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Automated Security Assessments of Amazon Web Service Environments
KTH, School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (EECS), Computer Science, Network and Systems Engineering.ORCID iD: 0000-0002-6762-3662
KTH, School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (EECS), Computer Science, Network and Systems Engineering.ORCID iD: 0000-0002-3293-1681
KTH, School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (EECS), Computer Science, Network and Systems Engineering.ORCID iD: 0000-0003-3089-3885
Foreseeti AB, Sweden.ORCID iD: 0000-0001-7055-3477
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2022 (English)In: ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security, ISSN 2471-2566, Vol. 26, no 2, p. 1-31, article id 20Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Migrating enterprises and business capabilities to cloud platforms like Amazon Web Services (AWS) has become increasingly common. However, securing cloud operations, especially at large scales, can quickly become intractable. Customer-side issues such as service misconfigurations, data breaches, and insecure changes are prevalent. Furthermore, cloud-specific tactics and techniques paired with application vulnerabilities create a large and complex search space. Various solutions and modeling languages for cloud security assessments exist. However, no single one appeared sufficiently cloud-centered and holistic. Many also did not account for tactical security dimensions. This article, therefore, presents a domain-specific modeling language for AWS environments. When used to model AWS environments, manually or automatically, the language automatically constructs and traverses attack graphs to assess security. Assessments, therefore, require minimal security expertise from the user. The modeling language was primarily tested on four third-party AWS environments through securiCAD Vanguard, a commercial tool built around the AWS modeling language. The language was validated further by measuring performance on models provided by anonymous end users and a comparison with a similar open source assessment tool. As of March 2020, the modeling language could represent essential AWS structures, cloud tactics, and threats. However, the tests highlighted certain shortcomings. Data collection steps, such as planted credentials, and some missing tactics were obvious. Nevertheless, the issues covered by the DSL were already reminiscent of common issues with real-world precedents. Future additions to attacker tactics and addressing data collection should yield considerable improvements.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), 2022. Vol. 26, no 2, p. 1-31, article id 20
Keywords [en]
Attack simulation, threat modeling, cloud security, enterprise modeling, automatic security assessment, attack graphs, domain-specific language
National Category
Computer Sciences
Research subject
Computer Science
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-324723DOI: 10.1145/3570903ISI: 000970870300010Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-85154572778OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-324723DiVA, id: diva2:1743059
Note

QC 20230529

Available from: 2023-03-13 Created: 2023-03-13 Last updated: 2025-12-19Bibliographically approved
In thesis
1. Modeling and Simulating Cyberattacks with Dynamic Graphs: With applications to cloud security assessments
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Modeling and Simulating Cyberattacks with Dynamic Graphs: With applications to cloud security assessments
2026 (English)Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

This dissertation presents a formalism for exploring two fundamental, yet underrepresented, cyberattack dynamics. Namely, how adversary actions drive the emergence of cyberattacks and how adversaries manipulate dynamic system structures, such as by creating and destroying objects. The formalism in question is encapsulated in the Dynamic Meta Attack Language (DynaMAL), a meta-level formalism for modeling and simulating cyberattacks with dynamic graphs. DynaMAL has been designed and developed in accordance with the design science research framework across four studies. The first study introduces an attack graph construction language for assessing cloud architectures and identifies the central problem of representing attacks in which adversaries manipulate dynamic system structures. The second study is a systematic literature review of cyberattack simulations that identifies key simulation concepts used in later stages of the design process. Building on the two initial studies, the third study establishes the cyberattack modeling foundations of DynaMAL, comprising a dynamic graph system, a multi-layered graph model, a lazy graph generation strategy, and the DynaMAL grammar. Finally, the fourth study develops the corresponding discrete-event simulation process for DynaMAL. The resulting capabilities are evaluated through a first simulation experiment that uses three cloud penetration testing scenarios that rely on dynamically creating and destroying resources. The scenarios are then solved automatically with near-optimal results by combining two search and optimization algorithms.

Abstract [sv]

I den här avhandlingen presenteras en formalism för att utforska två fundamentala men underrepresenterade cyberattackdynamiker. Dessa är hur antagonisters handlingar driver fram cyberattacker och hur antagonister manipulerar dynamiska systemstrukturer, till exempel genom att skapa och förstöra resurser. Formalismen i fråga är inkapslad i ett Dynamic Meta Attack Language (DynaMAL), en formalism på metanivå för att modellera och simulera cyberattacker med dynamiska grafer. DynaMAL:s design och utveckling fortlöper genom fyra studier utförda i enlighet med designforskningsramverket. Den första studien bidrar med ett attackgrafkonstruktionsspråk för att utvärdera molnarkitekturer, vilket utvecklar problematiken med att representera när antagonister manipulerar dynamiska systemstrukturer. Den andra studien är en systematisk litteraturstudie som granskar cyberattacksimuleringsforskning och uppdagar flertalet nyckelkoncept som understödjer de senare designaktiviterna. I den påföljande tredje studien etableras ett fundament för cyberattackmodellering innefattandes ett dynamiskt grafsystem, en lagerbaserad grafmodell, en lat grafgenereringsstrategi och DynaMAL-grammatiken. Den fjärde studien färdigställer DynaMAL-formalismen genom att implementera en motsvarande diskret händelsestyrd simuleringsprocess. De resulterande förmågorna utvärderas via ett första simuleringsexperiment, varvid tre molnpenetrationstestningsscenarion som krävde att resurser dynamiskt skapades eller förstördes används. Scenariona löses sedan automatiskt med nära inpå optimala resultat genom att kombinera två sök- och optimeringsalgoritmer.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: KTH Royal Institute of Technology, 2026. p. xxiii, 67
Series
TRITA-EECS-AVL ; 2026:6
Keywords
DynaMAL, attack graph, cyberattack simulation, dynamic graph, adversary-driven, structural dynamics, agent-based, metalanguage, graph construction, computer simulation, threat modeling, cybersecurity, DynaMAL, attackgraf, cyberattacksimulering, dynamisk graf, motståndardriven, strukturell dynamik, agentbaserat, metaspråk, grafkonstruktion, datorsimulering, hotmodellering, cybersäkerhet
National Category
Security, Privacy and Cryptography
Research subject
Computer Science
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-374603 (URN)978-91-8106-498-8 (ISBN)
Public defence
2026-02-11, F3, Lindstedtsvägen 26, Stockholm, 09:00 (English)
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Supervisors
Note

QC 20251219

Available from: 2025-12-19 Created: 2025-12-19 Last updated: 2026-01-12Bibliographically approved

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Publisher's full textScopushttps://doi.org/10.1145/3570903

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Engström, ViktorJohnson, PontusLagerström, Robert

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