Drawing on a social construction theory of ownership in biological material this paper discusses which differences in biological material might motivate differences in treatment and ownership rights. The analysis covers both the perspective of the person from whom the material originates and that of the potential recipient. Seven components of bundles of rights, drawing on the analytical tradition of Tony Honore, and their relationship to various types of biological material are investigated. To exemplify these categories the cases of a heart, a kidney, stem cells and hair are used.

The overall aim of this thesis is to show how some ideas in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics can be interpreted and used as a productive way to approach a number of pressing issues in bioethics. Articles I-II introduce, and endorse, a social constructivist perspective on rights (as opposed to the more traditional natural rights idea). It is investigated if the existence of property-like rights to biological material would include the moral right to commodification and even commercialisation. Articles III-V discuss similar questions and more specifically champion the application of an Aristotelian virtue ethics perspective. The articles are preceded by an introductory essay on some of the central themes in the Nicomachean Ethics. This section also includes a very brief account of what the connection between virtue ethics and a theory of social construction, including rights, could look like. The thesis seeks to show that if read somewhat creatively many of the ideas in the Nicomachean Ethics make for a highly useful approach to modern moral problems. It should be noted, however, that this thesis in no way claims to be an exegetic, or a complete, study of the Nicomachean Ethics.

Article I deals with ownership of biological material from a philosophical, as opposed to a legal, perspective. It is argued that a strand in liberal political theory that treats property relations as socially constructed bundles of rights, as developed by e.g. Felix Cohen and Tony Honoré, is well suited for discussions on ownership of biological material.

Article II investigates which differences in biological material might motivate differences in treatment and ownership rights. The article draws on the social constructivist theory of ownership which was developed in Article I.

Article III employs virtue ethics to explain why it is morally permissible to donate but not to sell organs such as kidneys. It is suggested that the former action will bring the agent closer to a state of human flourishing.

Article IV argues that virtues like philia, justice, beneficence and generosity — traditionally all seen as other-regarding — contain strong self-regarding aspects. The central claim is that these self-regarding aspects of the other-regarding virtues are necessary components of complete virtue and thus that the fully virtuous agent has to act virtuously both in her dealings with herself and others.

Article V applies the ideas that were developed in Article IV to the case of living organ donations to next of kin. It is proposed that such an act, although noble and fine, is supererogatory, rather than obligatory, as the donor is morally entitled to be partial to herself. This argument is made against the backdrop of a discussion on some Aristotelian ideas on philia and partiality.

Whereas previous discussions on ownership of biological material have been much informed by the natural rights tradition, insufficient attention has been paid to the strand in liberal political theory represented by Felix Cohen, Tony Honore, and others, which treats property relations as socially constructed bundles of rights. In accordance with that tradition, we propose that the primary normative issue is what combination of rights a person should have to a particular item of biological material. Whether that bundle qualifies to be called `` property'' or `` ownership'' is a secondary, terminological issue. We suggest five principles of bodily rights and show how they can be applied to the construction of ethically appropriate bundles of rights to biological material.

Now the turn has come to say more both about which virtues, and capacities, Aristotle had in mind and how agents are expected to acquire them. While the focus in this chapter is on the character virtues as well as the intellectual virtues the discussion also extends to how agents are supposed to instill them and how we become (more) virtuous agents. Consequently, a number of key concepts connected to the virtues, e.g., the Doctrine of the Mean, moral expertise and the process of deliberation, are explained and problematized. In addition to providing a theory background the following is also intended to work as a ‘reference chapter’ that the reader could re-visit while reading other parts of the book.

This article explores the respective roles that medical and technological cognitive enhancements, on the one hand, and the moral and epistemic virtues traditionally understood, on the other, can play in enabling us to lead the good life. It will be shown that neither the virtues nor cognitive enhancements (of the kind we have access to today or in the foreseeable future) on their own are likely to enable most people to lead the good life. While the moral and epistemic virtues quite plausibly are both necessary and sufficient for the good life in theory, virtue ethics is often criticised for being elitist and unachievable in practice for the vast majority. Some cognitive enhancements, on the other hand, might be necessary for the good life but are far from sufficient for such an existence. Here it will be proposed that a combination of virtue and some cognitive enhancements is preferable.

Looking around the world today it is quite clear that a great many are not leading as good a life as they potentially could. Here it has been suggested that this situation could, to some extent, be improved on were people in general to become more virtuous as this would have a positive impact on the cognitive abilities and capacity for decision-making. Against this it has been argued that it is naïve to talk about virtues. That there is little evidence is there that we can achieve stable character traits and, further, that the best explanation for why we keep behaving the way we do is that it is human nature.

In the last few chapters it has been argued that the life of virtue is the best, happiest and most desirable life. Even accepting that, one might wonder whether or not it is possible to have this life. This chapter will address some of those concerns and elaborate on the habituation process and the importance of role models, i.e. methods through which the virtues are instilled.

This chapter will provide concrete examples of a number of moral and epistemic virtues and show how they can help people in general to live better lives in the modern society. By ‘better’ it should be noted that I mean both in the sense they increase their own well-being and contribute to a broader improvement of society. The account provided here draws on scientific research into the ways in which people assimilate information and form their beliefs (as explained and exemplified in Chap. 3), as well as virtue theory. Further to this, the field of ‘Virtue Epistemology’ is introduced. While it is a relatively young field much interesting and, for the purposes here, highly applicable research has already been carried out.

This chapter explores how cognitive enhancement, by means of technology, in combination with a commitment to virtue ethics could improve our capacity for responsible decision making. Four examples of cognitive enhancement technologies are discussed: computer training, neurofeedback or electroencephalogram (EEG) biofeedback, transcranial direct stimulation (tDCS) and brain-computer interface (BCI). On describing and critically discussing the potential effects of these technologies it is argued that we ought to adopt a virtue ethical approach to this type of enhancement. Virtue ethics could, for example, provide a moral framework for the heightened cognitive skills to ensure that they are used virtuously and help us make responsible decisions about future technology. It will also be argued that cognitive enhancement and virtue ethics are, in many cases, complementary and indeed necessary for the good life. Plausibly, cultivating the virtues could improve quality of life both for the individual and the collective. 

This chapter focuses on the biological obstacles that stand between us and the type of good decision-making which enables us to live the happy life. Recent scientific studies indicate that our failure to lead the happy life can be explained in terms of lacking cognitive capacities. Humans in general are bad at responding to information, an inability which extends both ‘the gathering of information phase’ and to ‘the drawing conclusions and acting on them phase’. This has some very negative consequences.

This chapter introduces Aristotle’s version of the good life. The Greek term is eudaimonia but I will use the words ‘fulfilled’, ‘happy’ and ‘good’ interchangeably when I refer to this type of life. As part of this discussion a number of key concepts e.g. the dialectic method, the function argument and ergon will also be explained. I will try to keep the theory (as well as the Greek terms) to a minimum and mix it up with practical examples. A theoretical background is, however, necessary for the later discussion of the applicability and usefulness of virtue ethics.

Looking around the world today two things are obvious: (1) humans are severely challenged in the area of rational decision-making, and (2) as a result of e.g. technological developments society around us is getting increasingly complex. Numerous scientific studies in the fields of, for example, neurology and neuropsychology have shown that information overload and stress have a very negative impact on capacities such as memory (both process and long-term), risk assessment and epistemic deference.

Looking around the globe the same dismal scenario repeats itself: in the face of glaring evidence humans are led to make bad decisions by greed, selfishness, lack of responsibility, low capacity for taking in the bigger picture, irrational fear, bias and so forth. Our poor decision-making has large scale, potentially disastrous, consequences for millions of people. Consider, for example, the human suffering in the wake of global warming, armed conflicts and the financial crisis.

In this article we argue that (i) the principle of need, on some interpretations, could be used to justify the spending of publically funded health care resources on cognitive enhancement and (ii) that this also holds true for individuals whose cognitive capacities are considered normal. The increased, and to an extent, novel demands that the modern technology and information society places on the cognitive capacities of agents, e.g., regarding good and responsible decision-making, have blurred the line between treatment and enhancement. More specifically, it has shifted upwards. As a consequence, principles of need on their most reasonable interpretations can be used to support publically funded cognitive enhancement. At least this is so, if broader aims than curing and ameliorating diseases are included in the goals of health care. We suggest that it would be plausible to see health care as accepting such broader goals already today.

This chapter takes a closer look at cognitive flexibility. Firstly, we define this core cognitive capacity and explain why it is good to have it to a high degree. Secondly, we examine the link between the meditation techniques promoted here (see Chap. 2 ) and increased cognitive flexibility, as well as the impact on other psychological capacities. Thirdly, we point out that high cognitive flexibility (as an example of such improved psychological capacities) does not guarantee responsible moral decision-making. Consequently we need a robust, and action guiding, moral framework which can anchor these capacities and guide vacillating agents. The chapter finishes with a brief discussion of the connection between improved core cognitive capacities and the installing of a set of key epistemic virtues. This subject is then expanded on in Chap. 5.

On providing a brief summary of the arguments presented in the book Chap. 6 turns to discuss the potential for combining a wider range of life-style practices for greater effects. Examples include classical education, physical as well as mental training and playing specialized computer games. A brief resume of Aristotle’s account of eudaimonia including the idea that agents who are successful in instilling virtues plausibly can be taken to lead happier lives than those who fail to do so is presented. This Chapter also comments on the potential of embedding structures and how such measures might incentivize more pro-social behavior.

This chapter provides a background and a schematic overview of the book. In this volume we argue that meditation enables us to influence some aspects of our biological make-up and could, for example, boost our cognitive flexibility as well as our ability (and propensity) to act compassionately. Then we proceed to seek to connect a number of such changes to an improved capacity for instilling and maintaining a range of character traits (primarily epistemic virtues) as identified by Aristotle and some modern virtue epistemologists. Cultivating the virtues is of course beneficial for the individual but it seems likely that it also has a positive effect on the surrounding society and their fellow citizens.

This book explores how one can bring about changes in the brain through meditation, both through attention-focus training and through compassion training. Recent findings in the natural sciences have confirmed that it is possible for humans to achieve these structural and functional changes through various life-style practices. It is argued that meditation enables us to influence some aspects of our biological make-up and, for example, could boost our cognitive flexibility as well as our ability to act compassionate. Such changes are likely to facilitate the instilling of a number of epistemic virtues which have great bearing on our quality of life. This book offers the reader an accessible introduction to a set of neuro-enhancement methods, with a special focus on meditation techniques, and explores how such practices could contribute to make us better decision-makers and improve our moral virtues. The book is suitable for anyone looking for a text discussing the effects of neuro-enhancement from a secular ethics perspective.

The purpose of this chapter is two-fold. In Part A we explain some key aspects of virtue ethics e.g. including eudaimonia (the good life), the concept of the virtues and the development of stable character traits. For space reasons this will be very brief but should provide some theoretical background for the more general discussion in this book. To be clear, this is not intended as an authoritative, or exegetic, reading of Aristotle. Rather, our aspiration is to suggest that many of the ideas in the Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle’s central work on ethics) make for a highly useful approach to modern moral problems. In Part B we focus on epistemic virtues, both traditional and modern, and provide examples of their role in decision-making. We also show how the cognitive improvements from previous chapters can both increase the commitment to the type of life described by Aristotle, and boost the capacity for cultivation the necessary epistemic virtues.

Chapter 1 introduced the key ideas and identified the need for cognitive improvements. The first half of Chap. 2 consisted of a schematic review of the neurophysiological background for the development of such capacities. It was, for example, explained that the adult brain is plastic enough for both functional and structural changes to take place. The latter half of Chap. 2 was devoted to exploring three types of mental training techniques which, in evidence based studies, have been shown to have a positive, lasting and generalizable effect on cognitive capacities. Evidently these techniques are not without problems, nor are they the only methods around. The present chapter discusses some alternative methods for improving cognitive capacities. It includes an introductory account of how some pharmaceuticals and certain types of technology can be used to improve our cognitive skills and what risks that might attach to such practices.

This chapter begins by providing a schematic review of the neurophysiological background for the development of a set of capacities e.g. cognitive flexibility, meta awareness and emotional regulation. This includes a brief account of the evidence based scientific studies showing that we can change—i.e. that the adult human brain is plastic enough. We have our biological set up, and it is probably a pre-requisite that we are getting to know our limitations as well as our possibilities, in order to perform the changes that are warranted. Then we turn to the question of how to bring about such changes. In this chapter we examine the changes that regular mental training in the form of meditation can have on the adult brain and behavior.

In this paper we discuss what we believe to be one of the most important features of near-future AIs, namely their capacity to behave in a friendly manner to humans. Our analysis of what it means for an AI to behave in a friendly manner does not presuppose that proper friendships between humans and AI systems could exist. That would require reciprocity, which is beyond the reach of near-future AI systems. Rather, we defend the claim that social AIs should be programmed to behave in a manner that mimics a sufficient number of aspects of proper friendship. We call this “as-if friendship”. The main reason for why we believe that ‘as if friendship’ is an improvement on the current, highly submissive behavior displayed by AIs is the negative effects the latter can have on humans. We defend this view partly on virtue ethical grounds and we argue that the virtue-based approach to AI ethics outlined in this paper, which we call “virtue alignment”, is an improvement on the traditional “value alignment” approach.

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to argue that playing computer games for lengthy periods of time, even in a manner that will force the player to forgo certain other activities normally seen as more important, can be an integral part of human flourishing. Design/methodology/approach: The authors' claim is based on a modern reading of Aristotle's Nichomacean Ethics. It should be emphasized that the authors do not argue that computer gaming and other similar online activities are central to all people under all circumstances; but only seek to show that the claim holds true for some people under some circumstances and the authors try to spell out the relevant circumstances in detail. Findings: The authors provide a list of situations in which playing computer games for lengthy periods of time, in a manner that will force the player to forgo certain other activities normally seen as more important, is an integral part of human flourishing. Originality/value: The paper puts some novel pressure on the widely-held belief that playing computer games for lengthy periods of time, in a manner that will force the player to forgo certain other activities normally seen as more important. The paper claims that playing some computer games and partaking in some forms of online activities could be highly conducive to what it actually means in practice to take care of oneself and, to paraphrase Aristotle, to be eager for fine actions.

This article seeks to contribute to the discussion on the nature of choice in virtue theory. If several different actions are available to the virtuous agent, they are also likely to vary in their degree of virtue, at least in some situations. Yet, it is widely agreed that once an action is recognised as virtuous there is no higher level of virtue. In this paper we discuss how the virtue theorist could accommodate both these seemingly conflicting ideas. We discuss this issue from a modern Aristotelian perspective, as opposed to a purely exegetic one. We propose a way of resolving what seems to be a major clash between two central features of virtue ethics. Our proposal is based on the notion of parity, a concept which recently has received considerable attention in the literature on axiology. Briefly put, two alternatives are on a par (or are 'roughly equal') if they are comparable, although it is not the case that one is better than the other, nor that they are equally good. The advantages of applying the concept of parity to our problem are twofold. Firstly, it sheds new light on the account of choice in virtue theory. Secondly, some of the criticisms that have been mounted against the possibility of parity can be countered by considering the notion of choice from a virtue theory perspective.

Based on a modern reading of Aristotle's theory of friendship, we argue that virtual friendship does not qualify as genuine friendship. By 'virtual friendship' we mean the type of friendship that exists on the internet, and seldom or never is combined with real life interaction. A 'traditional friendship' is, in contrast, the type of friendship that involves substantial real life interaction, and we claim that only this type can merit the label 'genuine friendship' and thus qualify as morally valuable. The upshot of our discussion is that virtual friendship is what Aristotle might have described as a lower and less valuable form of social exchange.

It could hardly be denied that healthcare should be patient-centred. However, some of the practices commonly described as patient-centred care may have ethically problematic consequences. This article identifies and discusses twelve ethical conflicts that may arise in the application of (some variants of) person-centred care. The conflicts concern e.g. privacy, autonomous decision-making, safeguarding medical quality, and maintaining professional egalitarianism as well as equality in care. Awareness of these potential conflicts can be helpful in finding the best way to ensure that healthcare has its focus on the needs and interests of the patients. Patient-centred care may have to take different forms, depending of the nature of the disease, the patient’s life situation, and the economic, organizational and technological resources available to the healthcare unit.

An increasing number of cities around the globe aim to become Smart Cities through the implementation of a range of Information and Communication technologies (ICT), AI applications and cloud-based IoT solutions. While the underlying motivations vary, all such transitions require large amounts of data. In this paper, we articulate and defend two claims about privacy in a Smart City. Our first claim is that some level of systematic data collection and processing is ethically permissible. However, there is an upper limit for what is permissible: We suggest that it is never permissible to collect and process data that significantly undermine people's autonomy. Our second claim specifies when such minor privacy infringements that do not significantly undermine people's autonomy are permissible: We suggest that the only policies legitimized by the first claim are those that promote the collective good.