This article examines how the discursive logic of quasi-markets in Swedish university real-estate management enables depoliticisation while consolidating state control. Sweden is a distinctive case where universities are public agencies, yet most campus property is owned by Akademiska Hus AB, a profit-seeking corporation wholly owned by the state. Using interpretive policy and frame analysis of legislation, government decisions, and public debate, we trace how market rents were introduced and justified. We show that depoliticising narratives portraying academics as fiscally unaccountable and university space as wasteful legitimise New Public Management reforms. Extending the 'ghost in the machine' metaphor, we demonstrate how political logics permeate welfare governance but are rendered less visible. The quasi-market sustains centralised control and fuels distrust between universities and government, risking a cycle of expanding quasi-market instruments and reduced institutional autonomy. Diminished autonomy may in turn have implications for academic freedom.
QC 20260206