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Lattice-Based Post-Quantum Cryptography and Quantum Algorithms
KTH, School of Engineering Sciences (SCI), Mathematics (Dept.), Algebra, Combinatorics and Topology.ORCID iD: 0000-0002-3724-2914
2025 (English)Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

The focus of this thesis is the threat that quantum computers pose to asymmetric cryptography. This threat is considered through analysis and development of both quantum algorithms and post-quantum cryptosystems. Lattices are used in both of these areas of this thesis; lattice-based analysis is used for the quantum algorithms and the cryptosystems are lattice-based.

Arguably the most important building block for lattice-based cryptography is the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem. This problem was introduced by Regev in 2005 together with a quantum reduction from standard lattice problems. In this thesis Regev’s reduction is analyzed in detail, allowing for the first parametrization of a cryptosystem whose concrete security actually is based upon this reduction.

Another important problem used for lattice-based cryptography is the NTRU problem, which was introduced several years before the LWE problem. In this thesis, the NTWE problem is introduced as a natural combination of the NTRU and LWE problems with NTWE-based cryptosystems having certain benefits over comparable NTRU and LWE-based systems.

The quantum algorithms considered in this thesis are variants of Regev’s recently introduced quantum factoring algorithm. When attacking factoring-based cryptography, Regev’s algorithm has certain asymptotic advantages over previous quantum algorithms. As a part of this thesis, variants of Regev’s algorithm for solving other cryptographically relevant problems are introduced. Additionally, by analyzing the lattice-based classical post-processing of the algorithm, it is argued that the algorithm can be made robust to quantum errors.

Although Regev’s new algorithm, and the variations thereof, have an asymptotic advantage over previous quantum algorithms, an advantage for the concrete instances that are used for cryptography would arguably be more interesting. This motivates comparing the concrete efficiency of variants of Regev’s algorithm to that of previous quantum algorithms. Such a comparison is part of this thesis and — based on this comparison — it seems like previously available algorithms still are the best choice for quantum attacks against traditional cryptography.

The final contribution of this thesis is a new lattice-based digital signature scheme. Similar signature schemes have been considered before, such as with the recently standardized ML-DSA. However, compared to similar signature schemes, the new scheme is significantly more compact. This is in large part thanks to developing a new technique for constructing signatures, but also to some extent from being based on the NTWE problem instead of a variant of the LWE problem.

Abstract [sv]

Den här avhandlingen fokuserar på hotet som kvantdatorer innebär för asymmetrisk kryptografi. Mer specifikt analyseras och utvecklas både kvantdatorsäkra kryptosystem och kvantdatoralgoritmer som knäcker klassisk kryptografi. Inom båda dessa områden av avhandlingen så är gitter relevanta. Detta då relevanta kvantdatoralgoritmer analyseras med hjälp av gitter och fokus ligger på gitterbaserad kvantdatorsäker kryptografi.

En av hörnstenarna inom gitterbaserad kryptografi är “Learning With Errors” (LWE) problemet som introducerades 2005 av Regev. I samma arbete så utvecklade Regev även en kvantreduktion till LWE problemet från ett traditionellt gitterproblem. Ett av arbetena i denna avhandling analyserar denna reduktion i detalj, vilket möjliggör den första parametriseringen av ett kryptosystem vars konkreta säkerhet faktiskt baseras på denna reduktion.

Ett annat viktigt problem som används för gitterbaserad kryptografi är NTRU problemet, vilket introducerades flera år innan LWE problemet. I den här avhandlingen så introduceras NTWE problemet som en naturlig kombination av NTRU och LWE problemen. Dessutom utvecklas ett NTWE baserat kryptosystem som har vissa fördelar gentemot jämförbara NTRU och LWE baserade system.

Nyligen introducerade Regev en kvantfaktoriseringsalgoritm som, i vissa avseenden, är asymptotiskt bättre än tidigare kvantdatoralgoritmer på att attackera kryptografi som är baserad på svårigheten att faktorisera heltal. Som en del av denna avhandling så utvecklas nya varianter av Regevs algoritm som kan användas för att effektivt lösa andra kryptografiskt relevanta problem. Genom att analysera den gitterbaserade efterbehandlingen av algoritmen så argumenteras det också för att den kan göras robust mot fel i kvantdatorberäkningarna.

I denna avhandling så jämförs också den faktiska prestandan hos varianter av Regevs algoritm mot den hos tidigare kvantdatoralgoritmer. Trots att de nya algoritmerna har ett asymptotiskt övertag så visar jämförelsen att de tidigare algoritmerna fortfarande är att föredra för de konkreta probleminstanser som är kryptografiskt relevanta.

Det sista bidraget i denna avhandling är en ny gitterbaserad algoritm för digitala signaturer. Signaturscheman som bygger på liknande idéer finns sedan tidigare, exempelvis det nyligen standardiserade ML-DSA. Jämfört med dessa liknande scheman så är det nya signaturschemat som utvecklas i denna avhandling betydligt mer kompakt. Detta är till stor grad tack vare utvecklandet av en ny metod för att konstruera signaturer, men också till viss mån tack vare att schemat är baserat på NTWE problemet istället för någon variant av LWE problemet.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: KTH Royal Institute of Technology, 2025. , p. viii, 101
Series
TRITA-EECS-AVL ; 2025:48
Keywords [en]
Lattice-based cryptography, Quantum Algorithms, Post-quantum cryptography
National Category
Security, Privacy and Cryptography
Research subject
Computer Science
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-363229ISBN: 978-91-8106-271-7 (print)OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-363229DiVA, id: diva2:1958133
Public defence
2025-06-09, https://kth-se.zoom.us/j/62914864473, F3 (Flodis), Lindstedtsvägen 26 & 28, KTH Campus, Stockholm, 14:00 (English)
Opponent
Supervisors
Available from: 2025-05-20 Created: 2025-05-13 Last updated: 2025-06-30Bibliographically approved
List of papers
1. Concrete Security from Worst-Case to Average-Case Lattice Reductions
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Concrete Security from Worst-Case to Average-Case Lattice Reductions
2023 (English)In: Progress in Cryptology - AFRICACRYPT 2023 - 14th International Conference on Cryptology in Africa, Proceedings, Springer Nature , 2023, p. 344-369Conference paper, Published paper (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

A famous reduction by Regev shows that random instances of the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem are asymptotically at least as hard as a worst-case lattice problem. As such, by assuming that standard lattice problems are hard to solve, the asymptotic security of cryptosystems based on the LWE problem is guaranteed. However, it has not been clear to which extent, if any, this reduction provides support for the security of present concrete parametrizations. In this work we therefore use Regev’s reduction to parametrize a cryptosystem, providing a reference as to what parameters are required to actually claim security from this reduction. This requires us to account for the concrete performance of this reduction, allowing the first parametrization of a cryptosystem that is provably secure based only on a conservative hardness estimate for a standard lattice problem. Even though we attempt to optimize the reduction, our system still requires significantly larger parameters than typical LWE-based cryptosystems, highlighting the significant gap between parameters that are used in practice and those for which worst-case reductions actually are applicable.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Springer Nature, 2023
Keywords
Lattice-based cryptography, Learning With Errors, Post-quantum cryptography, Provable security, Public Key Cryptography
National Category
Telecommunications
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-336746 (URN)10.1007/978-3-031-37679-5_15 (DOI)001276584800015 ()2-s2.0-85169055866 (Scopus ID)
Conference
14th International Conference on Cryptology in Africa, AFRICACRYPT 2023, Jul 19 2023 - Jul 21, 2023, Sousse, Tunisia
Note

Part of ISBN 9783031376788

QC 20230919

Available from: 2023-09-19 Created: 2023-09-19 Last updated: 2025-05-13Bibliographically approved
2. NTWE: A Natural Combination of NTRU and LWE
Open this publication in new window or tab >>NTWE: A Natural Combination of NTRU and LWE
2023 (English)In: Post-Quantum Cryptography: 14th International Workshop, PQCrypto 2023, Proceedings, Springer Nature , 2023, p. 321-353Conference paper, Published paper (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

Lattice-based cryptosystems are some of the primary post-quantum secure alternatives to the asymmetric cryptography that is used today. These lattice-based cryptosystems typically rely on the hardness of some version of either the NTRU or the LWE problem. In this paper, we present the NTWE problem, a natural combination of the NTRU and LWE problems, and construct a new lattice-based cryptosystem based on the hardness of the NTWE problem. As with the NTRU and LWE problems, the NTWE problem naturally corresponds to a problem in a q-ary lattice. This allows the hardness of the NTWE problem to be estimated in the same way as it is estimated for the LWE and NTRU problems. We parametrize our cryptosystem from such a hardness estimate and the resulting scheme has performance that is competitive with that of typical lattice-based schemes. In some sense, our NTWE-based cryptosystem can be seen as a less structured and more compact version of a cryptosystem based on the module-NTRU problem. Thus, parameters for our cryptosystem can be selected with the flexibility of a module-LWE-based scheme, while other properties of our system are more similar to those in an NTRU-based system.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Springer Nature, 2023
Keywords
Lattice-based cryptography, Learning With Errors, NTRU, Post-quantum cryptography, Public Key Encryption
National Category
Computer Sciences Other Electrical Engineering, Electronic Engineering, Information Engineering
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-337992 (URN)10.1007/978-3-031-40003-2_12 (DOI)001275056200012 ()2-s2.0-85172390429 (Scopus ID)
Conference
Post-Quantum Cryptography - 14th International Workshop, PQCrypto 2023, Proceedings, College Park, MD, United States of America, Aug 16 2023 - Aug 18 2023
Note

Part of ISBN 9783031400025

QC 20231012

Available from: 2023-10-12 Created: 2023-10-12 Last updated: 2025-05-13Bibliographically approved
3. Extending Regev’s Factoring Algorithm to Compute Discrete Logarithms
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Extending Regev’s Factoring Algorithm to Compute Discrete Logarithms
2024 (English)In: Post-Quantum Cryptography - 15th International Workshop, PQCrypto 2024, Proceedings, Springer Nature , 2024, p. 211-242Conference paper, Published paper (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

Regev recently introduced a quantum factoring algorithm that may be perceived as a d-dimensional variation of Shor’s factoring algorithm. In this work, we extend Regev’s factoring algorithm to an algorithm for computing discrete logarithms in a natural way. Furthermore, we discuss natural extensions of Regev’s factoring algorithm to order finding, and to factoring completely via order finding. For all of these algorithms, we discuss various practical implementation considerations, including in particular the robustness of the post-processing.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Springer Nature, 2024
Keywords
Discrete logarithms, Factoring, Quantum cryptanalysis
National Category
Mathematics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-350531 (URN)10.1007/978-3-031-62746-0_10 (DOI)001273561700010 ()2-s2.0-85197149248 (Scopus ID)
Conference
15th International Conference on Post-Quantum Cryptography, PQCrypto 2024, Oxford, United Kingdom, Jun 12 2024 - Jun 14 2024
Note

Part of ISBN 9783031627453

QC 20240716

Available from: 2024-07-16 Created: 2024-07-16 Last updated: 2025-05-13Bibliographically approved
4. A high-level comparison of state-of-the-art quantum algorithms for breaking asymmetric cryptography
Open this publication in new window or tab >>A high-level comparison of state-of-the-art quantum algorithms for breaking asymmetric cryptography
2025 (English)In: IACR Communications in Cryptology, E-ISSN 3006-5496, Vol. 2, no 1Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

We provide a high-level cost comparison between Regev's quantum algorithm with Ekerå–Gärtner's extensions on the one hand, and existing state-of-the-art quantum algorithms for factoring and computing discrete logarithms on the other. This when targeting cryptographically relevant problem instances, and when accounting for the space-saving optimizations of Ragavan and Vaikuntanathan that apply to Regev's algorithm, and optimizations such as windowing that apply to the existing algorithms.

Our conclusion is that Regev's algorithm without the space-saving optimizations may achieve a per-run advantage, but not an overall advantage, if non-computational quantum memory is cheap. Regev's algorithm with the space-saving optimizations does not achieve an advantage, since it uses more computational memory, whilst also performing more work, per run and overall, compared to the existing state-of-the-art algorithms. As such, further optimizations are required for it to achieve an advantage for cryptographically relevant problem instances.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
International Association for Cryptologic Research, 2025
Keywords
Regev's algorithm, Cost estimates, Factoring, Discrete logarithms
National Category
Computer Sciences
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-362850 (URN)10.62056/ayzojb0kr (DOI)
Note

Not duplicate with DiVA 1899502

QC 20250428

Available from: 2025-04-28 Created: 2025-04-28 Last updated: 2025-05-13Bibliographically approved
5. Compact Lattice Signatures via Iterative Rejection Sampling
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Compact Lattice Signatures via Iterative Rejection Sampling
2024 (English)Manuscript (preprint) (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

One of the primary approaches for constructing lattice-based signature schemes is through the “Fiat-Shamir with aborts” methodology. Schemes constructed using this approach may abort and restart during signing, corresponding to rejection sampling produced signatures in order to ensure that they follow a distribution that is independent of the secret key. This rejection sampling is only feasible when the output distribution is sufficiently wide, limiting how compact this type of signature schemes can be. In this work, we develop a new method to construct lattice signatures with the “Fiat-Shamir with aborts” approach. By constructing signatures in a way that is influenced by the rejection condition, we can significantly lower the rejection probability. This allows our scheme to use an iterative rejection sampling to target narrower output distributions than previous methods, resulting in much more compact signatures. In the most compact variant of our new signature scheme, the combined size of a signature and a verification key is less than half of that for ML-DSA and comparable to that of compact hash-and-sign lattice signature schemes, such as Falcon. Alternatively, by targeting a somewhat wider distribution, the rejection condition of the scheme can be securely ignored. This non-aborting variant of our scheme still retains a notable size advantage over previous lattice-based Fiat-Shamir schemes.

Keywords
Lattice-based cryptography, Digital signatures, Post-quantum cryptography
National Category
Security, Privacy and Cryptography
Research subject
Computer Science
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-363227 (URN)
Note

QC 20250508

Available from: 2025-05-08 Created: 2025-05-08 Last updated: 2025-05-13Bibliographically approved

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