How public-private governance affects accountability for safety in the realm of critical infrastructure is the focus of this doctoral thesis. Case studies of previously under-researched crises and their cascading affects across infrastructures and governance systems, comparative analysis of public-private governance (PPG) of infrastructures such as space and urban rail junctions, and analysis of wider sets of policies and doctrine pertaining to critical infrastructures and their governance are presented.

This work further conceptualizes a contemporary techno-organizational shift, observed increasingly in mixed and integrated public-private structures and evident not only in governance, but in infrastructures themselves (seen for example in development of dual use-satellites, and in urban rail interchanges combining public transportation with consumption and leisure). Moreover, this thesis develops the concept of “patchwork PPG”, which aids unpacking the complexity of governance, addressing specifically the blurred boundaries of internal-external, public-private and domestic-international.

It is also found and demonstrated that accountability can be negatively affected when governance is fragmented, particularly when there exists a patchwork of several PPG constellations, with membership and mandate changing over time. Fragmented governance of infrastructural mega-projects has given rise to the misconception that the rise of private authority in terms of ownership and command and control also implies that private actors have attained/maintain accountability. Further, mega-projects entail lengthy timeframes, implying a loss of continuity and institutional memory, which in turn puts accountability at risk.

I draw on a large multidisciplinary body of past theory and research, including social science crisis research, organizational and governance theory, industrial economics, sociological risk analysis, and science and technology studies (STS). Methodologically, a structured and focused case study approach is employed, building on document analyses and, particularly in one case, personal interviews. Finally, I propose that effective accountability management implies acknowledgment of formal responsibility, that critique is actively and constructively taken on board, and mistakes admitted, without resorting to resignation/s or blame games. Commitment to explorative reflexivity is necessary to truly learn from mistakes, near misses or full-blown crises to implement reform, better tailor preparedness, and allocate resources for responsible management of holistically-viewed infrastructure projects, from conceptual, operational, augmentational through to retirement or reinvention stages.

Hur offentlig-privat styrning påverkar ansvarsutkrävande för säkerhet och sårbarhet gällande kritisk infrastruktur står i fokus för denna doktorsavhandling. Avhandlingen bestårdels av fallstudier av tidigare relativt outforskade kriser och deras kaskadeffekter tvärs över olika typer av infrastruktur och organisatoriska styrsystem. Dels innehåller avhandlingen jämförande analyser av offentlig-privat styrning av infrastruktur såsom satellitsystem och urbana järnvägsstationer. Vidare består avhandlingen av analyser av bredare kontexter för policy och styrning av kritisk infrastruktur.

Avhandlingen bidrar med konceptualisering av ett samtida teknologisk-organisatoriskt skifte som bottnar i integrerade offentlig-privata strukturer och som är påtagligt inte enbart i styrning utan även i infrastrukturen som sådan. Det senare ses exempelvis i utvecklingen av civil-militära satelliter och i urbana järnvägsstationer som kombinerar transporter av människor och gods med konsumtion och nöjesverksamhet såsom restauranger.

Avhandlingen bidrar även med ett begrepp som betecknar ”lapptäcken” av offentlig-privat styrning, vilket beaktar komplexitet i organisationsnätverk och styrning och som tar fasta på hur gränser suddas ut mellan internt och externt, privat och offentligt samt mellan inrikes och utrikes. I avhandlingen observeras även hur ansvarsutkrävande kan påverkas negativt, i synnerhet då offentlig-privat styrning sker via ”lapptäcken” inom vilka deltagande och mandat förändras över tid. Fragmenterad styrning av så kallade ”megaprojekt” har gett upphov till missuppfattningen att framväxten av privat ägande, styrning och kontroll även innebär att privata aktörer har tagit och fått ansvarsskyldighet. Vidare implicerar ”megaprojekt” långa tidsperioder vilket innebär risk för förlist av kontinuitet och institutionellt minne, vilket i sin tur försvagar ansvarsutkrävande.

Avhandlingen drar nytta av en större mängd tidigare forskning inklusive samhällsvetenskaplig krisforskning, organisations- och styrningsteori, industriell ekonomi, sociologisk riskanalys samt studier av vetenskap och teknik. Metodologiskt tillämpas ansatsen ”strukturerad och fokuserad fallstudie”, som bygger på analys av framförallt offentliga dokument samt för en studie personliga intervjuer. Slutligen påpekas att effektivt ansvarsutkrävande innebär erkännande av formellt ansvar, att kritik aktivt och konstruktivt tas emot och att misstag som begås erkänns utan att det leder till avgång eller försök att skylla ifrån sig. Att behålla ett öppet och reflekterande förhållningssätt är nödvändigt för att på ett genuint sätt lära sig från misstag och kriser för att genomföra reformer, anpassa beredskapsåtgärder samt allokera resurser för ansvarsfull hantering av helheten när det gäller infrastruktur gällande alltifrån planeringsstadier till genomförande, operativ styrning och slutligen avveckling eller förnyelse.

Nyckelord: Ansvarsutkrävande, Kritisk infrastruktur, Offentlig-privat styrning, Säkerhet

This chapter addresses the technological megashift and implications for security and accountability within the EU. Digitalised interconnectivity of increasingly 'embedded' systems, infrastructures and societal functions are megashift features. Although the EU hardly lacks technological strategies, accountability structures beg improvement, and there are multiple expert groups with insufficient coordination and societal focus. The EU suffers from techno-optimism-coupled to powerful objectives of fuelling economic growth-which can lead to broadly conceived and represented security issues falling in shadow and struggles between interests being inadequately addressed. This chapter analyses how the EU deals with the megashift with respect to threats, surveillance systems, infrastructural vulnerability and public-private accountability. It is suggested that the EU take (i) a holistic grip on the megashift and implications, (ii) abandon optimistic techno-determinism for nuanced and contextual understanding and (iii) avoid outsourcing management of sensitive data and critical infrastructures.

How is accountability in safety management affected in and by public-private urban multiroute stations? To help address this question, major interchanges with newly tunneled lines in London and Stockholm are studied: Stratford station and Stockholm Station City. Differences in origin, national and regional significance, and specific governance features of these megaprojects are identified. Accountability in safety management appears more critiqued in the Swedish case, possibly related to comparatively higher attention to particularities of this "bottleneck" national nexus. Wrought with albeit less visible geographical and geological constraints, the comparative magnitude of London and acclimatization to projects has explanatory value. Similarity in the patchwork of public-private actors, implying fragmented governance jeopardizing accountability is observed in both cases. Both megaprojects span decades, with turnover and lack of institutional memory posing further challenges for accountability and safety. A major finding is that, complementary to standard risk analysis, accountability in the governance of infrastructural megaprojects begs improvement.

Disasters can have an enormous impact on the health and well-being of those affected. Internationally, governments and service providers are often challenged to address complex psychosocial problems. Ideally, the potentially broad range of support activities include a coherent, high-quality mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) programme. We present a theory-driven quantitative analysis of the quality of 40 MHPSS programmes, mostly implemented in European disaster settings. The objective is to measure quality domains recognized as relevant in the literature and to empirically test associations. During the EU project "Operationalizing Psychosocial Support in Crisis" (OPSIC) an evaluation survey was designed and developed for this purpose and completed by 40 MHPSS programme coordinators involved in different mass emergencies and disasters. We analysed the survey data in two steps. Firstly, we used the data to operationalize quality domains of a MHPSS programme, tested constructs and assessed their internal consistency reliability. A total of 26 out of 44 survey items clustered into three of the four domains identified within the theoretical framework: "planning and delivery system" (Cronbach's alpha 0.82); "general evaluation criteria" (Cronbach's alpha 0.82); and "essential psychosocial principles" (Cronbach's alpha 0.75). "Measures and interventions applied", theoretically a potential fourth domain, could not be confirmed to empirically cluster together. Secondly, several models with associations between domains and measures and interventions were tested and compared. The model with the best fit suggests that in MHPSS programmes with a higher planning and delivery systems score, a larger number of measures and interventions from evidence informed guidelines are applied. In such programmes, coordinators are more positive about general evaluation criteria and the realization of essential psychosocial principles. Moreover, the analyses showed that some measures and interventions are more likely to be applied in programmes with more evolved planning and delivery systems, yet for most measures and interventions the likelihood of being applied is not linked to planning and delivery system status, nor to coordinator perceptions concerning psychosocial principles and evaluation criteria. Further research is necessary to validate and expand the findings and to learn more about success factors and obstacles for MHPSS programme implementation.

Corporatisation of critical information infrastructure (CII) is rooted inthe ‘privatisation wave’ of the 1980s-90s, when the ground was laidfor outsourcing public utilities. Despite well-known risks relating toreliability, resilience, and accountability, commitment to efficiencyimperatives have driven governments to outsource key publicservices and infrastructures. A recent illustrative case with enormousimplications is the 2017 Swedish ICT scandal, where outsourcing ofCII caused major security breaches. With the transfer of the SwedishTransport Agency’s ICT system to IBM and subcontractors, classifieddata and protected identities were made accessible to non-vettedforeign private employees – sensitive data could thus now be inanyone’s hands. This case clearly demonstrates accountability gapsthat can arise in public-private governance of CII.

How is outer space governed? This article argues that private authority is gaining salience in space politics, even with respect to the traditionally state-centric security and military aspects of space. Further, while commercial actors have always played a role in space programs, three significant changes can be detected: transnational conglomerates and consortia as opposed to individual corporations are emerging as key partners in space politics; private partners are gaining stronger and wider responsibilities for the development and management of space programs (including manned spaceflights); and public accountability is increasingly at stake due to a widening of security in space policy. The latter development includes a blurring of key distinctions between military and civilian usage (also referred to as dual-use or dual-role application), as well as between the public and private realms.

This paper addresses the rapidly evolving cross-sectoral interconnectedness of “critical infrastructures” in the European Union (EU), a development studied over the past decade. In the name of counter-terrorism and the European economy, cross-sectoral interconnectedness of critical infrastructures in the European Union (EU) is propelled. Critical infrastructures are increasingly connected through sensors in the “Internet of Everything” (IoE) via “next” or “fifth” generation (5G) networks, and in public-private partnerships (PPPs). This under-researched technology and data fusion can be interpreted as the “securitization of everything”. Whereas ICT and sensor-enabled applications are employed between various domains for numerous, often combined purposes with vast safety, security, and integrity implications, accountability and transparency regarding embedded technology is lacking. Transparency and accountability are not either certain within agencies and/or private contractors regarding applications due to widespread sub-contracting and flux in PPPs, differential knowledge, and motivations. Gaps in transparency, awareness, and variable intention in themselves create safety, security, and integrity issues, undermining governance. Securitization legitimates secrecy and confidentiality-driven PPP, motivated by objectives rivalling those of conventional threat projections, implying a neo-corporatist system ultimately putting accountability at stake.