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Decompressing Dilithium's Public Key with Fewer Signatures Using Side Channel Analysis
KTH, School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (EECS), Electrical Engineering, Electronics and Embedded systems.ORCID iD: 0000-0001-6281-4091
KTH, School of Engineering Sciences (SCI), Mathematics (Dept.), Algebra, Combinatorics and Topology.ORCID iD: 0000-0002-3724-2914
KTH, School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (EECS), Electrical Engineering, Electronics and Embedded systems.ORCID iD: 0000-0001-7382-9408
2025 (English)In: Proceedings - 2025 IEEE 55th International Symposium on Multiple-Valued Logic, ISMVL 2025, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) , 2025, p. 135-140Conference paper, Published paper (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

The CRYSTALS-Dilithium digital signature scheme, selected by NIST as a post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standard under the name ML-DSA, employs a public key compression technique intended for performance optimization. Specifically, the module learning with error instance (A, t) is compressed by omitting the low-order bits t0 of the vector t. It was recently shown that knowledge of t0 enables more effective side-channel attacks on Dilithium implementations. Another recent work demonstrated a method for reconstructing t0 from multiple signatures. In this paper, we build upon this method by applying profiled deep learning-assisted side-channel analysis to partially recover the least significant bit of t0 from power traces. As a result, the number of signatures required for the reconstruction of t0 can be reduced by roughly half. We demonstrate how the new t0 reconstruction method enhances the efficiency of recovering the secret key component s1, thereby facilitating digital signature forgery, on an ARM Cortex-M4 implementation of Dilithium.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) , 2025. p. 135-140
Keywords [en]
Dilithium, ML-DSA, post-quantum cryptography, Public-key cryptography, side-channel attack
National Category
Signal Processing
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-368822DOI: 10.1109/ISMVL64713.2025.00034ISI: 001540510800026Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-105009349390OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-368822DiVA, id: diva2:1994371
Conference
55th IEEE International Symposium on Multiple-Valued Logic, ISMVL 2025, Montreal, Canada, Jun 5 2025 - Jun 6 2025
Note

Part of ISBN 9798331507442

QC 20250902

Available from: 2025-09-02 Created: 2025-09-02 Last updated: 2025-12-08Bibliographically approved

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Wang, RuizeGärtner, JoelDubrova, Elena

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