Artif Soc Social Simul 5(3); 2002, J Artif Soc Social Simul 9(3), 2006).

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