In Sweden, environmental policy is essentially carried out through a system of environmental objectives adopted by Parliament in the late 1990s. This system contains principles, objectives, interim targets, strategies, and follow-up mechanisms, which together provide a solid ground for increased efficiency and improved prioritization in environmental policies. Despite the ambitious approach of the Swedish Parliament, the system of environmental objectives suffers from certain shortcomings. Some of the objectives are imprecise and difficult to evaluate, and there are no rules or principles that may be used to solve goal conflicts and to prioritize between different objectives. As a consequence, the environmental objectives tend to differ in their degrees of operationalizability, and the priority-setting between different objectives is often unclear.

For priority-setting purposes, simple criteria are needed to estimate, provisionally, the inherent properties of potential carcinogens for which adequate data are not available. Expected utility analysis is used to evaluate three such criteria from a decision-theoretic point of view: (1) the species criterion, which assigns lower priority to experimental than to epidemiological carcinogens, (2) the genotoxicity criterion, which prioritizes substances known to be genotoxic, and (3) the potency criterion, which apportions priorities according to carcinogenic potencies that are derived from animal experiments. The outcome of this analysis is favorable to the potency criterion. It is concluded that considerations of potency should have a much more prominent role than what they have in current regulatory practice.

Mainstream moral theories deal with situations in which the outcome of each possible action is well-determined and knowable. In order to make ethics relevant for problems of risk and uncertainty, moral theories have to be extended so that they cover actions whose outcomes are not determinable beforehand. One approach to this extension problem is to develop methods for appraising probabilistic combinations of outcomes. This approach is investigated and shown not to solve the problem. An alternative approach is then developed. Its starting-point is that everyone has a prime facie moral right not to be exposed to risk. However, this right can be overridden fi the risk-exposure is part of an equitable system for risk-taking that works to the advantage of the individual risk-exposed person.

In addition to traditional fallacies such as ad hominem, discussions of risk contain logical and argumentative fallacies that are specific to the subject-matter. Ten such fallacies are identified, that can commonly be found in public debates on risk. They are named as follows: the sheer size fallacy, the converse sheer size fallacy, the fallacy of naturalness, the ostrich's fallacy, the proof-seeking fallacy, the delay fallacy, the technocratic fallacy, the consensus fallacy, the fallacy of pricing, and the infallibility fallacy.

The advantages and disadvantages of formalization in philosophy are summarized. It is concluded that formalized philosophy is an endangered speciality that needs to be revitalized and to increase its interactions with non-formalized philosophy. The enigmatic style that is common in philosophical logic must give way to explicit discussions of the problematic relationship between formal models and the philosophical concepts and issues that motivated their development.

From experiments or epidemiological studies designed to search for a particular toxic effect, it is in general possible to determine an upper bound for that effect. This observed bounded effect level (OBEL) is defined for both positive and negative experiments. It is non-zero even for negative experiments, and it is inversely related to the size of the exposed group. The OBEL can be used to determine the linearly extrapolated bounded effect level (LEBEL) for various effect doses. Contrary to no-observed-effect' levels (NOELs), LEBEL values are designed to protect against type 11 (false negative) errors. It is proposed that LEBEL values replace NOELs as a tool for decision-making.

The paper introduces ten open problems in belief revision theory, related to the representation of the belief state, to different notions of degrees of belief, and to the nature of change operations. It is argued that these problems are all issues in philosophical logic, in the strong sense of requiring inputs from both logic and philosophy for their solution.

Contrary to the received view, decision theory is not primarily devoted to instrumental (ends-to-means) reasoning. Instead, its major preoccupation is the derivation of ends from other ends. Given preferences over basic alternatives, it constructs preferences over alternatives that have been modified through the addition of value object modifiers (modes) that specify probability, uncertainty, distance in time etc. A typology of the decision-theoretical modes is offered. The modes do not have (even extrinsic) value, but they transform the value of objects to which they are applied. A rational agent's total set of preferences should be coherent, but from this it does not follow that her preferences over mode-containing objects have to be derivable from her preferences over mode-free objects.

Modern industrialised societies have been described both as knowledge societies and as risk societies. The article analyses the relations between the terms knowledge, information, data, uncertainty, ignorance, and risk, and discusses the sense in which a society can be characterised by one of them. The role of uncertainty and risk in modern society is further examined. An explanation is offered why it need not be contradictory to describe present-day societies as both knowledge societies and societies characterised by risk or uncertainty.

It is almost universally acknowledged that risks have to be weighed against benefits, but there are different ways to perform the weighing. In conventional risk analysis, collectivist risk-weighing is the standard. This means that an option is accepted if the sum of all individual benefits outweighs the sum of all individual risks. In practices originating in clinical medicine, such as ethical appraisals of clinical trials, individualist risk-weighing is the standard. This implies a much stricter criterion for risk acceptance, namely that the risk to which each individual is exposed should be outweighed by benefits for that same individual. The different choices of risk-weighing methods in different policy areas seem to have emerged from traditional thought patterns and social relations, rather than from explicit deliberations on possible justifications for the alternative ways to weigh risks against benefits. It is not obvious how the prevalent differences in risk-weighing practices can be reconstructed in terms of consistent underlying principles of preventive health or social priority-setting.

In order to clarify the concept of equal opportunities we need an accurate definition of opportunity. Opportunities can be defined in terms of qualifying actions through which an agent can achieve an advantageous position. It is concluded that equal opportunities is often used as a catchword in cases when opportunities are not really equal, and no one tries seriously to make them so. In many of these cases it would have been more accurate to speak of open opportunities and procedural justice. These are important enough aspects of social justice, that should be appreciated for what they are, rather than being falsely represented as equal opportunities.

Five types of constructions are introduced for non-prioritized belief revision, ie:, belief revision in which the input sentence is not always accepted. These constructions include generalizations of entrenchment-based and sphere-based revision. Axiomatic characterizations are provided, and close interconnections are shown to hold between the different constructions.

Although stability is a central notion in several academic disciplines, the parallels remain unexplored since previous discussions of the concept have been almost exclusively subject-specific. In the literature we have found three basic concepts of stability, that we call constancy, robustness, and resilience. They are all found in both the natural and the social sciences. To analyze the three concepts we introduce a general formal framework in which stability relates to transitions between states. It can then be shown that robustness is a limiting case of resilience, whereas neither constancy nor resilience can be defined in terms of the other. Hence, there are two basic concepts of stability, both of which are used in both the social and the natural sciences. This congruence in the concepts of stability is of particular interest for endeavours to construct models that represent both natural and social phenomena.

The legal systems for the classification and labelling of chemical substances have an incentives structure that discourages rather than encourages companies to test their products. This is shown in a logical analysis of the European classification system and also in an analysis of recent changes in the classification of individual substances. Finally two methods to improve the incentives structure are proposed and discussed: the introduction of negative clauses that allow new information to lead to less strict classifications, and a new danger-class and a symbol (a question mark) that indicates serious lack of data.

For most of the chemical substances that are subject to regulatory and industrial decision making, important toxicological data are missing. The available dataset is often difficult to interpret, and the differences between alternative, scientifically reasonable interpretations may have major impact on decision making. Since such uncertainties are an important factor in decision making it is essential that they be reported in a transparent and understandable way. In order to clarify how toxicologists report uncertainties, 30 risk assessments for one and the same substance (trichloroethylene) from the years 1973-2001 were searched for phrases indicating uncertainty. These phrases can be divided between four categories: contentual, epistemic, conditionalising, and inferential uncertainty indicators. A typology of uncertainty indicators, based on these categories, is proposed. It is concluded that the use of uncertainty indicators in these texts is not transparent and that the development of standardised uncertainty indicators should significantly improve communications both within the scientific community and between scientists and policymakers.

This paper introduces a theoretical framework for the evaluation of workplace inspections with respect to their effects on working conditions. The choice of a concept of efficiency is discussed, and its relation to criteria for a good working environment is clarified. It concludes that in order to obtain reliable information on the effects of different inspection methods, it is necessary to perform controlled comparative studies in which different methods are used in different workplaces. Given the ease with which such studies can be performed, it is surprising how few have been made. The studies that are available provide sufficient evidence that inspections can increase compliance with regulations and that they can also increase workplace safety, but not much can be concluded about the relative efficiency of different inspection methods.

In this paper we discuss how rights-based moral theories can increase our understanding of siting controversies. It is argued that the notion of residual obligations can be used to overcome, at least in part, the conflict between the individual right not to be exposed to involuntary risks arising from e.g. the establishment of a new industry, and the rights of industries and other large organizations to build plants that are associated with risks for people living nearby. Use is made of a typology of residual obligations according to which the types are obligations to compensate, to communicate, to improve, to search for knowledge, and to have an appropriate attitude. Each of these types of residual obligations can be shown to be relevant in siting controversies.

This study has two parts. In the first part, fourteen carcinogen risk assessments of acrylamide made by different expert groups during the years 1976-2002 are compared in terms of their overall conclusions and their use of primary data. In the second part, the public debate on acrylamide and cancer risks and the questioning of the expert risk assessment, that arose as a reaction to the identification of this substance in staple food is discussed. In the first part it is shown that the expert risk assessors concur to a large degree about the assessment of the acrylamide potential to cause cancer. Three risk assessors have concluded that acrylamide is neither carcinogenic to humans nor to animals, while eleven risk assessors have concluded that acrylamide is carcinogenic in animals and is likely to be carcinogenic in humans. The differences in the overall conclusions seem to a large extent be explained by an evolving database. The risk assessors agree considerably on how to interpret and evaluate the available primary data, but the coverage of the available references is low. These results are also compared to those previously published on risk assessments of trichloroethylene. In the second part the arguments used in the public debate to question the expert risk assessment are summarized and it is argued that they are not based on the principles generally accepted in toxicological risk assessment.

This is a study of carcinogen risk assessment of the chlorinated solvent trichloroethylene within the European Union existing substances program and the classification and labeling process. The focus is on the most active and influential participants of this process, namely, those from the United Kingdom, Germany, and Sweden, and from industry. The member state and other experts have different opinions regarding the appropriate classification of trichloroethylene for mutagenicity (no classification or category 3) and carcinogenicity (category 3, 2, or 1). In this article these differences are described, as well as how the primary carcinogenicity and mutagenicity data have been interpreted and evaluated by these participants. It is concluded that underlying the different assessments are disagreements about issues that to some degree lie outside the scope of purely scientific considerations.

Background The American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) threshold limit values (TLVs)for occupational exposure to chemicals and physical agents have been very influential in the setting of occupational exposure limits in many countries. Methods Three ACGIH risk assessments of the chlorinated solvent trichloroethylene (TCE) [ACGIH (1989): 5th edition; ACGIH (1992): 5th edition. Revised Vol II; ACGIH (1996): Suppl. 6th edition] are compared to 26 other risk assessments made of the same chemical substance. The documents are compared in terms of their overall conclusions and the data selected for assessment. Results It is shown that these ACGIH risk assessment documents were based on incomplete and biased data sets. Conclusions The data on which the ACGIH [ACGIH (1996): Suppl. 6th edition] base their TCE risk assessment do not adequately reflect the available scientific knowledge about TCE toxicity and carcinogenicity. This may have influenced their conclusion that TCE is not carcinogenic in either animals or humans which stand out compared to contemporary risk assessments.

The European Commission has decided on harmonized classifications for a large number of individual chemicals according to its own directive for classification and labeling of dangerous substances. We have compared the harmonized classifications for acute oral toxicity to the acute oral toxicity data available in the RTECS database. Of the 992 substances eligible for this comparison, 15% were assigned a too low danger class and 8% a too high danger class according to the RTECS data. Due to insufficient transparency-scientific documentations of the classification decisions are not available-the causes of this discrepancy can only be hypothesized. We propose that the scientific motivations of future classifications be published and that the apparent over- and underclassifications in the present system be either explained or rectified, according to what are the facts in the matter.